{"id":122,"date":"2007-09-07T06:30:12","date_gmt":"2007-09-07T06:30:12","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/global-labour.info\/en\/2007\/09\/07\/seiu-united-we-win\/"},"modified":"2007-09-07T06:30:12","modified_gmt":"2007-09-07T06:30:12","slug":"seiu-united-we-win","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/global-labour.info\/en\/2007\/09\/07\/seiu-united-we-win\/","title":{"rendered":"SEIU: United We Win"},"content":{"rendered":"


\nThis document is also available with all charts and graphs as a PDF file<\/a>.<\/em>
\nAbout This Discussion Paper
\nThis paper is being used as a tool for discussion within SEIU — the Service Employees International Union.
\nIt was sparked by a recognition that, despite many victories and reasons for hope within SEIU and the broader labor movement in recent years, the strength of working people and unions in the United States continues to decline.
\nNo single local union or international union can reverse that decline by itself. We have to take a step back and ask ourselves: What obstacles to greater strength for workers are within our control? How could we help each other in ways that we don\u2019t today? What could we change in labor\u2019s culture and structure that would give working people a fighting chance?
\nSEIU approaches this discussion without a clear prescription or agenda but with a deep commitment to greater unity and strength throughout the labor movement. The problems discussed in this paper can be found in our own organization, not just in others, and solutions will require change and sacrifice on everyone\u2019s part.
\nGiven that it deals with complex problems that have no easy answers, this paper is not intended to be a finished document but rather a contribution to continuing discussion both within the union and with others in the labor movement. Discussion questions at the end of the paper are designed to encourage the debate we need.
\nWhile the paper mainly uses SEIU examples because we know them best, it draws on the insights and experience of many people in many unions. We hope that readers will add their voices to the discussion; contribute their experiences with a wide variety of industries; agree, disagree, and add missing points; and, most importantly, propose alternative analyses and conclusions.
\nFebruary, 2003
\nContents
\nSummary
\n4
\n1. Working people in America are facing a serious crisis.
\n6
\n2. Trying harder \u2013 doing more of what we\u2019re doing now \u2013 won\u2019t prevent the continuing decline in labor\u2019s strength and workers\u2019 living standards.
\n10
\n3. Building strength in particular industries, markets, employers, political jurisdictions, or unique skilled occupations is the key.
\n14
\n4. The labor movement needs a structure, rules, and culture that help workers build industry and market strength.
\n19
\nQuestions for Discussion
\n27
\nAppendix
\n28
\nNotes
\n30
\nSummary
\nWorking people in America are facing a serious crisis. Domination by corporate special interests at the expense of working families is steadily increasing, and victories for working people are the exception, not the rule. While union members in America are better off than nonunion workers, the continuing decline in union strength is making it harder and harder even for union members to achieve and maintain real gains.
\nWe cannot reverse these trends and build a more just and humane society unless millions more workers join unions. A much stronger, united labor movement is the key to winning real victories for working people both on standards for pay, benefits, and working conditions and on broader economic and community issues that affect us all. Yet, the percentage of the workforce in unions continues to drop — to 13.5% overall and only 9% in the private sector.
\nWe have to build the strength to overcome one of the biggest obstacles to uniting more workers in unions: employer interference. Polls show that 50 percent of American workers who don’t have a union want one. That’s more than 50 million workers. But employer interference — much of it currently legal — prevents all but a handful from uniting in a union each year. Legislation could protect workers\u2019 right to form a union, but without finding ways to reduce employer interference and increase the percentage of workers in unions, the labor movement cannot build the strength to win those reforms.
\nTrying harder \u2013 simply doing more of what we’re doing now — won’t help millions more workers join unions. Even if the labor movement could somehow double or triple the number of workers who join unions each year, the percentage of union members in the workforce and the strength of union members in nearly all sectors would continue to decline.
\nTo change the balance of power between workers and corporate interests, overcome employer opposition, and help millions of workers unite with us, the labor movement must build strength in numbers in particular industries, markets, employers, political jurisdictions, and unique skilled occupations. A labor movement that has national industry and market strategies can\u2026
\n\u00b7 Achieve enough unionization in an industry or market, or demonstrate a serious plan to do so, so that nonunion workers have more incentive to take the risk of trying to join the union and employers less incentive to resist.
\n\u00b7 Use collective bargaining by existing members — including strikes if needed — to win the right of other employees of the same employers to join the union so everyone will be stronger.
\n\u00b7 Develop long-term bargaining, organizing, political, and community strategies based on strength in and deep experience with an industry or market.
\nTo build industry and market strength, the labor movement needs a structure and strategies that have that focus. Union members have shown that we can win when we have\u2026
\n\u00b7 Unions that have the size, resources, focus, and skill to unite the strength of workers in particular industries, markets, employers, political jurisdictions, and unique skilled occupations.
\n\u00b7 A united strategy that uses our combined political, bargaining, capital, and community resources to reduce employer interference with workers trying to form unions.
\n\u00b7 A commitment to act like one united movement to carry out industry strategies — pooling resources, coordinating in dealing with employers and elected officials, and holding each other accountable.
\n\u00b7 A strategy to build workers\u2019 strength in both the private and public sectors \u2013 because one cannot be sustained without the other.
\nThe labor movement’s current structure and culture actually stand in the way of building workers\u2019 industry and market strength.
\n\u00b7 While corporations constantly restructure to build and maintain strength, the labor movement’s adjustments too often are too little, too late. If workers were to start from scratch to design a labor movement that could build industry strength in today’s economy, it surely would have a very different structure and culture than we now have.
\n\u00b7 Without making a conscious strategy decision, the labor movement has become a collection of a few very large general unions, each of which may organize workers in any industry or sector and may, like SEIU, be a mixture of workers in different sectors. Nearly half of all AFL-CIO members are in 6 of the federation’s 65 affiliates, and more than 3\/4 are in the 15 largest. In 13 of the 15 major sectors of the economy, at least 4 unions have a significant presence. In 9 of those sectors, there are at least 6 significant unions.
\n\u00b7 Meanwhile, many affiliates lack the strength to pursue effective industry strategies. The average membership of the smallest 50 affiliates is 58,000.
\n\u00b7 The unions of the AFL-CIO generally do not work together to design and carry out strategies to build workers\u2019 industry and market strength.
\n\u00b7 The rules the AFL-CIO unions have created do not provide for mutual accountability to carry out united action.
\n\u00b7 United strategies are not in place for unions in the private and public sectors to work together to build workers’ strength in both, to help workers form unions in the huge emerging nonunion service sector, nor to reestablish workers’ strength in traditional sectors such as manufacturing.
\nThe labor movement desperately needs a new debate leading to new joint action based on a recognition that we either sink or swim together \u2013 and that the ultimate test of a new strategy will not be whether SEIU or other individual unions benefit as institutions but whether working people build and exercise the strength to win.
\n1. Working people in America are facing a serious crisis.
\nq We don\u2019t have the strength to stop living standards from declining.
\nq The decline in standards for most workers makes it increasingly difficult to achieve and maintain gains for union members.
\nq While helping more workers join unions is the key to winning more victories for working people, the labor movement generally lacks the strength to reduce one of the main obstacles to workers forming a union: employer interference.
\nA. Declining living standards.
\n\u00af Workers not sharing the benefit of productivity growth. Until 1973, median worker pay and benefits went up as productivity went up. Since then, productivity has increased by 55% while median compensation has risen less than 10%.[1] In the past year, worker productivity rose 5% while real weekly earnings actually declined.[2]
\n\u00af Growing inequality of income. From the end of World War II through 1979, family income grew roughly equally across the income spectrum. However, from 1979 to 1998, while the top 5% had a 64% increase in real income, the bottom 20% of families lost ground and the middle 60% saw little or no gain.[3]
\n\u00af Extreme inequality of wealth. In 2001, the richest 1% of households controlled about 38% of the nation\u2019s wealth, while the bottom 80% held 17%.[4]
\n\u00afDecline in health care affordability, coverage, and quality.
