The following paper was presented at the workshop of the International Institute of Labour Studies (IILS) on “Cross-Border Social Dialogue and Agreements: an Emerging Global Industrial Framework?”, ILO, Geneva, December 15 and 16, 2006. Together with the other papers presented at the workshop, a version of this paper has been published as an ILO\/IILS publication in 2008 under the title of the workshop.<\/p>\n
The following paper was presented at the workshop of the International Institute of Labour Studies (IILS) on “Cross-Border Social Dialogue and Agreements: an Emerging Global Industrial Framework?”, ILO, Geneva, December 15 and 16, 2006. Together with the other papers presented at the workshop, a version of this paper has been published as an ILO\/IILS publication […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[18],"tags":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/global-labour.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/174"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/global-labour.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/global-labour.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/global-labour.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/global-labour.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=174"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/global-labour.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/174\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/global-labour.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=174"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/global-labour.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=174"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/global-labour.info\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=174"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}
\nIntroduction <\/strong><\/em>
\nSoon it will be twenty years since the first agreement between an international
\ntrade union organization and a transnational corporation (TNC) was signed.
\nSixty such agreements or International Framework Agreements (IFAs), have
\nbeen signed since and it may be assumed that more will be signed in the
\ncoming years. A considerable body of academic and trade union literature has
\ndeveloped to discuss their significance. It seems appropriate at this point to
\nreview this discussion in the light of what was originally intended, of what has
\ndeveloped since, and of future prospects.
\nThis chapter depicts a number of historical events, which constitute key
\nbenchmarks in the emergence of trans-national labour\/management relations
\nand agreements. We first explain the original intention of the trans-national
\nnegotiations undertaken between the International Trade Secretariats (ITSs)
\nand TNCs in the 1960s (section 1), as well as lessons drawn from this original
\nexperience (section 2). We then focus on the history of first IFA (Danone,
\n1988) and the reasons which might have motivated the TNC in reaching this
\nagreement (section 3). We then highlight the differences between IFAs and
\ncorporate codes of conduct (section 4) and the relation between IFAs and
\nEuropean Works Councils (section 5). We conclude by discussing the issue of
\nwhether IFAs can still be considered to constitute elements of an emerging
\nglobal labour relations architecture, within a political and economic context
\nincreasingly hostile to trade union rights.
\n1. The Original Intention<\/strong><\/em>
\nIt is not difficult to trace back the origins of the International Framework
\nAgreements (IFAs). They originate in the response, in the 1960s, of three
\nInternational Trade Secretariats (ITSs, now renamed Global Union
\nFederations or GUFs) to the growing influence of transnational corporations
\non industrial relations, also and especially at national level.
\nThe three ITSs were the International Federation of Chemical and General
\nWorkers’ Unions (ICF), the forerunner of the present International Federation
\nof Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers’ Unions (ICEM), the
\nInternational Metalworkers’ Federation (IMF) and the International Union of
\nFood and Allied Workers’ Associations (IUF), the forerunner of the present
\nInternational Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering,
\nTobacco and Allied Workers’ Associations.
\nThe International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) was of course the first
\nITS to conclude international agreements with employers’ federations in the
\nmaritime industry and is thus the pioneer of international collective bargaining.
\nMost recently, in 2000, the ITF concluded a sectoral agreement with the
\nInternational Maritime Employers’ Committee (IMEC). This, however, is a
\nspecial case that should be examined separately (see, Lillie in this volume
\nwho examines a key episode in the history of the cross-border social dialogue
\nin the maritime shipping industry, i.e., the adoption of a consolidated ILO
\nMaritime Labour Convention following global trade union campaign against
\nflag of convenience shipping and negotiations between the ITF and ship-
\nowners).
\nThe three industrial ITSs were inspired by the American example of co-
\nordinated bargaining or coalition bargaining, which had been developed by
\nunions in the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), particularly the
\nUnited Auto Workers’ Union under the leadership of its president Walter
\nReuther. After the merger of the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and the
\nCongress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) in 1955, the Industrial Union
\nDepartment of the AFL-CIO continued this strategy.
\nThe basic idea was simple: to prevent the existing fragmentation of the
\nmovement to become a factor of division and weakness when bargaining with
\na multi-plant corporation:
\n“In the United States, trade union jurisdictional lines in certain
\nindustries are extremely blurred […] This results in several unions
\nhaving bargaining rights for different plants of the company. Each is
\ntherefore confronted by the total combined strength of the company
\nalthough it may be bargaining with a local plant official […] To offset
\nthis very great disadvantage in power at the bargaining table, the
\nIndustrial Union Department of the AFL-CIO (IUD) has developed a co-
\nordinated bargaining program. Under this plan all unions with collective
\nbargaining rights within a plant of a given company work out their
\ndemands and bargaining strategy jointly. Thus a company would have
\na single set of demands and a single strategy to contend with, backed
\nby a number of different unions in a common front. Although still in its
\ninitial stages, this plan has already achieved some notable successes,
\nparticularly with General Electric, Westinghouse and other companies.”
\n(Levinson 1972: 103-104).
\nThe same factors which led North American unions to adopt the coalition
\nbargaining strategy would apply even more at international level, where by
\ndefinition, in almost all cases, different national unions would hold bargaining
\nrights in different production sites of the same company. (1) Consequently, the
\nnecessity of working out “their demands and bargaining strategy jointly” would
\nbe even more compelling in terms of the objective of building an international
\ncountervailing union force to counter the “combined strength of the company”
\nand it would make the coalition bargaining strategy even more relevant.
\nHowever, in addition to working towards creating an international collective
\nbargaining situation where union and management power would be more
\nevenly balanced, in seeking to co-ordinate union activities at TNC level the
\nITSs also responded to the perceived need of their member unions for mutual
\nsupport in conflict situations, whether within a formal bargaining framework or
\nnot.
\nIn the event, the ICF itself successfully practiced this strategy in many
\ninstances, starting in the middle 1960s (Levinson, 1972: 112-17). The ICF
\naction against the Saint-Gobain glass company in 1969 attracted international
\nattention. It was simultaneously conducted in four countries including a
\ntwenty-six day strike in the United States, and it was the first major
\ninternational trade union action based on the principle of coalition bargaining
\nin the post-war period.
\nThe IMF based its response to transnational corporations on similar
\nprinciples, starting in the automobile industry. The first IMF auto workers’
\nconference focusing on TNCs was held in Paris in 1959. Successive
\nconferences in the 1960s progressively built up a strategy of World Auto
\nCompany Councils for the nine world corporations, accounting at the time for
\n80 percent of the Western world’s production. The first three World Auto
\nCouncils (Ford, General Motors and Chrysler) were set up in June 1966, the
\nfourth (Volkswagen-Mercedes Benz) was established in November 1966, and
\nthe fifth (Fiat-Citro\u00ebn) in November 1968.
\nThrough these world councils, the IMF organised specific actions, such as the
\nparticipation of an experienced negotiator from the union in the country of the
\nparent company in local negotiations at a subsidiary location. They also
\norganised communication of economic and collective bargaining information
\nbetween unions operating in the same company and intervention by unions
\nwho had the support of the parent company in strikes at subsidiary plants.