\no Health care costs rose by 13.7% in 2002 and are expected to rise another 15.4% in 2003.[5]
\no Workers’ share of premiums is rising even faster — up 27% in 2002.[6]
\no More than 1 out of 3 workers don’t have employer-provided coverage.[7]
\no 41.2 million people were uninsured in 2001, up by 1.4 million from 2000. More than 80% of them were employed. [8]
\no About 37 million adults have no drug coverage.[9]
\no Text Box: Soaring Health Care Costs (Average annual premiums)Understaffing contributes to 1 out of 4 incidents leading to hospital patient deaths or injuries, according to the industry’s accrediting agency.[10]
\n\u00af Decline in secure retirement benefits.
\no Half of people who work are not provided pensions by their employer.[11]
\no While in 1979 more than four of five retirement plans provided defined, guaranteed benefits, today a majority of plans provide only a defined contribution, with no guarantee of benefits.[12]
\no About two-thirds of retirees depend on Social Security for at least half their income, and for one in five it’s their only income. Yet, the average benefit is only $874 per month.[13] Now, anti-worker politicians want to privatize the system, putting benefits at risk.
\n\u00af Parents working longer hours, with less time to spend with family. Two-parent families had to work an average of 12 weeks more per year in 2000 than in 1969.[14]
\n\u00af Largest transfer of wealth in history from working people to the rich as a result of tax changes. The 2001 Bush tax law reduced by $832 billion the contributions by the wealthiest 20% to public services for working people and other public needs.[15]
\n\u00af 11 million working people denied right to vote and other rights because they are undocumented. The power of working people in elections and on the job is drastically cut when a significant percentage cannot fully participate.[16]
\n\u00af Severe cuts in vital public services at federal, state, and local levels. As those whose wealth skyrocketed in the 1990s pay less to support public services and as unemployment grows, many states are facing the largest deficits ever, threatening funding for education, health care, and other needs. Meanwhile, Bush proposes to turn over services 850,000 federal workers provide to profit-making corporations.
\n\u00af Trade agreements that help corporations drive down living standards and buying power for workers everywhere.
\no Trade agreements like NAFTA that protect corporate interests but not workers have cost 3 million U.S. jobs and have helped many employers hold down U.S. wages and benefits by threatening to move abroad.[17] Meanwhile, wages in Mexico are lower and poverty levels higher than before NAFTA. Many workers in both the U.S. and Mexico are now losing jobs as work is being shifted to even lower-wage countries in Asia.
\nB. Increasing difficulty in achieving and maintaining gains for union members as standards decline for all workers.
\n\u00e8 Attacks on living standards and security. Contract negotiations for many union members these days are not about taking major steps forward but about fighting to maintain their jobs or their health and retirement benefits.
\no Union members average only 11.5% more in wages than nonunion workers similar in occupation, experience, region, and other factors.[18]
\no Average wages for white-collar workers are essentially the same for union and nonunion employees. [19]
\no The biggest differences are still in health coverage (84% of union workers but only 62% of nonunion)[20] and pensions (69% of union members are provided defined benefit plans but only 14% of nonunion workers are).[21]
\no Blue-collar workers receive more than twice the health benefits that nonunion counterparts receive, and 3\u00bd times the pension benefits.[22]
\n\u00e8 Attacks on worker rights through government action. Recent attacks like those listed below may become even more frequent as a result of the 2002 elections:
\no Use of presidential executive power to undermine the ability of union members at major airlines to negotiate freely with their employers.
\no First-ever use of the Taft-Hartley law by the president against workers who were locked-out by their employer, as the White House attempted to undercut the ability of longshore union members to negotiate freely.
\no Repeal of the Clinton \u201cergonomics\u201d standards established to protect workers from preventable injuries caused by poor job design.
\no The right to a union stripped from 170,000 public service employees under the so-called Homeland Security law[23] and from thousands of Justice Department employees by executive order.
\no \u201cProject labor agreements\u201d that provide fair treatment to workers on federally funded construction jobs ended by executive order.
\no \u201cRight to Work” for Less passed in Oklahoma and discussed elsewhere.
\no Other anti-worker state ballot initiatives that divert workers’ resources from fighting for new gains even if the ballot measures are voted down.
\no Use of tax money by Connecticut\u2019s governor to pay for strikebreakers brought in by nursing home owners in a state-wide strike.
\nC. Lack of strength to reduce one of the biggest obstacles to workers who want a union: employer interference.
\n\u00d8 50% of American workers who don’t have a union say they would vote to have one, according to a new national poll. That’s more than 50 million workers.[24]
\nText Box: More than 50 million don\u2019t have a union but want one
\nText Box: 16 million have a union
\n\u00d8 Nearly 7 million public employees in 22 states aren’t provided a legal process for achieving union recognition. The same is true for millions of contingent workers, farm workers, and employees designated as supervisors under the law.[25]
\n\u00d8 Most workers will choose to have a union if their employer doesn’t interfere with their choice, as shown by the experience of those employees who have the legally established right to organize in the public sector \u2013 where employer interference traditionally has been much less. One study found that 80% of public workers won union elections, while fewer than half of private sector workers did.[26]
\n\u00d8 An average of only 84,000 private sector workers per year make it through the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) process to win a union representation election,[27] and only about a quarter of those have a contract in place five years later. Some workers organize through non-NLRB election processes, including public sector elections and recognition after presenting cards, but their numbers aren’t enough to keep the union percentage of the workforce from dropping.
\n\u00d8 About 24,000 workers won cases in 1998 proving they had been illegally discriminated against for union activity. In most cases, it takes so long to process cases and the penalties are so weak that the employer action has the intended effect of discouraging other workers from supporting a union.[28]
\n\u00d8 Some of the most effective interference by private sector employers is legal \u2013 for example, pressure on employees during work time by supervisors who control their working conditions, schedules, and chances for promotion, or mandatory meetings with management to be browbeaten into opposing a union.
\n\u00d8 A combination of legal and illegal tactics is used against virtually every group of private sector workers who try to form a union:[29]
\no 91% force employees to attend meetings to hear anti-union presentations.
\no 80% require immediate supervisors to attend training on how to attack unions.
\no 80% hire outside consultants to run anti-union campaigns.
\no 79% have supervisors deliver anti-union messages.
\no Half of employers threaten to shut down if employees unionize.
\no 31% illegally fire workers because they want to form a union.
\n2. Trying harder \u2013 simply doing more of what we’re doing now — won’t be enough to prevent the continuing decline in labor\u2019s strength and workers\u2019 living standards.
\nEven if the number of workers who join unions each year doubled or tripled, from the current 84,000 per year[30] through the NLRB process to 168,000 or 252,000, the percentage of union members in the workforce and union members’ strength in nearly all sectors would continue to decline.
\nA. Declining strength in absolute numbers and as a percentage of the total workforce. [31]
\nText Box: From 1956 to 1978, the number of workers in unions barely grew at all while the workforce grew by millions. The small increase in membership masked a steady drop in union members\u2019 percentage of the workforce from 32% in 1956 to 23% in 1978. From 1978 to 2001, union membership declined from 19.5 million to 16.2 million and the percentage of the workforce in unions dropped from 23% to 13.5%.
\nB. Disappearing strength in the private sector. A drastic decline of union membership in the private sector has not only left private sector workers without the strength they need but also deprived public service employees of a key organized political constituency to help maintain and improve vital public services.
\nFrom 1973 to 2001, the number of private sector union members dropped from nearly 15 million to 9 million \u2013 from 24.2% of the total private sector workforce to 9%.