\nA conference of the IMF World Auto Company Councils, held in London in
\nMarch 1971, defined specific demands for each of the councils and adopted a
\ndeclaration which stated in part:
\n“On the collective bargaining front it is imperative that the centralized
\ncontrol of the international corporations be countered by the closest
\npossible co-ordination of unions in all nations representing the workers
\nof each such corporation […] Help must be given, in every country
\nwhere it is needed, to organize the still unorganised workers of such
\ncorporations. Collective bargaining rights, including the right to strike,
\nmust be won in every country where they are now denied. National
\naffiliates of the IMF must be provided with all the help they require to
\nstrengthen their organizations and to train their members and leaders
\nto bargain more effectively with their employers.
\n“We call for meetings of representatives of each of the IMF World Auto
\nCompany Councils with the top policy-makers of these respective
\ninternational corporations. Among the priority items to be discussed at
\nsuch meetings are information concerning investment and production
\nplans and job security.
\n“Common expiration dates should be established for collective
\nbargaining contracts in all nations, corporation by corporation, so that
\nthe full weight of the totality of the firm’s organized workers can be
\nbrought to bear upon each corporation, under conditions in which all
\nunions involved are free of contractual restrictions.”
\nIn 1967, the IMF had established a Commission for Multinational Corporations
\nto co-ordinate its general policy in this area. The action program was
\nextended beyond the auto industry to the machine and electrical engineering
\nindustries, with international meetings of unions in General Electric,
\nInternational Harvester, Philips and Honeywell, among others.
\nAlso in 1967, the IMF established a European Committee of Metal Trade
\nUnions, as a co-ordinating body of the IMF in what was then the European
\nEconomic Community. This Committee worked to establish bargaining rights
\nwith several transnational corporations, but focused particular attention on
\nPhilips, the Dutch electronics industry corporation.
\nThe unions’ short-term objective was an agreement securing parity of
\ntreatment of workers employed by Philips in different countries, as well as the
\nprotection of workers affected by technological change. A longer term goal
\nwas an international collective bargaining agreement covering working
\nconditions (including wages and hours) and union rights and representation in
\nthe plants.
\nFrom 1967 to 1970, three meetings were held between representatives of the
\nEuropean Committee and Philips management officials. In the first meeting
\n(September 1967), the discussions centred on the effect on employment and
\nwage rates of changes in production processes resulting from technological
\ninnovation and from international production transfers. An agreement was
\nreached to hold further discussions at a later date.
\nAt the second meeting (June 1969) management agreed that unions would be
\ngiven previous notice of important transfers of production from one country to
\nanother and of any changes in the limits set on production within individual
\nplants. Management also agreed to consider union proposals on readjustment
\nand vocational training measures for workers affected by technological
\nchange.
\nThe third meeting (September 1970) dealt primarily with work organisation
\nand future developments of the company’s economic activities. Philips
\nrepresentatives agreed to consider the European Committee’s demands for a
\npermanent labour-management liaison committee, a comprehensive labour
\npolicy and of discussions at international level in advance of proposed layoffs
\nand international transfer of employees. They also agreed that if production
\ntransfers were undertaken, the “redundant” workers would be guaranteed full
\nwages and social security contributions for at least six months and that
\nspecial protection would be extended to worker over fifty years old.
\nAfter this meeting the Philips management apparently decided against
\ncontinuing to engage with the unions in a discussion of their labour relations
\nat international level. A fourth meeting, planned for 1971, was to discuss the
\npossibility of establishing a permanent joint advisory committee which would
\nexamine employment, social policy and industrial relations problems within
\nthe Philips group, but “owing to the company’s increasing hesitancy” this was
\nindefinitely postponed (Levinson, 1972: 132).
\nA “Philips European Forum” was formed in 1996 as a European Works
\nCouncil (EWC) under Article 13 of the EU directive. Like other EWCs, its
\nmandate is limited to “information and consultation”. In February 2001, the
\nIMF held its first Philips World Conference, with about 60 participants from 18
\ncountries, which established a Steering Committee and a Task Force to build
\nan effective information network. The conference also considered that the
\nestablishment of a World Works Council, “to complement the existing
\nEuropean Works Council (European Philips Forum – EPF)” was necessary,
\nbecause “Philips gears its decision-making to the global level. The emerging
\ntrend whereby production plants are moved to low-wage countries requires a
\nglobal organization of trade unions and company employee representatives.”
\n(IMF, 2001). There is no IFA covering Philips.
\nThe International Union of Food and Allied Workers’ Associations (IUF) had
\ntaken an active interest in international co-ordination of trade union bargaining
\nsince 1958, when it undertook a comparative survey of wages and working
\nconditions in British-American Tobacco (BAT). The issue was also on the
\nagenda of sectoral conferences in 1961, for the meat and tobacco companies.
\nBAT was in fact the first company where the IUF organised solidarity action
\nbetween member unions in different countries representing workers in the
\nsame TNC.
\nThe action was in defence of the Pak Cigarette Labour Union (PCLU), which
\nrepresented workers at the Pakistan subsidiary of BAT. The PCLU was
\nformed in 1961 but was denied recognition. Instead, the union faced lockouts,
\narrests, dismissals and fines. In February 1963 the union went on strike
\nduring which its general secretary was jailed for four months and twelve union
\nmembers were dismissed. The IUF organized financial support for the
\ndismissed workers and called on its members at BAT to raise the issue with
\ntheir local management. In December, the general secretary of the British
\nTobacco Workers’ Union, Percy Belcher, travelled to Karachi officially
\nrepresenting the IUF and helped bring about negotiations between the union
\nand the company. These negotiations resulted in the reinstatement of the
\ndismissed workers and of the union’s general secretary, as well as in the first
\never collective bargaining agreement reached between any union and
\nemployer in Karachi.
\nIn May 1964, the issue of TNCs was on the agenda of the 14th Congress of
\nthe IUF in Stockholm, which adopted the following Resolution on International
\nCollective Bargaining:
\n“The Fourteenth Statutory Congress of the International Union of Food
\nand Allied Workers’ Associations, meeting in Stockholm from May 27 to
\n30, 1964:
\nCONSIDERING the dominant position of international companies in all
\naspects of economic and social life;
\nCONSIDERING the growing ability of such companies to mobilize their
\nfull international potential in collective bargaining with single national
\nunions;
\nCONSIDERING the threat arising to national trade union organizations
\nfrom inadequate communication and coordination in their dealings with
\ninternational companies;
\nDIRECTS the Executive Committee to take all appropriate measures to
\nsecure the recognition of the IUF as an international negotiating body
\nand to perfect an appropriate procedure for conducting international
\nnegotiations in the food and allied industries under IUF sponsorship.”
\nFollowing the congress, the IUF approached BAT with the proposal to
\nestablish a permanent joint negotiating body but did not meet with a positive
\nresponse. However, the IUF continued to organise international coordination
\nat TNC level, typically in the context of a conflict situation.
\nOne such action was in support of a strike by the US Bakery and
\nConfectionary Workers’ Union in October 1969 against the National Biscuit
\nCo. (Nabisco), involving unions from ten countries where Nabisco had
\nsubsidiaries. The strike was successfully ended two weeks after the initial call
\nfor international solidarity.