\nMeanwhile, the number of public sector union members rose from 3 million to more than 7 million \u2013 from 23% of all public employees to 37.4%.[32]
\nC. Lack of strength to stop the devastation of union jobs in manufacturing.
\nFrom 1973 to 2001, union manufacturing jobs dropped by 66% during a period in which the total number of U.S. manufacturing jobs dropped by only 12%.[33] Big corporations have been able to win trade policies that have made it easier to move jobs overseas while doing little to maintain domestic manufacturing industries nor raise labor standards and workers’ buying power in other countries. They have also been able to reduce unionization through a shift to nonunion white-collar jobs, corporate restructuring and contracting out, job-cutting technology, and the expansion of nonunion industries such as high-tech electronics.
\nAbout 85% of the approximately 16 million manufacturing jobs still in the U.S. are nonunion. Protecting the remaining union jobs and figuring out how to help a substantial number of those nonunion workers join unions remain major challenges for the entire labor movement.
\nManufacturing union membership[34]
\nYr
\nManuf. union members
\n% of all members
\nTotal decline
\n% decline
\n73
\n7,827,700
\n38.9%
\n78
\n7,076,800
\n34.2%
\n750,900
\n9.6%
\n83
\n5,302,800
\n27.8%
\n2,524,900
\n32.3%
\n88
\n4,516,000
\n22.1%
\n3,311,700
\n42.3%
\n93
\n3,591,800
\n19.2%
\n4,235,900
\n54.1%
\n98
\n3,127,200
\n15.8%
\n4,700,500
\n60.0%
\n01
\n2,658,100
\n14.6%
\n5,169,600
\n66.0%
\nD.
\nLittle strength in fastest growing sectors and companies.[35] In private sector industries that are losing employment, 20.2% of workers are in AFL-CIO unions, but union membership is only 8.5% in sectors that are growing. In some high growth sectors (retail trade, business and personnel services, finance and insurance), the percentage of union membership is 5% or less. In general, jobs in these sectors are more difficult to move overseas than jobs in manufacturing, but the labor movement has no coordinated plan to help these millions of workers join unions.
\nSector[36]
\nNumber of workers (in millions)
\n% of workers in unions
\nRetail trade
\n19.0
\n5.2%
\nServices
\n15.0
\n3.0%
\nHealth care
\n10.0
\n9.4%
\nDurable manufacturing
\n10.0
\n16.4%
\nFinance & insurance
\n7.5
\n2.7%
\nEducation
\n6.8
\n35.3%
\nNon-durable manuf.
\n6.5
\n14.5%
\nGovernment
\n5.5
\n32.2%
\nConstruction
\n5.2
\n20.2%
\nWholesale trade
\n4.1
\n5.4%
\nHotels and entertainment
\n3.6
\n8.9%
\nTransportation
\n3.4
\n27.3%
\nCommunications & utilities
\n2.2
\n27.4%
\nAgriculture
\n1.7
\n2.9%
\nMining
\n0.5
\n10.6%
\nMore than 30 million workers are employed in the almost entirely nonunion service and retail sectors in huge companies such as those shown below.[37]
\nIndustry
\nCompany
\nEmployees
\nIndustry
\nCompany
\nEmployees
\nRetail
\nWal-Mart
\n1,244,000
\nRestaurants
\nMcDonalds
\n364,000
\nSears
\n323,000
\nTricon Global
\n190,000
\nJ.C. Penney
\n264,555
\nBuilding Serv.
\nSecuritas\/Pin-kerton\/Burns
\n124,000
\nTarget
\n254,000
\nBuilding\/Food
\nARAMARK
\n139,094
\nKmart
\n252,000
\nHotels
\nMarriott Intl
\n143,010
\nHome Depot
\n202,205
\nStarwood
\n129,000
\nGAP Inc.
\n166,000
\nAccounting
\nPrice Waterh.
\n160,000
\nMay Dept. Str
\n135,050
\nAndersen
\n140,000
\nFederated Dept. Stores
\n132,400
\nStaffing Serv
\nKelly Services
\n779,100
\nFinance
\nCitigroup
\n242,000
\nManpower
\n560,000
\nBank Amer.
\n155,906
\nSpherion
\n547,000
\nWells Fargo
\n130,484
\nInfo Tech
\nEDS
\n122,000
\nEntertainment
\nNatl Amusemt
\n133,332
\nE. Shift to contingent work, nearly all nonunion. There are about 18 million contingent, temporary, or subcontracted workers \u2013 many working without union protection in traditionally unionized industries. Employment in temporary help services doubled in the past decade.[38]
\nType of workers[39]
\n#
\n% of workforce
\nContingent workers
\n5,400,000
\n4.0%
\nIndependent contractors
\n8,600,000
\n6.4%
\nOn-call workers
\n2,100,000
\n1.6%
\nTemp agencies
\n1,200,000
\n0.9%
\nContract workers
\n633,000
\n0.5%
\nF. Little strength in certain states and regions. Text Box: Nearly 40% of those private sector workers who are without a union — almost 36 million — are in 22 “right-to-work” (for less) states where it is illegal to negotiate union contracts requiring every worker to contribute to union representation, even though all workers in the unit reap the benefits.
\nPrivate sector
\nnon union workers
\nText Box: Public Sector nonunion Workers Half of those public employees who are without unions — more than 5 million — are in 20 states where they don’t have a legally established mechanism to negotiate union contracts.
\n\u00d8 Not surprisingly, the list of right-to-work-for-less states is almost identical to the list of states without public employee bargaining laws.[40] Many of these states are in the South, where nearly a third of U.S. workers live.
\n\u00d8 The percentage of union membership is below 9% in 18 of the 22 right-to-work-for-less states. In the 10 states with the lowest percentage of union membership — all right-to-work-for-less states — average wages are 20% lower and the chances of being without health insurance 28% higher than in the 10 states with the highest percentage of union membership.[41]
\nG. Aging union workforce. As the percentage of workers in unions declines, the current union membership continues to grow older than the workforce as a whole. In 1983, 35% of members were over age 45. In 2001, 45% were \u2013 compared to 38% of the workforce.[42]
\nH. Few workers able to join, and their strength divided. Not only is the number of workers who have been able to join unions in the past four years tiny (310,000 in winning NLRB elections)[43] but often they have been divided into separate unions instead of building workers\u2019 strength in numbers in particular industries, employers, or markets.
\n\u00d8 From 1998-2001, at least 16 Internationals each conducted organizing elections for workers in 5 or more different sectors.[44] Multiple unions organized auto parts workers, truck drivers, school employees, miners, and many other workers who are not their union’s primary focus.
\n\u00d8 12 Internationals held NLRB elections for hotel workers.[45]
\n\u00d8 30 different unions held NLRB elections for health care workers.[46]
\n3. Strength in numbers in particular industries, markets, employers, political jurisdictions, or unique skilled occupations is key to building the strength workers need.
\nA focused industry and market strategy is essential for\u2026
\nq Achieving breakthroughs in raising standards for pay, benefits, and working conditions.
\nq Reducing employer interference with workers trying to join unions.
\nA. Industry and market strategies to win gains for workers.
\n“The impact of unions on wages is likely to depend on the extent to which they organize workers in the relevant product market… the wages of union workers are likely to be higher, all else the same, the greater the percent organized.” Profs. Medoff and Freeman[47]
\nChanging the balance of power between workers and corporate interests depends first and foremost on building strength in numbers \u2013 sometimes called \u201cdensity\u201d or \u201cindustry strength\u201d \u2013 in an industry, market, employer, geographical area, or unique skilled occupation.
\nOther factors determine union success as well \u2013 from worker involvement to leadership, strategic thinking, and willingness to take risks. But unless a focused industry and market strategy is in place, successes will always be the exception, not the rule.
\nMany of the great advances achieved by working people — health coverage, pensions, paid time off, and health and safety protections — were won first by industry-focused national unions in auto, steel, mining, trucking, and other industries and stand as proof of the crucial advantages of a focused industry and market approach. Building and construction unions also have shown the importance of representing enough workers in a market to be able to improve standards.
\nThe following industry and market examples illustrate how strength in numbers or density makes it possible for workers to win \u2013 while losing density causes pay, benefits, and other standards to drop. These examples remind us that\u2026
\no There is no natural wage level for most occupations \u2013 it depends largely on the strength in numbers workers have in dealing with that employer or industry in that market.
\no Helping more workers join unions makes a significant difference only if tied to a focused strength-in-numbers strategy by industry, market, or employer.
\nIndustry studies
\ncomparing 1978-79 to 1996 (in 1996 dollars):
\nMeat products. When union density went down from 45% to 20%, union wages went from $14.77 to $8.69, and the union premium \u2013 the difference between union and nonunion wages — went from 29% to 4%.[48]
\nTrucking services. When union density dropped from 50% to 25%, union wages went from $19.56 to $13.59, and the union premium from 40% to 23%.
\nBus\/urban transit services. As union density went from 51% to 25%, union wages went from $16.62 to $12.24, and the union premium from 46% to 20%.
\nCasinos. High union density in Las Vegas casinos results in wages that are \u201c24% higher than wages in identical occupations in Reno,\u201d a nonunion market. [49]
\nSupermarkets. For every 10% increase in union density for that industry in a given city, union wages increase by an average of 5.31% and pull up nonunion wages by 2.03%. \u201cAt the average union density for the supermarket industry, the union premium is $1.25 (19.5%) above the nonunion wage. For cities with lower densities, there is very little union premium; for regions with high union densities, the union premium is pronounced.\u201d [50]
\nCarpenters. In cities where union carpenters are enough of the workforce to have real strength, they make between $5 and $14 an hour more than nonunion auto mechanics (chosen just for a point of comparison). But in cities where carpenters lack union density, they make between $1.92 and $6.46 an hour less than auto mechanics (see appendix for details).[51]
\nConstruction. The chart below shows the direct relationship between union density in the construction industry and workers’ hourly compensation.[52]
\nThe following comparisons are from SEIU contracts and show how union members’ ability to build and maintain density in markets has affected pay and benefit standards. [53]
\nCommercial building services.
\nLA: 1983: 80% union density; Wage: $7.07; Family health insurance
\n1986: 10% union density; Wage: $4.50; No health insurance
\n2002: 80% union density; Wage: More than $9; Family health insurance
\nNY\/Fairfield County (25 miles away):
\n2000: NY 95% density; Wage: $17.00 Fairfield: 30% density; Wage: $5.65
\n2003: NY 95% density; Wage: $18.55 Fairfield: 70% density; Wage: $9.00
\nNursing Homes:
\nSan Francisco: Density 52%; Wage $10.90; pension and health benefits
\nLos Angeles: Density 8%; Wage $8.12; no pension or health benefits
\nHospitals. A comparison of hospital wages in the mostly nonunion Chicago market to the highly unionized markets of Minneapolis, New York, San Francisco, and Seattle (see appendix for details) reveals that\u2026
\no Nursing aides, orderlies, and attendants make an average of 50% more in unionized markets than in the mostly nonunion market.
\no Strength in numbers in unionized markets yields an average of $4 per hour more for registered nurses.
\no Home health aides in highly unionized markets average 29% more.
\nB. Industry and market strategies to reduce employer interference with workers trying to join unions.
\nEnough strength in numbers in an industry, market, or employer makes the difference not only in winning high standards but also in helping more workers join the union.
\nOnce union density reaches a critical mass or tipping point or there is a clear strategy to do so\u2026
\n\u00d8 Nonunion workers are more likely to decide that the benefit of trying to join the union outweighs the risk, as they will not be isolated islands of unionization with little hope of having the strength to raise standards.
\n\u00d8 Employers are more likely to decide that it makes more sense to pay what others are paying rather than endure the costs of a fight.
\nUnions with industry and market strategies have shown in recent years that it is possible to use existing members’ strength to reduce employer interference and allow more workers to join the union. A few examples:
\n\u00ad Card check agreements. The success rate is extremely high among workers who are covered by agreements that provide the right to form a union simply by signing cards instead of going through an \u201celection\u201d dominated by employer interference.
\no Communications Workers (CWA) members have used their strength in numbers in major telecommunications companies to win contracts that include card check agreements, helping thousands more workers to unite with them in the union.
\no Auto Workers (UAW) members at Johnson Controls, an auto parts supplier, struck successfully to win a card check agreement for 8,000 other workers at 26 nonunion plants. The strike was particularly effective because it cut off the supply of parts for some assembly plants operated by the Big 3 auto companies.
\no Hotel and Restaurant (HERE) members have used their strength to win card check agreements with major hotel companies.
\no Tens of thousands of janitors have joined SEIU through the national Justice for Janitors campaign that involves current members to help others win union recognition through card check.
\n\u00ad Negotiated limits on interference. A number of unions have used their strength in numbers in dealing with particular employers to win agreements that reduce interference with workers\u2019 free choice.
\no With 500,000 members in California, including 200,000 health care members, SEIU had the industry strength, political clout, and long-term community relationships to run a four-year campaign that convinced Catholic Healthcare West, the largest health care chain in the state, to let workers at nonunion hospitals have elections to join the union without facing the use of supervisors to intimidate employees and other typical management tactics. In the next nine months, more than 12,000 joined.
\no More than 70,000 SEIU health care members in New York City had the strength to win an agreement with the League of Voluntary Hospitals and Nursing Homes to allow employees not already covered by the union to join without interference.
\n\u00ad Getting action from public officials. Strength in numbers in an industry or a geographical area can convince public officials to help reduce employer interference or at least help workers withstand employer intimidation:
\no A multi-union coalition including the UFCW, HERE, IAM, IBT, OPEIU, and SEIU helped 3,000 San Francisco airport workers organize with crucial support from area politicians. City leaders passed an ordinance allowing the workers to organize using a card check procedure, and elected officials met with workers, took part in public events, and participated in meetings with employers to send a clear message.
\no Factory workers at Norton Abrasives in Worcester, MA, who in the past had been stopped by management intimidation from joining the UAW succeeded in 2001 thanks in part to the support of all of the area\u2019s state senators and representatives and its congressman, Jim McGovern. McGovern attended a rally, met with workers, and wrote them a letter of support.
\n\u00ad Coalition bargaining. Unions that represent workers for a single employer or industry have pooled their strength to win agreements that allow other workers to join without interference. A recent example involved unions that together represent 60,000 employees at Kaiser Permanente, one of the nation\u2019s largest health care chains. They agreed to negotiate jointly with Kaiser and won not only landmark improvements for themselves and their patients but also protection that helped nearly 8,000 more employees become union members.
\n\u00ad Coordinated organizing. In states such as Missouri and in Puerto Rico, unions have agreed on a common strategy to win new collective bargaining laws and help public employees form unions.
\n\u00ad Capital strategies. Unions have worked more closely in recent years to make sure that employee benefit funds invest their assets prudently, taking into account the quality of services and labor relations policies of the companies in which they invest. This may involve shareholder resolutions, litigation, or support for particular candidates for corporate boards.
\n\u00ad State and local laws. In many areas throughout the country, unions and community allies have combined their strength to win local or state laws or regulations that have the effect of ensuring that public funds are spent for their proper public purpose and not diverted to interfere with workers\u2019 choice of whether to form a union. Some examples:
\no Making sure only responsible contractors win government contracts by ensuring that they comply with employment-related laws.