\nThe 16th IUF Congress held in Zurich in July 1970 again noted the
\nconcentration of power taking place at international company level and
\nstressed the need to strengthen union co-operation at that level. It called for
\nregular meetings of unions representing workers in the major TNCs as well as
\nfor ad hoc meetings in emergencies and for exchanges of union delegations
\nto observe each others’ negotiations within the same TNC.
\nIn May 1972, in Geneva, the IUF held its first World Conference of Nestl\u00e9
\nWorkers, which established a Nestl\u00e9 Permanent Council. The tasks of the
\nCouncil were to: (a) contact the management of Nestl\u00e9 Alimentana SA on
\ninternational questions or at the request of affiliates; (b) call future Nestl\u00e9
\nconferences; and (c) follow up on the decisions of the Conference.
\nThe Conference adopted a statement which formulated demands on job
\nsecurity and wages policy, but also on the respect of union rights and on
\nunion participation in management policy decisions.
\nThe statement also included a political demand: it invited Nestl\u00e9 to “contribute
\nto the development of underdeveloped countries” in particular by the following
\nmeasures:
\n> ensure the equitable distribution of its subsidiaries’ revenues,
\nwhether in the form of wages or taxes;
\n> bring the prices of Nestl\u00e9 products to a level where all
\nconsumers will be able to purchase them;
\n> bring its influence to bear to guarantee fair prices for the primary
\ncommodities which it processes;
\n> follow a policy of processing primary commodities where these
\noriginate, without thereby creating employment problems in its
\nsubsidiaries located in industrialized countries.
\nFinally, the participating unions agreed to “increase, through the IUF
\nsecretariat, the exchange of information and experiences concerning their
\nrelations with Nestl\u00e9, thereby laying the groundwork for more effective co-
\noperation at the level of the company” and to “mutually support their demands
\nand their struggles.”
\nIt was also decided that the IUF secretariat should publish a Nestl\u00e9 bulletin
\nand such a bulletin did appear on an approximately monthly basis until most
\nIUF periodical publications were replaced by a web site in the late 1990s.
\nIn June 1972, a delegation of the IUF Permanent Council met with Nestl\u00e9
\nmanagement at the company headquarters in Vevey to discuss the
\nconclusions of the World Conference, after having agreed that these talks
\ncould not become a substitute for management\/labour relations at the national
\nlevel.
\nThe management representatives assured the IUF delegation that the
\ncompany considered good relations with the unions of utmost importance and
\nin particular attached importance to the respect of trade union rights by its
\nassociated companies and subsidiaries, that Nestl\u00e9 intended to make the
\nsafeguarding of jobs a priority, and it would seek an understanding with
\nworkers’ representatives on the material and social impacts of lay-offs
\nresulting from rationalisation measures.
\nThe management representatives also said that the company would issue
\nappropriate recommendations to companies manufacturing or distributing
\nNestl\u00e9 products whenever such companies would not observe the parent’s
\nfirm policy on these two issues.
\nConcerning Nestl\u00e9’s role in the “underdeveloped countries”, the company
\nstated its desire to contribute to the establishment of equitable prices for
\nprimary commodities, particularly for coffee and cocoa, at a level which would
\npermit the development and consumption in producing countries.
\nBoth parties agreed that further meetings between representatives of the IUF
\nPermanent Council and the Nestl\u00e9 management should take place at the
\nrequest of either of them.
\nHowever, relations soured in 1973 when Nestl\u00e9 management refused to
\ndiscuss the anti-union policies of Stouffer Foods, a recent acquisition in the
\nUS, and when it refused to intervene in a conflict at the Chiclayo plant of
\nPerulac, its subsidiary in Peru.
\nThe dispute in Chiclayo occurred when the workers who had struck in
\nsympathy with a walk-out at another Nestl\u00e9 plant in Lima (Maggi) returned to
\nwork on April 10 to find that non-union workers were the only ones being paid
\nfor strike days. This resulted in another strike which lasted six weeks, with the
\nworkers occupying the plant. In a solidarity action organized by the IUF,
\nunions representing Nestl\u00e9 workers in fifteen countries supported the strike. A
\ndecisive intervention by the New Zealand Dairy Workers’ Union, which
\nthreatened to close down the Nestl\u00e9 powdered milk plant which supplied all
\nNestl\u00e9 operations on the South American Pacific coast, tilted the balance.
\nThe final settlement on May 23 met all the demands of the Perulac Workers’
\nUnion: a lump sum to be paid to the union to allow it to compensate its
\nmembers for loss of earnings during the strike, a 20 percent wage increase,
\npaid holidays up from 15 to 20 per years, dropping all charges against union
\nmembers and a commitment by management to cease discrimination against
\nthem, and retroactive recognition of the legality of the strike by the Peruvian
\ngovernment (which had it declared illegal on May 2).
\nHowever, the IUF regional secretary for Latin America, who had visited the
\nunion during the strike was arrested on May 5 and expelled from the country
\non May 9. In July, he returned to Peru and was only subjected to a short
\npolice interrogation, but almost a year later, the regional secretary and the
\ngeneral secretary of the IUF again visited Peru, having been invited by the
\nPerulac union to participate in the inauguration of its new premises. On March
\n24, 1974, they were arrested in Chiclayo by security police led by an official
\nwho held a paper with Nestl\u00e9 letterhead in his hand (2). They were then transferred
\nto Lima and expelled on March 26.
\nAfter that, relations between the IUF and Nestl\u00e9 became decidedly frosty for
\nseveral years. A thaw set in 1989 when the then IUF president G\u00fcnter
\nD\u00f6ding, also president of the German Food and Allied Workers’ Union NGG,
\nmet with Helmut Maucher, Nestl\u00e9 CEO whom he had known as director of
\nNestl\u00e9 Germany, and over dinner decided that Nestl\u00e9 could recognise the IUF
\nas its international social counterpart.
\nThis led to a resumption of annual meetings between a reconstituted IUF
\nNestl\u00e9 Council and Nestl\u00e9 management, but only at European level. These
\nmeetings were eventually formalised in 1996 as an EWC (the “Nestl\u00e9
\nEuropean Council for Information and Consultation – NECIC). Nestl\u00e9 has,
\nhowever, so far refused to sign an IFA with the IUF.
\nExcept for two informal agreements on training and equal opportunities, such
\nagreements as exist are only procedural (frequency of meetings, composition
\nof the delegations, countries to be included). Even on procedure, contentious
\nissues arose: the IUF insisted that the workers’ side should only include union
\nmembers (officials and lay members from the production sites), Nestl\u00e9 wanted
\nto include an “independent” union in Spain the IUF did not recognise. The IUF
\nalso wanted the meetings to cover all of geographical Europe, whereas Nestl\u00e9
\nwanted only EU countries included. The trade union issue was eventually
\nresolved on IUF terms but the geographical issue only partially resolved.
\nAs a parallel activity, the IUF also convened regional Nestl\u00e9 meetings: most
\nrecently, for Asia and the Pacific in Manila (1999) and Jakarta (2002), for
\nEastern Europe in Lviv (2003) and for Africa in Cape Town (2003). The
\nseventh Nestl\u00e9 conference for Latin America took place in Buenos Aires in
\n2003. The director of corporate human relations attended some of these
\nrecent regional meetings. Since 2004, the IUF has established a network of
\nregional Nestl\u00e9 co-ordinators based in Bangkok, Johannesburg, Montevideo
\nand Moscow.
\nIn 1998, Nestl\u00e9 adopted “Corporate Business Principles” which affirm, among
\nother things, the “respect of the right of employees to join legally recognized
\nlabour unions”. However, the establishment of formal mechanisms of
\ncommunication between the IUF and Nestl\u00e9 did not reduce the number of
\nconflicts. In all parts of the world, including Europe, unions have been in
\nconflict with local Nestl\u00e9 managements in recent years over a wide variety of
\nissues, including union rights issues.
\n2. Conclusions from Experience<\/strong><\/em>
\nThe main conclusion that can be drawn from the experience of the ICF, IMF
\nand IUF in the 1960s and 1970s is that their work in co-ordinating
\ninternational union activities at TNC level was in fact a basic trade union
\nresponse to a new development affecting the structure of their employer
\ncounterparts: the concentration of capital and the shift of the place where
\ncorporate power was exercised and decisions made from the national to the
\ninternational level.
\nThis response was intended to be a strategy of trade union struggle and it
\nwas motivated by the need to make this struggle more effective under the new
\nconditions, which affected industrial relations world wide. International co-
\nordination was viewed as a tool through which unions could build up a
\ncountervailing power comparable to that of the TNCs they were facing and
\nlevel the proverbial playing field.
\nFrom that perspective, international framework agreements, although a logical
\noutcome of international negotiations, were not the principal objective. The
\nprincipal objective was rather to build union strength at TNC level to achieve
\nany number of basic trade union aims, such as successfully conducting
\nsolidarity actions. This is something the ITSs would have had to do in any
\nevent, and it is still part of their basic functions, whatever institutional form it
\nmay take.
\nNo IFAs existed in the 1960s and 1970s and those few companies (for
\nexample, BAT, Philips, Nestl\u00e9) which had agreed to meet with ITS delegations
\nto discuss industrial relations problems affecting their entire operations quickly
\ndrew back when they realised that the ITSs involved expected some form of
\nbinding commitment and serious changes in their corporate practices.
\nAlthough disappointing, this did not stop the ITSs from further building union
\ncoalitions and organizing at TNC level.
\nThe situation may best be understood by comparing the international with the
\nnational or even local level. Trade unions exist to defend the interests of their
\nmembers in a variety of ways over a wide range of issues; they do not exist
\nexclusively for the purpose of concluding collective bargaining agreements
\n(CBAs), although this is part of their normal activities. But when it comes to
\nbargaining, because they must defend their members’ interests against
\nopposing interests, trade unions must always be prepared for conflict and
\norganise for conflict, even as they negotiate. A collective bargaining
\nagreement is, in an institutionalised form, the temporary outcome of a conflict
\nsituation, whether latent or open, soft or hard. It reflects, in an institutionalised
\nform, the balance of power, at any given time, between the contracting
\nparties. This is why there are strong and weak agreements.
\nInternational collective bargaining is only different insofar as there is no
\ninternational legal framework, such as exists in most countries at national
\nlevel, to provide a guaranteed legal status to any labour\/management
\nagreement reached at international level. Since such agreements are
\ntherefore entirely voluntary, they depend even more on the balance of power
\nbetween the contracting parties at the time they are concluded. This is why
\nthere are strong and weak IFAs, and this is also the reason why there are so
\nfew of them.
\n3. The First International Framework Agreement<\/strong><\/em>
\nThe first international framework agreement was signed by the IUF and the
\nFrench transnational food company BSN, (re-named Danone in 1994), on
\nAugust 23, 1988. It is entitled “Common Viewpoint IUF\/BSN” and states that
\nthe parties agree to promote co-ordinated initiatives, throughout the BSN
\ngroup, on four issues:
\n1. A policy for training for skills in order to anticipate the
\nconsequences of the introduction of new technologies or industrial
\nrestructuring. To achieve this objective, the social partners will seek to
\nintegrate this aspect into present and future plans for training;
\n2. A policy aiming to achieve the same level and the same quality
\nof information, both in the economic and the social fields, in all
\nlocations of BSN subsidiaries. To achieve this objective, the social
\npartners concerned will seek, both through national legislation as well
\nas collective agreement, to reduce the differences observed in terms of
\nthe information between one country and another or between one
\nlocation and another;
\n3. A development of conditions to assure real equality between
\nmen and women at work. Developing jobs and work processes have
\nled to distortions between the situation of men and women; the social
\npartners will therefore evaluate, location by location, the nature of the
\ndifferent initiatives to be adopted to improve the situation;
\n4. The implementation of trade union rights as defined in ILO
\nconventions Nos. 87, 98 and 135. The social partners concerned will
\nidentify where progress can be made in improving trade union rights
\nand access to trade union education.”
\nThe adoption of the “Common Viewpoint” was preceded by a number of
\nmeetings, since 1984, between an IUF delegation, normally composed of the
\nIUF general secretary, a member of the IUF staff responsible for coordinating
\nBSN activities and representatives of the French IUF affiliates (the CFDT and
\nForce Ouvri\u00e8re food workers’ unions), with Danone management, normally
\ncomposed of Antoine Riboud, CEO, the director of human resources and a
\nmember of his staff.
\nIn 1986, a first meeting between the management and delegates from IUF
\naffiliates in Belgium, France, Germany and Italy with membership in BSN was
\norganized by the IUF in Geneva. This meeting was the first of annual
\nmeetings which have regularly taken place since, with growing participation,
\nto include all of geographical Europe and representation from the rest of the
\nworld. On the management side, central management (the CEO, HR director
\nand staff), as well as all national directors in Europe, would participate. The
\njoint meeting would last one day; the workers’ group meets the day before to
\nprepare and the day after for evaluation and to discuss the follow-up. The
\ncompany bears the expenses of all meetings. The IUF appointed a
\ncoordinating union (the CFDT Food Workers’ Union) for the Workers’ Group
\nand its national officer responsible for Danone would chair the joint meetings.
\nIt was agreed that all IUF\/Danone agreements would cover the entire
\noperations of the company in all parts of the world. Neither the agreements,
\nnor the joint meetings, nor their agenda, were therefore “European” in nature,
\nbut worldwide in scope. Unions representing Danone workers outside of
\nEurope (Africa, Asia\/Pacific, Latin America and, for some years, North
\nAmerica) would be represented at the joint meetings by the IUF regional
\nsecretaries for these regions. In some meetings, unions from outside Europe
\nalso participated.
\nFollow-up agreements to the “Common Viewpoint” were concluded in 1989
\n(on economic and social information for staff and their representatives, and on
\nequality at work for men and women), in 1992 (on skills training), and in 1994
\n(on trade union rights). In 1997, a further agreement was signed on measures
\nto be taken in the event of changes in business activities affecting
\nemployment or working conditions. This agreement, the first of its kind at
\ninternational level, served as a basis for a specific agreement on social
\nstandards applicable to all plants affected by the industrial restructuring plan
\nof 2001 for biscuit operations in Europe.