\no Making sure taxpayer money, including public money used by private sector companies, is not diverted to promote or deter workers\u2019 efforts to form unions.
\no Requiring companies that bid on public contracts to disclose violations of any laws.
\no Ensuring that public workers can form unions by card check.
\no Requiring government contractors and subcontractors to retain employees of the former contractor in order to provide job security for workers and preserve quality of service for taxpayers.
\no Passing a living wage law that also ensures that employers honor workers\u2019 rights.
\no Making sure that any new development benefits the community in terms of its impact on jobs, housing, and other community concerns.
\no Setting standards to ensure that purchases \u2013 such as uniforms made by public agencies — are not made from sweatshops.
\no Making sure that minimum safety and training standards are in place for all workers, including temporary and contractor employees.
\n\u00ad International alliances. Unions with a clear industry focus have been able to develop long-term relationships to pool strength with unions in the same industry in other countries. These industry-based alliances do not just involve U.S. workers helping workers in poorer countries. Many employers U.S. workers now deal with are multinational corporations based in Japan, Korea, Mexico, Western Europe, Scandinavia, or other parts of the world. In many cases, workers elsewhere have more union density and are able to use their strength to help reduce interference by their employers with union organizing in the U.S. or to embolden U.S. nonunion workers to overcome that interference.
\n4. The labor movement needs a structure, rules, and culture that help workers build industry and market strength.
\nq A common strategy to build and use industry and market strength.
\nq A structure and rules that unite the strength of workers in each industry, market, or employer.
\nq A united movement with discipline and accountability.
\nWhile corporations constantly restructure to build and maintain strength, the labor movement’s adjustments too often are too little, too late. If workers were to start from scratch today to design a labor movement that could build industry strength in today’s economy, it surely would have a very different structure and culture than we now have.
\nThe labor movement is at a point today that has similarities to the early 1930s, when union workers were a small minority in an economy dominated by the emergence of huge industrial corporations. The odds seemed slim of uniting millions more workers in unions and passing a legislative agenda like the New Deal that made it much easier to form unions and established Social Security and many other protections for working families.
\nBut union members did achieve those breakthroughs. Unions created new structures, major unions contributed money, and workers in different industries helped each other systematically build unions with density, focus, and industry strength.
\nThe unions of the AFL-CIO could achieve a similar breakthrough today. Some essential elements of a new strategy include the following:
\nA. A common strategy to build and use industry and market strength.
\nBefore we can achieve a goal, we need a strategic plan to get there. The unions of the AFL-CIO should come together to agree on and implement\u2026
\n\u00d8 A united industry and market plan for uniting millions more workers in the labor movement. Instead of each union fending for itself, unions ought to jointly identify priorities for helping workers form unions in some combination of\u2026
\no Industries and markets where union members already have some strength in numbers.
\no Traditionally nonunion industries and markets where the bargaining and political strength of current union members could be used to help reduce employer interference. (For example, the southern operations of industries that are highly unionized in northern markets.)
\no Industries, markets, or employers — including those which are traditionally nonunion — where workplace issues, the demographics of the workforce, community alliances, and other factors might help workers\u2019 efforts to form unions.
\n\u00d8 A united political strategy for getting elected officials to support workers trying to form unions. While unions cooperate to some degree in politics, we often have not made support for workers who want to join unions our top request of elected officials.
\nIn politics, as at the bargaining table, we too often find ourselves playing defense \u2013 even when we do our political work well — because there simply are not enough of us. In many cities and states, it would not take a huge increase in union membership to tip the balance of political power in favor of working people.
\nAs long as we don\u2019t make it our top political priority to reduce employer interference so some of the 91% of private sector workers and 87% of all workers who are unorganized can join our movement, it is hard to see how working people will ever have the political strength we need to get more than crumbs off the table.
\n\u00d8 A united plan to use our other resources to reduce employer interference with workers who want to join unions in a particular industry, market, or geographical area. Together, we have people power, financial resources, community alliances, and other ways to put pressure on employers who interfere with workers’ freedom to form a union. But those resources have to be united behind an industry and market strategy.
\n\u00d8 A plan to unite the strength of private sector and public sector workers. Without the strength of private sector union members in the states, many public sector workers would have never won state laws giving them the right to collective bargaining
\nNow that the public employee share of union membership has grown dramatically while private sector union membership has plummeted, public sector unionists have both a duty and self interest in providing resources and using their political strength to help rebuild private sector union strength.
\nIn many cases, public employers cite lower pay and benefit standards in the private sector when they demand concessions from public employees. In addition, the decline of private sector unionism has in many places reduced the organized political constituency for adequate funding of the services public employees provide.
\nLooking at states where few public or private sector workers belong to unions \u2013 especially states that don\u2019t have public employee bargaining laws and do have right-to-work-for-less laws that undercut private sector bargaining power \u2013 it is clear that workers will need a coordinated strategy that unites workers\u2019 strength across public and private sector lines.
\nB. A structure that unites the strength of workers in each industry, market, or employer.
\nAlong with a united plan to build industry and market strength, the labor movement needs a structure to carry it out.
\nIndustry-focused unions, not general unions.
\nWorkers who are united in unions that are focused on building strength through an industry and market strategy have crucial advantages over workers in unions that represent a smattering of employees in particular industries, markets, or employers.
\nUnions focused on building strength in industries and markets can\u2026
\n\u00f0 Use collective bargaining by existing members — including strikes if needed — to win the right of other employees of the same employers to join the union so everyone will be stronger.
\n\u00f0 Achieve density, or demonstrate a serious plan to do so, giving nonunion workers more incentive to take the risk of trying to join the union and employers less incentive to resist.
\n\u00f0 Develop bargaining, organizing, and legislative strategies based on deep experience with the particular industry.
\n\u00f0 Train members to reach out to nonunion workers who do the same work \u2013 the most effective way to help workers organize.
\n\u00f0 Develop consistent and effective relationships with community allies, public officials, and employers to further an industry strategy.
\n\u00f0 Dig in for the long term to improve contract standards and achieve new breakthroughs for a whole market or industry.
\n\u00f0 Create serious industry-wide or market-wide crises through united worker action when needed to get employers or public officials to respond to workers’ concerns.
\n\u00f0 Develop long-term strategies with union members in other countries who work for the same employers or industries to achieve common goals for everyone’s benefit.
\nYet, without a strategy discussion or conscious decision by the unions of the AFL-CIO, the federation has steadily become a collection of a few very large unions, each of which may organize workers in any industry or sector, and dozens of small unions that are often too small to have the resources to carry out effective industry and market strategies.[54]
\nText Box: \u00b7 The 6 largest AFL-CIO affiliates represent almost half the members. The remaining 59 affiliates represent the other half. \u00b7 9 affiliates represent 8 of 13 million total AFL-CIO members. \u00b7 The 15 largest affiliates represent 10 of the 13 million members — more than 3\/4 of the labor movement.
\n\u00b7 In 13 of the 15 major sectors of the economy, at least 4 unions have a significant presence.
\n\u00b7 In 9 of those sectors, there are at least 6 significant unions.
\n\u00b7 In 5 sectors, at least 8 and as many as 15 unions have a significant presence. [55]
\nSEIU itself combines workers in three major sectors — health care, public employment, and building services. While members in each have helped the others win important victories over the years, it is a fair question whether workers designing a labor movement today would create a union with this structure.
\nWhile unions sometimes engage in coordinated organizing, bargaining, or political campaigns, these are the exception, not the rule \u2013 and there is no requirement that they do so nor any overall plan for uniting workers in each industry, market, or employer. In too many cases, a union’s organizing success is defined as adding members, not as building strength for workers based on an agreed-upon industry or market strategy.
\nBecause the federation and its affiliates often don\u2019t operate as one united movement, each union is left to fend for its own survival and argue for exceptions or rationales that are in its particular interest. For example, in health care\u2026
\n* One union argues that health care workers are best served by being united in one national union.