\nFollowing the adoption by the EU of its European Works Council directive in
\n1994, an agreement establishing a Danone information and consultation
\ncommittee was signed in 1996. The IUF commented as follows:
\n“This committee, although functioning within the framework or European
\nlegislation, continues the work carried out by the IUF since 1984 on behalf of
\nits affiliates and also continues the positive features characteristic of Danone-
\nIUF relations since 1984:
\n> trade union recognition
\n> at enterprise level: workers’ representatives are exclusively
\ntrade union delegates;
\n> at national level: full-time national officers are included in the
\ntrade union delegation;
\n> at international level: the secretariats of the IUF and of the ECF-
\nIUF are members of the new structure and the other regional
\nsecretaries of the IUF represent Danone workers outside Europe.
\nDanone accepts that in a transnational company with a global spread
\nof activities, the international trade union movement represents the
\nglobal counterpart.
\n> shared responsibilities: the themes for discussion are decided
\njointly, and the meetings are chaired by the IUF international co-
\nordinator Pierre Laurent.
\n> Finally, the committee does not confine itself in an information
\nand consultation role, as the EU legislation suggests, but continues the
\nmomentum of IUF-Danone relations by being a forum for negotiations
\non the crucial issues of concern to all Danone workers. (IUF, 1997)
\nThe Danone agreement, including its subsidiary agreements, remains the
\nmost far-reaching IFA to this day, and has set the pattern for further IUF
\nagreements with TNCs (Accor, Chiquita, Fonterra) and others (T\u00f8rres and
\nGunnes, 2003: 9).
\nThere has been some speculation as to why Danone was the first company to
\nagree to an IFA of this nature. The personal views of Antoine Riboud, its
\nfounder and CEO until 1996 when he was succeeded by his son Franck, were
\nundoubtedly an important factor. Antoine Riboud, who died in 2002, was a
\nprogressive Catholic with links to the Socialist Party and viewed trade unions
\nas legitimate counterparts at all levels. As he declared in a meeting with an
\nIUF delegation, he wanted strong unions in his company because he could
\nnot imagine leading his company against its employees and without
\nrespecting their rights. There is no doubt that this was his sincere belief.
\nRiboud was a man of honour.
\nThe recent experiences of the IUF at that time, however, also played a role. It
\nbecame apparent to all TNCs in the IUF’s scope that it was becoming a
\nserious counterpart, including Danone. As we have seen, the IUF had
\nsustained a bruising conflict with Nestl\u00e9 in 1973, although in the end it had
\nbeen resolved on union terms. In 1980, the IUF conducted a major conflict
\nwith the Coca-Cola Company, in order to secure the survival of a union (and
\nindeed the physical survival of its officers and activists) at a bottling subsidiary
\nin Guatemala. An international campaign involving solidarity strikes at Coke
\nplants in several countries, demonstrations, and negative publicity, with wide-
\nspread support from NGOs and political groups, obliged the Coca-Cola
\ncompany to buy the subsidiary plant, recognise the enterprise union and
\nintervene such that the then government ceased is anti-union terror
\ncampaign, at least in that plant.
\nThis, however, was not the end of the story. Four years later, the directors
\nCoca-Cola had put in charge of the plant absconded with the cash and
\ndeclared the plant bankrupt. The workers, who had become aware that this
\nmight happen, occupied the plant on February 18, 1984. The IUF again made
\nrepresentations to the Coca Cola Company, and the company initially refused
\nto take responsibility, as in 1980.
\nThe assumption by the company that the IUF would not be able to replicate its
\ncampaign of 1980 proved unfounded. In fact, the 1984 campaign was even
\nstronger than the first one. It involved: unions which had previously stood
\naside (notably in the US and in Canada); a union television crew from New
\nYork who visited the occupied plant to document the occupation (3); a
\nprofessional accountant from the Interfaith Council for Corporate
\nResponsibility in the United States (4) who discovered how the directors had
\ncooked the books which they had left behind in their precipitated departure; more
\nsolidarity strikes; waiters in the Philippines and supermarket cashiers in
\nSweden refusing to serve or sell Coke, and more. The damage to the
\ncompany image was enormous.
\nAfter three months, the company wanted to settle. On May 27 company
\nrepresentatives (the corporate HR director and regional directors) met with an
\nIUF delegation (the general secretary, the North American regional secretary,
\nthe vice president of the principal North American affiliate and two officers of
\nthe Guatemalan union) in Costa Rica. After two days of tense negotiations the
\ncompany agreed to sell the plant to a reputable buyer, guaranteed that the
\nnew owners would recognise the union and the existing CBA, agreed to
\nemploy and pay the workers occupying the plant until it reopened, and agreed
\nthat the plant would reopen with all its workers and that no-one would be laid
\noff. On that basis, the IUF called off its boycott.
\nThe implementation of the agreement took several more months. Coca-Cola
\nwas looking for a buyer, the workers were still occupying the plant and the IUF
\nwas standing by to resume the international solidarity action. Finally, on
\nNovember 9, the company announced that they had found a buyer: a
\nconsortium led by Carlos Porras Gonz\u00e1les, a reputable economist who had
\nrun businesses in El Salvador. New negotiations then had to be conducted
\nwith the new owners, which were concluded on February 1, 1985, just over
\ntwo weeks short of the anniversary of the start of the occupation, and the
\nplant re-opened on March 1. The final settlement corresponded to the
\nagreement reached with Coca-Cola on May 27, 1984, although the plant
\nreopened with only 265 of the 350 workers who had been occupying it (the
\nothers were re-hired in the following months). Since then, the Guatemalan
\nunion has become the core of a national food workers’ federation and the
\nCBA has been regularly re-negotiated, although the plant now has other
\nowners.
\nThe IUF has had many meetings with Coca-Cola top management since to
\ndiscuss problems arising in the Coca-Cola system, and also reached
\nagreements on specific issues, but without a formal framework.
\nWhen the IUF met with the Coca-Cola management representatives on May
\n25-27, 1984, at a time when the company was obviously ready to make
\nextensive concessions to put an end to the conflict, the question arose
\nwhether the IUF delegation should demand the establishment of a general
\nIFA as part of the settlement. The IUF general secretary decided against it
\nbecause, with the lives of the workers in the plant still under threat (the
\nGuatemalan army had surrounded the plant since the beginning of the
\noccupation and was still there), it was his opinion that the IUF should not risk
\ndelaying the settlement by introducing extraneous issues. The overriding
\npriority had to be to protect the Guatemalan affiliate and its members. The IFA
\ncould wait.
\nThe Nestl\u00e9 conflict in 1973 and especially the conflicts with Coca-Cola in 1980
\nand 1984\/5 had received extensive press coverage. The IUF had
\ndemonstrated its capacity of creating serious inconveniences to even large
\nand powerful TNCs and it may be safely assumed that by 1984 at the latest
\nthe IUF had caught the attention of all leading TNCs in its field of activity.
\nThe Danone agreement was not reached in the context of any conflict with
\nDanone and all discussions and negotiations were conducted in a friendly
\natmosphere of mutual respect and trust. It would be wrong to suggest that
\nDanone had become interested in concluding an IFA with the IUF because it
\nfeared a conflict with the IUF: no serious conflict was on the horizon and,
\ngiven the Danone corporate philosophy, it was highly unlikely to arise. It can,
\nhowever, be said that Danone had perceived the IUF to be a serious
\ninternational counterpart and had come to the conclusion that signing an
\nagreement with the IUF was not only a moral and political imperative but also
\na smart business move.
\n4. IFAs and Codes of Conduct<\/strong><\/em>
\nThe distinction between Codes of Conduct and IFAs is sometimes ignored or
\nblurred. For example, a list of IFAs established by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung,
\nin 2002, is called: “List of Codes of Conduct\/Framework Agreements”, as if
\nthey were interchangeable. A footnote says: “Some GUFs call the agreements
\n‘Framework Agreements’, not Code of Conduct, because there had been only
\na few principles fixed in the first agreement which often have been extended
\nby additional agreements. For instance in the case of Danone the first
\nagreement of 1988 has meanwhile been developed by six other agreements.”
\nThis is, of course, not true. Neither the IUF nor anyone else ever called the
\nDanone agreement a Code of Conduct, nor did anyone ever suggest that a
\nCode was in any sense stronger than a Framework Agreement. A similar list, by SASK, the Finnish trade union development agency, in 2005, is also headed “Codes of Conduct\/Framework Agreements”, with a similar footnote.
\nA positive article about IFAs in the IMF journal Metal World (Nilsson, 2004)
\nintroduces the subject by referring to IFAs “or Codes of Conduct, as they were
\nformerly called” and goes on to say that IFAs were called Codes of Conduct
\n“before that expression was compromised.” The article later correctly points
\nout some of the fundamental differences between Codes and IFAs, but the
\nfact is that IFAs were never called Codes and that the concept of Codes was
\ncompromised from the beginning as a management-driven public relations
\nexercise.
\nThe ICFTU and some GUFs have developed “model codes of conduct” as
\npotential stepping stones to IFAs or for lack of a better alternative. But some
\nanalysts have pointed out with reason, that:
\n“With this voluntary initiative by management to implement social policy
\nrules as business principles, weak unions and workers’ representatives
\nwill tend to have little say in taking this further to a framework
\nagreement that commits both management and unions. There is
\nreason to consider this a barrier to adopting global agreements that
\ncommit both management and unions, and thus a hinder for trade
\nunion recognition.” (T\u00f8rres and Gunnes, 2003: 45).
\nOn the subject, these authors also note:
\n“Codes of conduct covering issues of social responsibility are
\nbecoming more frequent. However, the extent to which this is
\nfacilitating improved communications and dialogue between employees
\nand management is more doubtful. […] There is […] a danger that
\ncodes are seen as something more than they really are, and used to
\ndeflect criticism and reduce the demand for negotiations or external
\nregulation. […] In some cases, codes have led to a worsening of the
\nsituation for those whom they purport to benefit.” (T\u00f8rres and Gunnes,
\n2003: 443).
\nMost trade unionists, analysts and researchers make a clear distinction
\nbetween IFAs and Codes of Conduct.
\nThe ICFTU notes that “the content of a framework agreement is often similar
\nto the language found in some of the codes of conduct that companies have
\nadopted for their suppliers and which cover some, or all, of the fundamental
\nrights at work. However, that does not mean that a framework agreement is
\nthe same thing as a code of conduct. It is not.
\n“There is a fundamental difference between a code of labour practice, which
\nis a unilateral management pledge, mainly made to address public concerns,
\nand a framework agreement, which is recognition that the company will
\nengage the relevant international trade union organization and discuss issues
\nof fundamental concerns to both parties.” (ICFTU, 2004)
\nOthers have been even more explicit. Riisgaard notes that code of conduct
\nresponses are frequently an example
\n“where businesses […] have embraced codes of conduct as protection
\nagainst public opinion and as a means to sidestep demands for
\nunionisation. The RUGMARK certification system for example
\nguarantees that no child workers have been used in the production of
\nthe labelled blankets, but does nothing to secure the rights of the
\nremaining workforce […] A 1998 ILO investigation of 215 codes found
\nthat only around 15 percent refer to freedom of association or the right
\nto collective bargaining, and likewise a 1999 OECD investigation
\nshows that only around 20 percent of the 182 investigated codes refer
\nexplicitly to the ILO conventions on freedom of association and the
\nright to collective bargaining […] As seen in the examples above, one
\ncan seriously question whether most voluntary initiatives reflect NGO
\nor business interests rather than workers’ interests. […] As a result, it is
\nimportant to differentiate between voluntary initiatives that are
\nnegotiated with labour and initiatives that are not.” (Riisgaard, 2003: 2)
\nThis author has pointed out elsewhere that in many cases, far from promoting
\nlabour rights, one of the main purposes of Codes of Conduct has actually
\nbeen union avoidance:
\n“In 1990, 85 percent of the top 100 US corporations were found to have
\na code; in the UK, this figure was 42 percent, in the Netherlands 22
\npercent.(5) However, most codes of conduct that address social issues
\nare limited in their coverage and do not address basic labour rights […]
\nThis comes as no surprise since, in some cases, companies adopted
\ncodes as part of a union-avoidance strategy by pre-emption, preferring
\nto unilaterally offer a paternalistic package than have a recognized
\nnegotiating body to deal with. As the ICFTU has pointed out, ‘many of
\nthe US-based companies that were the first to adopt codes were, in
\nboth principle and practice, opposed to trade unions’. For example,
\nthe Caterpillar code states that the company seeks to ‘operate the
\nbusiness in such a way that employees don’t feel a need for
\nrepresentation by unions or other third parties’ and the Sara Lee Knit
\nProducts code states that the company ‘believes in a union-free
\nenvironment except where law and cultures require (SKP) to do
\notherwise.’ The DuPont code reads: ’employees shall be encouraged
\nby lawful expression of management opinion to continue an existing
\nno-union status, but where employees have chosen to be represented
\nby a union, management shall deal with the union in good faith.’ (6)
\nA second problem has been monitoring of compliance. Most codes do
\nnot provide for a credible independent monitoring procedure, or for
\nstrong enforcement and complaints mechanisms. Unions have argued
\nthat the existence of independent trade unions throughout the
\noperations of transnational corporations are the most efficient
\nmonitoring system (7). Many companies have gone to great length – and
\nexpense – to resort to other monitoring systems (creating their own,
\ncontracting out to commercial monitoring enterprises or to compliant
\nNGOs) with dubious results.” (Gallin, 2000)
\nAfter a detailed analysis of the differences between IFAs and Corporate
\nSocial Responsibility (CSR) initiatives, most commonly expressed in the form
\nof Codes of Conduct, Gibb observed:
\n“When considering the argument that IFAs are no different than other
\nCSR initiatives, or that IFAs are one form of CSR, it must be
\nrecognized that if the contribution of IFAs was limited to improving the
\npublic image or providing a marketing boost to companies, there would
\nbe as many IFAs signed as there are CSR initiatives. This is not the
\ncase.” (Gibb, 2005)
\nIn a document for the IUF Executive Committee meeting in 2006, the IUF
\nsecretariat makes the same point:
\n“Whilst some may say that IFAs are little more than agreed ‘codes of
\nconduct’ they are clearly significantly better. Unlike codes their very
\nexistence as signed agreements means they are explicitly built on
\nunion recognition at international level and therefore do not pose the
\ndanger of being used as an alternative to unions in the same way that
\nmany codes and CSR initiatives do (even those where unions
\nsomehow ‘sign on’).” (IUF, 2006)
\nAlthough the one obvious difference between Codes and IFAs is that most
\nCodes are unilateral company statements whereas IFAs are negotiated
\nlabour\/management agreements, it is not the only difference and actually not
\nalways the case: there are some negotiated Codes. There may be a deeper
\nunderlying issue, which has to do with the view unions take of the purpose of
\nsuch agreements. If IFAs are primarily meant to address company behaviour,
\nthey may indeed appear to be no more than a stronger kind of Code: stronger,
\nbecause the outcome of a negotiation, but not basically different in purpose.