\n* A union that represents professional employees contends that nurses and other health care professionals have a natural community of interest with its members.
\n* A public employee union argues that it is the natural home for health care workers in the public sector.
\n* An industrial union with a manufacturing base in a particular community says that all workers in that geographical area, including health care employees, should be united with that base \u2013 especially since no single AFL-CIO affiliate as it\u2019s now structured has the resources to help all health care workers organize.
\n* A union made up only of nurses believes that nurses need their own association, separate from other health care employees.
\n* Yet another union says it should represent a particular nursing home because workers there heard of that union through a family member.
\nAll of these rationales may have some logic, but taken together, they result in health care union members being divided among many unions, while 89% of the 11 million health care workers in the U.S. have no union at all. With no unified structure or strategy, there is the constant risk of unions seeing themselves more as competitors than partners \u2013 achieving some gains for workers but not nearly as much as they could as part of one united movement.
\nIn this and other sectors, the labor movement needs to create whatever structures make sense in order to pool money, bargaining power, political and community alliances, and other resources to help workers form unions and build industry and market strength.
\nUnions large enough to build industry strength.
\n\u00a7 40 AFL-CIO affiliates have fewer than 100,000 members.
\n\u00a7 The average membership of the smallest 50 affiliates is 58,000.
\n\u00a7 Only 18 affiliates have more than 200,000 members.
\nSize alone does not guarantee effectiveness, but in today\u2019s world it is rarely possible to take on employers and anti-worker political forces without significant resources. As the AFL-CIO Committee on the Evolution of Work said in 1985, even the best-run smaller unions may not have the resources to help workers build strength in bargaining and in politics and unite workers in particular industries or employers on the scale that is needed. [56]
\nSome mergers at that time or since have united the strength of workers in particular industries or who work for particular employers \u2013 for example, the merger of the Clothing Workers and Ladies Garment Workers to form UNITE — but many have not.
\nNon-strategic mergers too often have deprived workers of an opportunity to unite their strength with others who deal with the same industry, employers, and markets.
\nVirtually all major international unions have engaged in this practice. SEIU, for example, went far beyond the three sectors where its members have most strength — building service, public employment, and health care — to affiliate metal spinners, jewelry workers, leather workers, laundry workers, and silver-plated, hollow-ware workers.
\nDespite SEIU’s size, it was not able to provide the expertise and industry strength to make a difference for these workers, just as it would not be an effective force in manufacturing, trucking, construction, or other industries and markets outside its focus.
\nSince 1996, SEIU has worked with other unions to address this problem. For example:
\n\u00d8 2,000 SEIU members at Disney World voted to shift to HERE, which was the larger union there. The combined group then had the strength to win the right of 3,000 part-time workers to join the union through card check. SEIU hotel members in Boston, Rhode Island, and San Francisco also chose to unite with other hotel workers in HERE. At the same time, HERE health care members in upstate New York decided to shift to SEIU to united with 200,000 other health care workers in their state.
\n\u00d8 About 7,500 laundry workers who belonged to SEIU decided to join UNITE, a union with a national strategy to unite industrial laundry workers. So did another 4,500 SEIU leather workers. UNITE nursing home workers in Florida and Pennsylvania chose to join SEIU to unite with other workers from their industry.
\n\u00d8 SEIU is encouraging more than 3,000 gas utility workers to vote to move from SEIU to another union to be united with other union members in their industry.
\nEfforts like these will remain imperfect and piecemeal until a systematic program of building strength is agreed upon throughout the labor movement.
\nIn the absence of such a plan, SEIU members from at least 40 locals have been involved in realignments to unite their bargaining strength with others in SEIU who work for the same employers or industries. These changes have ranged from mergers of two or more locals that represented the same type of work in the same market to a shift by members between locals.
\nSome of these mergers or realignments involved initial reservations on the part of some union leaders or some members used to certain traditions — but the proposed changes quickly gained strong support from members once they saw how it would increase their strength and result in real, sometimes dramatic, improvements in pay, benefits, and working conditions.
\nRealignments should not be done just for realignment\u2019s sake. It does no good for workers to choose to shift to another union if there aren\u2019t the resources and strategic plans to use the added strength in numbers for everyone\u2019s benefit. But at the same time, it makes no sense for workers to be in even a well-run union that does not have the industry or market strength to win.
\nWhen workers choose to consolidate their strength in larger unions with a clear industry focus and strategy, they will face a challenge of how to ensure union democracy, accountability, member involvement, and worksite effectiveness. But the alternative — maintaining small or multiple-industry unions \u2013 generally provides no greater guarantee of democracy or involvement. Real democracy often is limited now when workers are divided in multiple unions too weak to exercise strength and with little possibility of uniting the majority of workers in the industry who are not in a union at all.
\nMembers of SEIU and many other unions have demonstrated that they are far more likely to actively participate in the union when they believe that their involvement contributes to a clear strategy to build strength in dealing with their employer and industry. The greatest participation by janitors, home care workers, nursing home or hospital employees, or other members has come when they can see that they are acting in unity with large numbers of people who do the same work and are fighting for the same goals.
\nOrganizing rules based on a common strategy to build industry and market strength, not on whomever-gets-there-first
\nThe rules developed by the affiliates that make up the AFL-CIO ought to be designed to unite workers in unions with other workers in the same industry, market, and employer. Yet, Articles XX and XXI of the federation’s constitution do not achieve that goal. Under these rules\u2026
\n\u00d8 Union “A” might represent all but one widget plant, or school, or mine in a particular market but\u2026
\n\u00d8 If Union “B” started an organizing campaign in the one remaining unit, it could use the fact that it got there first to try to block Union “A” from talking to the workers\u2026
\n\u00d8 Union “A” could argue that it has a strategic plan to build strength for all workers in that market or employer, but the rules provide that there shall be “no inherent preference between an organizing drive directed solely at a particular employee group and a strategic organizing campaign that includes that group.”
\nIn 1999, the unions of the AFL-CIO adopted a new rule that allowed a union or group of unions to ask the rest of the labor movement to recognize a strategic organizing strategy in a particular industry or market. Once the strategic organizing campaign was approved and “registered,” other unions would be barred from interfering with that strategy for a set time.
\nBy the end of 2002, consensus had been reached on only four applications, while eight others had been blocked. Even if this process were resulting in more applications and more approvals, it still assumes that individual unions have to develop and implement strategies on their own, and not that unions are partners with an overall strategic plan to build worker strength in particular industries, markets, and employers.
\nC. A united movement with discipline and accountability.
\nBalancing the power of corporate interests and their political allies requires the same discipline and unity of purpose that their side usually displays. Yet, the AFL-CIO is maintained by the nation’s unions as a loose federation of autonomous affiliates. Participation in coordinated strategies is generally voluntary. Individual unions generally make whatever decisions they want regarding contract standards, organizing strategy, political endorsements, legislative and regulatory issues, mergers, and actions or statements that may impact all union members\u2019 image with the public.
\nNothing in AFL-CIO rules or culture prevents unions from doing the following:
\n\u00b7 Refusing to participate in coordinated bargaining, organizing, or political strategies in order to help achieve and maintain the highest possible standards.
\n\u00b7 Negotiating pay, benefits, or other contract terms below those established or being fought for by a primary union that deals with that employer, industry, or market.
\n\u00b7 Offering themselves to an employer as an alternative to another union that may have more strength in that industry or market.
\nThere are many examples of unions undercutting each other, either deliberately or simply because a union lacks the strength, experience, knowledge, or focus that a primary union in that industry or market has developed. The current culture in the labor movement precludes the affected unions not only from doing anything about it but even from talking about it publicly.