\nIf, on the other hand, IFAs are seen and used as organizing tools, the contrast
\nwith Codes becomes much clearer. (Egels-Zand\u00e9n and Hyllman, 2007)
\n5. IFAs and European Works Councils<\/strong><\/em>
\nAs a rule, European Works Councils (EWCs) do not negotiate IFAs and are
\nnot signatories to IFAs.
\nCarley (2001) observes that:
\n“In formal terms, the prospects of EWCs developing a negotiating role
\nare not very bright. The (EU) Directive provides for no such role for
\nthem, stating that their purpose is to improve information and
\nconsultation and laying down only an informative\/consultative role for
\nstatutory EWCs based on its subsidiary requirements.”
\nThe European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), whilst it supports the
\ndevelopment of a European framework for transnational collective bargaining,
\nwhich should complement the existing framework for European “social
\ndialogue” (5), stresses that EWCs do not have a mandate for negotiations nor
\nthe right to sign transnational agreements:
\n“The power to do this must remain solely and strictly a trade union
\nright, owing to their representativeness long recognized by the
\nCommission, which also specified as much in a text. Transnational
\nagreements as such must be left up to collectively responsible and thus
\nplayers with a mandate to represent their members. […] EWCs, which
\nwe stress were only given powers of information and consultation, are
\nnot appropriate bodies for negotiations given the current state of
\nlegislation.” (ETUC, 2005)
\nTherefore, unsurprisingly: “The first and arguably the clearest conclusion is
\nthat from the available evidence, the practice of negotiating joint texts in
\nEWCs is extremely rare. The research has found only 22 examples in nine
\nmultinationals. Given that there are probably 700 EWCs in existence, this
\nrepresents only a tiny proportion of the total (little over 1 percent).” (Carley,
\n2001: 47)
\nThe existence of joint texts in EWCs is even more rare than Carley suggests,
\nsince he included six Danone agreements in that number, although, as we
\nhave seen, these were neither negotiated nor signed by an EWC but in an
\nentirely different context and, indeed, even before the existence of the EU
\ndirective.
\nThis does not stop Carley from claiming that the joint IUF\/Danone committee
\nwhich met annually from 1987 onward was “one of the first EWCs”:
\n“BSN\/Danone thus established an EWC long before all but one or two other
\nfirms had done so – and long before the EWC directive was proposed – and
\nthis body (and IUF) was given a negotiating role almost a decade before any
\nother EWC.” (Carley, 2001: 34).
\nIn fact, the IUF\/Danone committee was not an EWC at all, since neither the
\nIUF nor the company could possibly foreseen the future creation of a body
\nthat did not exist at that time. Furthermore, although – as Carley rightly points
\nout- the joint IUF\/Danone committee was subsequently “formalized” by an
\nArticle 13 agreement in March 1996, this joint committee has none of the
\ntypical limitations of the EWCs (in the sense that it is vested with negotiating
\npowers, and is worldwide in scope). This is so precisely because it did not
\noriginate as an EWC and therefore does not conform to the standard EWC
\npattern.
\nOne wonders which of the remaining sixteen “joint texts” have been similarly
\nretroactively annexed to an agenda of bolstering an assumed EWC
\nnegotiating role. The ENI agreement (2002), for one, is also one signed by the
\nGUF and not by the EWC.
\nFrom the point of view of an international labour strategy, three issues need to
\nbe addressed and solved in a way consistent with trade union interests,
\nnamely, the negotiation issue; the trade union issue; and the geographical
\nissue (Gallin, 2003).
\nFirst, some EWC agreements (EFAs) explicitly rule out any negotiating role,
\nothers make provisions for certain types of negotiations. The important point
\nhere is that the content of what happens in an EWC depends on a mutual
\nagreement of the social counterparts and not necessarily by what the
\nDirective says. Unions should therefore push for what is consistent with their
\nobjectives and their interests, rather than voluntarily conforming to rules
\ninvented by others that work to their disadvantage.
\nSecond, the trade union issue arises because the EWC directive is a much-
\ndiluted version of the original draft of 1980, which would have given trade
\nunions statutory representation rights. In its final and present form, it does not
\nmention trade unions at all, so that unions have had to fight to nail down the
\nright of their officials to be part of the EWC and to ensure that the lay
\nmembers themselves be union members. Where this has not succeeded,
\nEWCs remain vulnerable to management manipulation or become outright
\nmanagement tools.
\nThe main reason why the trade union presence, and specifically international
\ntrade union presence, is necessary, is because it represents the long term
\ngeneral interest of workers, whereas works council representatives are not
\nnecessarily committed to defending more than the specific interests of the
\nworkers of their enterprise as those interests appear to them at the time of the
\nmeeting. When each delegation comes to the meeting determined to defend
\nits short-term interests, this can easily lead to a free-for-all where
\nmanagement can impose its own decisions. Whenever workers’
\nrepresentatives meet internationally, it is their obligation to reach a position
\nreflecting the long-term general interest of all involved and, in order to do so,
\nto negotiate the necessary compromises among themselves. Once this is
\ndone, they can confront management with a united position. Any other
\nscenario is a recipe for defeat.
\nDrawing the lessons of the Renault-Vilvoorde conflict (other examples could
\nalso apply), Rehfeldt (1999) observes:
\n“The EWC alone will always have great difficulties when it tries to
\ndefine common interests of the workforce in different European plants
\nand in different economic situations. Union intervention will always be
\nnecessary in order to facilitate a compromise between different
\ninterests and different strategic approaches. Neither the ETUC, nor the
\nEuropean industry federations have yet been able to play this role of
\ninterest intermediation and arbitration.” (Rehfeldt, 1999: 113)
\nFinally, the geographical issue arises because the directive formally only
\napplies to EU countries, but leaves agreement on the actual coverage of the
\ncouncil to the social counterparts. Most companies seek to limit the EWCs to
\nthe EU only (the issue here is not so much Norway and Switzerland but
\nEastern Europe). The union interest is of course to secure the maximum
\ncoverage, ideally of every single operation of the company regardless of its
\nlocation anywhere in the world. Thus most EWCs are confined to the EU,
\nsome cover all of geographical Europe and at least three are worldwide in
\nscope.