\nIn making decisions, the federation operates by consensus. Affiliates representing 90% of union members might agree on a strategy, but if affiliates representing the other 10% do not, action often will be stymied.
\nOnce decisions are made, there are few, if any, mechanisms to hold affiliates accountable. The AFL-CIO’s unions have not given it the constitutional authority to enforce decisions that the federation and its affiliates reach. For example, AFL-CIO conventions are full of speeches and resolutions about devoting more resources to helping workers join unions, but many affiliates have simply ignored those goals. Accountability is also lacking when it comes to a union\u2019s basic effectiveness. If an affiliate isn\u2019t succeeding in collective bargaining or organizing or political action, that is considered to be that affiliate\u2019s sole concern unless it asks for help.
\nThis lack of discipline and accountability is found not just within the federation, but within many individual international unions. Within SEIU, changes approved by local union delegates to the 2000 international convention resulted in a dramatic increase in coordination among local unions within industries and markets. But there still are cases of locals not working effectively with others to raise contract standards for workers, unite unorganized workers in their industry, and enlist public officials to support workers who want to join the union. In some cases, locals continue to work at cross purposes, particularly in the political arena, with the result that workers\u2019 strength is divided and opportunities for greater gains are squandered.
\nAchieving greater unity behind a common industry and market strategy for the labor movement will take enormous commitment, humility, and willingness to meet the needs of workers and unions in new, creative ways. In our finest moments, the labor movement has shown that we can unite, develop new strategies, and win. Given the crisis working people face and the unrelenting decline in labor\u2019s strength, there is no time to waste.
\nQuestions for discussion
\nThis discussion paper will provoke many questions. The following are just a start.
\n1. Do you agree with the basic premises of this discussion paper? Do you agree\u2026
\n\u00a7 That working people urgently need new strength in dealing with employers and their political allies?
\n\u00a7 That building and exercising new strength for workers depends on building strength in numbers or \u201cdensity\u201d in industries, markets, employers, and geographical areas? If not, what do you think is the key to new strength?
\n\u00a7 That we cannot build new strength unless we use the strength we have to reduce employer interference so millions more workers can join unions? If not, what do you think is the key to helping workers join unions on a much larger scale?
\n\u00a7 That we cannot build and exercise strength without helping workers join unions in both the private and public sectors? If not, how do you see either private or public sector workers making progress on their own?
\nIf you don\u2019t agree with these premises, how do you see the state of workers and the labor movement, and what do you think needs to be done?
\n2. Do you agree that we have to operate as one united movement at all levels, with accountability and discipline, to dramatically increase industry and market strength, reduce employer interference, and unite millions of private and public sector workers in industry-focused unions? If so, what is in the way of doing so, and how could we remove those obstacles? If not, what do you think needs to be done instead?
\n3. If you were going to design a labor movement today \u2013 starting from scratch \u2013 what would the structure look like? What do your answers say about what we should do now?
\n4. What are the responsibilities of unions that are growing and unions that are losing membership? What are the responsibilities of public and private sector unions toward each other? What should each be doing locally, regionally, and nationally to build a stronger labor movement?
\n5. What immediate steps could we take together to unite for more strength?
\n\u00a7 Realignment and strategic mergers?
\n\u00a7 New rules for the AFL-CIO and its affiliates that would require coordinated strategies, pooling of resources, standards, and accountability?
\n\u00a7 Organizing, bargaining, and political coalitions in particular industries, markets, employers, and\/or states? Help workers unite in industries and markets where union members already have some strength in numbers? In traditionally nonunion industries and markets where the bargaining and political strength of current union members could be used to help reduce employer interference? In industries or markets where workplace issues, the demographics of the workforce, community alliances, and other factors might make success more likely?
\n\u00a7 Other alternatives?
\n6. How could the situation for workers in your industry or area improve if the problems identified in this discussion paper were addressed?
\nAppendix
\nHow Union Density in Markets Affects Wages
\nIn cities where union carpenters are enough of the workforce to have real strength, they make between $5 and $14 an hour more than nonunion auto mechanics (chosen just for a point of comparison). But in cities where carpenters do not have that union density, they actually make between $1.92 and $6.46 an hour less than auto mechanics.
\nHigh Union Density
\nCarpenters
\nAuto Mechanics
\nDifference $
\nDiff. %
\nNYC
\n$24.11
\n$10.01
\n$14.10
\n140.9%
\nMinneapolis
\n$19.81
\n$14.32
\n$ 5.49
\n38.3%
\nSan Francisco
\n$25.27
\n$19.26
\n$ 6.01
\n31.2%
\nSeattle
\n$22,58
\n$17.47
\n$ 5.11
\n29.3%
\nLow Union Density
\nAtlanta
\n$15.00
\n$16.92
\n-$1.92
\n-11.3%
\nHouston
\n$13.72
\n$20.18
\n-$6.46
\n-32.0%
\nBureau of Labor Statistics, cited in www.economy.com.
\nThe same is true of butchers. In cities where enough butchers are unionized to have strength in numbers, butchers have wage levels similar to those of auto mechanics. But in cities where only a small number of butchers are union members, butchers make only a little more than half what mechanics receive.
\nHigh Union Density
\nButchers
\nAuto Mechanics
\nDifference $
\nDiff. %
\nWash DC
\n$16.90
\n$16.32
\n$0.58
\n3.6%
\nSeattle
\n$17.06
\n$17.47
\n-$0.41
\n-2.3%
\nSan Francisco
\n$17.11
\n$19.26
\n-$2.15
\n-11.2%
\nLow Union Density
\nAtlanta
\n$ 9.37
\n$16.92
\n-$7.55
\n-44.6%
\nHouston
\n$10.76
\n$20.18
\n-$9.42
\n-46.7%
\nBureau of Labor Statistics, cited in www.economy.com.
\nThe following chart compares hospital wages in the mostly nonunion Chicago market to the highly unionized markets of Minneapolis, New York, San Francisco, and Seattle.
\nnonunion Chicago
\nmarket
\nSEIU
\nMinneapolis
\nSEIU
\nNew York
\nSEIU
\nSan Fran.
\nSEIU
\nSeattle
\nUnion ave.
\nHow much more union workers get because of union \u201cdensity\u201d
\n$
\n%
\nHome Health Aides
\n$8.02
\n$11.82
\n$8.10
\n$10.00
\n$11.44
\n$10.32
\n$2.30
\n28.7%
\nLicensed Practical Nurses
\n$15.38
\n$15.82
\n$16.20
\n$20.33
\n$16.03
\n$17.10
\n$1.72
\n11.2%
\nMedical And Clinical Laboratory Technologists
\n$19.09
\n$20.71
\n$20.20
\n$25.09
\n$22.75
\n$22.19
\n$3.10
\n16.2%
\nNursing Aides Orderlies And Attendants
\n$9.01
\n$12.26
\n$12.85
\n$14.88
\n$13.95
\n$13.49
\n$4.48
\n49.7%
\nRegistered Nurses
\n$23.29
\n$24.88
\n$27.28
\n$32.05
\n$25.19
\n$27.35
\n$4.06
\n17.4%
\nRespiratory Therapists
\n$18.02
\n$21.66
\n$20.96
\n$25.93
\n$20.75
\n$22.33
\n$4.31
\n23.9%
\nService Employees International Union Research Department, 2002. SEIU reported hospital wages are from the largest SEIU contract in that market using the mid-point of the negotiated salary range. New York only negotiates minimum wages, which were used in the table. No shift premiums or other premiums were included in the reported SEIU wages.
\n[1] Mishel, Lawrence, Jared Bernstein, and Heather Boushey. The State of Working America 2002-03. ILR Press, pp. 154-155.
\n[2] AFL-CIO, \u201cTime to Get Real About the Economy,\u201d 1\/27\/03. U.S. Department of Labor, 2\/6\/03.