\nSince the social counterparts are largely free to make their own arrangements
\nwhen establishing an EWC, there is no reason why unions should obediently
\nrestrict themselves to the letter of the Directive. In the end, the structure and
\nfunctions of an EWC boil down to a question of the existing balance of power,
\nwhich, as we have seen, applies to any negotiating situation. Admittedly,
\ngiven the present balance of social and political power in the EU member
\nStates and in the Commission, it is unlikely that much progress can be
\nachieved at this time through a revision of the EWC directive.
\nBecause the EWC represent, at least temporarily, a dead end, some GUFs,
\nsuch as the IMF, have revived the World Councils. UNI, for its part has
\ncreated a number of international union networks at TNC level, which appear
\nto be in fact world councils in a more flexible form.
\nConclusion: Back to the Future?<\/strong><\/em>
\nAs we noted above, the significance and value of an IFA very much depend
\non the purpose it is intended to serve, which, in turn, is confirmed (or not) by
\nits results.
\nThe broader issue is to what extent IFAs can still be considered to be the
\nelements of an emerging architecture of international labour\/management
\nrelations in a global political context that is increasingly hostile to trade union
\nrights. In such a context, there is a danger that TNCs will be increasingly
\ntempted to ignore “social partnership” arrangements, whilst the options for
\nunions are narrowing down to their “core business”: rebuilding power relations
\nthrough struggle.
\nThe situation of the labour movement is that it is confronted not only with the
\nhostility of anti-union corporations and conservative governments here and
\nthere, but also with a worldwide political and social project, driven by
\ntransnational capital, which is fundamentally anti-democratic. It is about power
\nin society.
\nThis system of power is codified and given enforcement authority by the
\nWorld Trade Organisation (WTO) and reinforced through the international
\nfinancial institutions, which are also instruments of corporate policy. It is about
\na new hierarchy of rights in which corporate rights outweigh all others at the
\nlevel of enforcement, in a world where other international institutions, such as
\nthe ILO, or Conventions on human rights, have little or no enforcement
\ncapacity.
\nIn this world, the objective of any meaningful international labour strategy can
\nonly be to challenge and reverse the existing hierarchy of rights by changing
\nthe existing power relationships through organisation.
\nIn this context, the role of IFAs has to be reassessed. In order to become a
\nuseful part of a global labour strategy, IFAs must be primarily understood and
\nused as global organizing tools that can be evaluated by measurable
\noutcomes. Where rights such as freedom of association and the right to
\ncollective bargaining are affirmed, IFAs should contain provisions ensuring
\nthat such rights are actually exercised.
\nIFAs must confront the employment-destroying nature of the system as a
\nwhole, which is not the same thing as fighting individual plant closures. In
\nnegotiating IFAs, the priority should be to put a stop to outsourcing and
\ncasualisation, which are now rampant throughout the manufacturing and
\nservices industries. Unions must claim the right to challenge management
\npolicies and decisions when these are damaging to labour interests and to the
\ngeneral interests of society. In other words, IFAs can and should become
\ninstruments of industrial democracy.
\nWe know that very few companies would today be prepared to sign on to such
\na program. That is no reason to scale down our level of ambition and to refuse
\nto develop adequate responses to the crisis we are facing. In conclusion, we
\ncannot do better than quote from a speech of the IUF communications
\ndirector addressing the same issues last year:
\n“We need to develop a political response to the corporate program, and
\nwe need to link this program to our members’ day-to-day struggles in
\nways which can effectively challenge the enormous shift in the balance
\nof power which is what globalisation is fundamentally about. While the
\nchallenge is enormous, we must never forget that the historic gains of
\nthe labour movement – gains which profoundly transformed the world
\nwe live in – seemed scarcely realizable when we first began to fight for
\nthem. We fought and we won. There was nothing inevitable about the
\ncorporate advances of the last two decades. We were simply out-
\norganized at all levels, or failed to organize because we didn’t
\nappreciate the significance of what was taking place.” (Rossman, 2003)
\nReferences<\/strong><\/em>
\nCarley M. (2001). Bargaining at European Level? Joint Texts Negotiated by
\nEuropean Works Councils, European Foundation for the Improvement of
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\n(1) The exceptions are the labour movement in the United States and Canada, and in the United Kingdom and Ireland, where some unions hold membership and collective bargaining rights in both countries.
\n(2) As seen by the author himself who was at that time the general secretary of the IUF.
\n(3) The film is called “The Real Thing”. It was shown at hundreds of solidarity meetings in many
\ncountries.
\n(4) Paul Abrecht of the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR), New York. His report is available in the IUF archives.
\n(5) Kaptein, S. P. and Klamer, H. K. (1991). Ethische Bedrijfscodes in Nederlandse Bedrijven,
\nNederlands Christelijk Werkgeversbond, The Hague, quoted in van Liemt G. (1999), “Codes of
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\nStandards in Export Industries, paper presented at the conference on Multinational Enterprises and the Social Challenges of the 21st Century”, Leuven, May 3-4.
\n(6) Caterpillar: Code of Worldwide Business Conduct; Sara Lee Knit Products: International Operating Principles; DuPont: Labour Relations Policies and Principles; quoted in ILO document GB.273\/WP\/SDL\/1 (Add. 1): \u201cOverview of global developments and Office activities concerning codes of conduct, social labeling and other private sector initiatives addressing labour issues\u201d, (Annex, endnotes 69 and 70), November 1998
\n(7) “The experience is that independent and secure trade unions are the most effective means of ending or of preventing the exploitation and abuse of workers. Codes of conduct are not as efficient as what workers can do for themselves when they are allowed to join free trade unions and to bargain collectively with their employer in the knowledge that their rights are secure and protected. The objectives of codes are best achieved when governments respect the trade union rights of workers. Self-promulgated codes that do not mention trade union rights give the impression that it is possible to protect workers’ interests without respecting their right to organize into independent trade unions. This impression is reinforced where codes merely pledge the company to respect national laws and practice.” (ICFTU (1997), p. 2). Also:
\n[…] “Independent monitoring by itself … is not sufficient to ensure respect for minimal worker rights and occupational and environmental health and safety standards. No independent monitor can substitute for the independent organization of workers through their trade unions, which must be represented on the monitoring bodies for these to meaningfully do their job.” (Ron Oswald, IUF General Secretary, in a letter to the International Herald Tribune, June 9, 1998)
\n(8) A note on terminology is in order. About twenty years ago, a new vocabulary was introduced in the public discourse on industrial relations, typically involving concepts like “social partners” and “social partnership”, or “social dialogue”. This vocabulary seems to have originated with the EU Treaty of Rome (1984), but has since, unfortunately, been adopted by the ILO and by most international trade union organisations. In fact, it is not designed to reflect reality but to hide it. “Partnership”, by any definition, assumes shared interests. In recent years. it has become increasingly obvious that whatever shared interests may have existed or still exist between workers and employers, they are overridden by conflicts of opposing interests in most areas of industrial relations. Today, trade unions do not have
\n“social partners” in any real sense: the accurate term would be: “social counterparts”. As for “social dialogue”, it is a particularly vague and meaningless term, obviously designed to dilute the reality of labour\/management relations, perhaps to sidestep terms like “negotiation”. Since vocabulary is never innocent, it is worth reflecting on what interest is served by introducing this kind of language.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"