\n[3] Mishel, Lawrence, Jared Bernstein, and Heather Boushey. The State of Working America 2002-03. ILR Press, p. 52.
\n[4] Mishel, Lawrence, Jared Bernstein, and Heather Boushey. The State of Working America 2002-03. ILR Press, p. 277.
\n[5] Hewitt Associates. \u201cHealth Care Cost Increases Expected to Continue Double-Digit Pace in 2003.\u201d October 14, 2002.
\n[6] AFL-CIO Public Policy Department Fact Sheet. \u201cCrisis in Health Care Coverage and Cost Threatens Health and Economic Well-Being of Working Families,\u201d 2002.
\n[7] Kaiser Family Foundation, State Health Facts Online, www.statehealthfacts.kff.org.
\n[8] Kaiser Family Foundation, State Health Facts Online, www.statehealthfacts.kff.org.
\n[9] Department of Health and Human Services, Prescription Drug Coverage, Spending, Utilization and Prices, April 2000.
\n[10] Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations. \u201cHealthcare at the Crossroads,\u201d August 2002.
\n[11] Bureau of Labor Statistics. http:\/\/www.bls.gov\/news.release\/ebs2.t01.htm, 1\/8\/03.
\n[12] AFL-CIO Public Policy Department Fact Sheet. \u201cCorporate Scandals, Stock Market Plunge Rattle Retirement Security For Millions,\u201d 2002.
\n[13] Social Security Administration. http:\/\/www.ssa.gov\/statistics\/fast_facts\/2002\/ff2002.pdf, 1\/8\/03.
\n[14] Mishel, Lawrence, Jared Bernstein, and Heather Boushey. The State of Working America 2002-03. ILR Press, p. 95.
\n[15] Citizens for Tax Justice. \u201cYear-by-Year Analysis of the Bush Tax Cuts Shows Growing Tilt to the Very Rich,\u201d June 12, 2002.
\n[16] Boston Globe, \u201cAnalysis: 11 million illegals in the United States,\u201d 2\/6\/01.
\n[17] Scott Robert. \u201cFast Track to Lost Jobs,\u201d Economic Policy Institute, October 2001.
\n[18] Mishel, Lawrence, Jared Bernstein, and Heather Boushey. The State of Working America 2002-03. ILR Press, p. 189.
\n[19] Mishel, Lawrence, Jared Bernstein, and Heather Boushey. The State of Working America 2002-03. ILR Press, p. 192.
\n[20] Mishel, Lawrence, Jared Bernstein, and Heather Boushey. The State of Working America 2002-03. ILR Press, p. 191.
\n[21] Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics. http:\/\/www.bls.gov\/news.release\/ebs2.t01.htm, 1\/8\/03.
\n[22] Mishel, Lawrence, Jared Bernstein, and Heather Boushey. The State of Working America 2002-03. ILR Press, p. 189.
\n[23] AFL-CIO Public Policy Department Fact Sheet. \u201cA Worker-Friendly Congress More Important Than Ever,\u201d 2002.
\n[24] Peter D. Hart Research Associates, “Americans’ Vews on the Economy, Corporate Behavior, and Union Representation,” August, 2002. Workforce estimate from Bureau of Labor Statistics.
\n[25] United States General Accounting Office. \u201cCollective Bargaining Rights,\u201d September 2002, p. 10.
\n[26] Juravich, Tom and Kate Bronfenbrenner, \u201cPreparing for the Worst: Organizing and Staying Organized in the Public Sector,\u201d in Kate Bronfenbrenner, et. al. (eds.), Organizing to Win: New Research on Union Strategies. Cornell Press, 1998, pp. 263-282.
\n[27] Bureau of National Affairs statistics.
\n[28] Human Rights Watch, Unfair Advantage: Workers\u2019 Freedom of Association in the United States under International Human Rights Standards, 2002.
\n[29] Bronfenbrenner, Kate. \u201cThe Effects of Plant Closing or Threats of Plant Closing on the Rights of Workers to Organize,\u201d Labor Secretariat of the North American Commission for Labor Cooperation, 1996.
\n[30] BNA statistics.
\n[31] Hirsch, Barry and David MacPherson, Union Membership and Earnings Data Book, BNA, 2002.
\n[32] Hirsch, Barry and David MacPherson, Union Membership and Earnings Data Book, BNA, 2002.
\n[33] Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics. http:\/\/www.bls.gov\/news.release\/prod4.t05.htm, 1\/8\/03.
\n[34] Hirsch, Barry and David MacPherson, Union Membership and Earnings Data Book, BNA, 2002.
\n[35] AFL-CIO Union Representation by Industry Survey, 1998.
\n[36] AFL-CIO Union Representation by Industry Survey, 1998.
\n[37] These numbers, unless otherwise noted, are from UNICORE data. Manpower number from http:\/\/www.us.manpower.com\/uscom\/contentDouble.jsp?articleid=4, 1\/8\/03.
\n[38] According to the American Staffing Association. http:\/\/www.staffingtoday.net\/staffstats\/qtrlytrends.htm, 1\/8\/03.
\n[39] Bureau of Labor Statistics. \u201cContingent and Alternative Employment Arrangements, February 2001.\u201d http:\/\/www.bls.gov\/news.release\/conemp.nr0.htm, 1\/8\/03.
\n[40] Hirsch, Barry and David MacPherson, Union Membership and Earnings Data Book, BNA, 2002. Of the 25 states with the highest private sector union density, all but 3 have collective bargaining rights for state employees. Of the 20 states that exceed the national average for private sector union density, all but 6 also exceed the national average for public sector union density. Of the 20 states with the lowest level of private sector union density, 14 do not have collective bargaining rights for state employees and 17 are among the 20 states with the lowest public sector union density. 17 states both have right-to-work-for-less laws and lack public employee bargaining laws. Only 5 states have right-to-work-for-less laws but allow public employee bargaining. Only 3 states lack public employee bargaining but don’t have right-to-work-for-less laws.
\n[41] AFL-CIO. “The Silent War.” June, 2002.
\n[42] Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.
\n[43] Source: NLRB database.
\n[44] Source: NLRB database.
\n[45] Source: NLRB database.
\n[46] Source: NLRB database.
\n[47] Freeman, Richard B. and James L. Medoff. \u201cThe Impact of the Percentage Organized on Union and Nonunion Wages.\u201d The Review of Economics and Statistics, p. 561. Article accepted for publication May 27, 1981.
\n[48] Belman, Dale and Paula B. Voos. \u201cUnion Bargaining Power: A First Look at the Evidence.\u201d University of Wisconsin (Milwaukee and Madison, respectively), May 1998, pp. 32-33.
\n[49] Waddoups, C. Jeffrey. \u201cUnions and Wages in Nevada\u2019s Hotel-Casino Industry.\u201d Journal of Labor Research, vol. XXI, no. 2, Spring 2000, p. 345.
\n[50] Johansson, Robert C. and Jay S. Coggins. \u201cUnion Density Effects in the Supermarket Industry.\u201d Journal of Labor Research, vol. XXIII, no. 4, Fall 2002, p. 680.
\n[51] Bureau of Labor Statistics, cited in www.economy.com.
\n[52] Presentation by Jeff Grabelsky, Cornell University.
\n[53] Service Employees International Union Research Department, 2002.
\n[54] AFL-CIO Union Representation by Industry Survey, 1998.
\n[55] AFL-CIO Union Representation by Industry Survey, 1998.
\n[56] AFL-CIO Committee on Evolution of Work, “The Changing Situation of Workers and Their Unions,” 1985.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[26],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/global-labour.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/122"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/global-labour.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/global-labour.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/global-labour.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/global-labour.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=122"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/global-labour.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/122\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/global-labour.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=122"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/global-labour.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=122"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/global-labour.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=122"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}