Conclusions
Earlier in this document we stated that the key questions concerning “dialogue” with state-run organisations in a dictatorship were: for what purpose? and at what price? These two questions must be answered. If the answer is that there is no useful purpose to be served or that the price is too high, the only sensible conclusion is to forget about “dialogue” until the situation changes and the questions about purpose and cost can be answered differently. This could be the case in the present instance.

The trade union and democratic activists in China and Hong Kong do not oppose “dialogue” with the Chinese state and its institutions on principle, and neither do democratic trade unionists elsewhere need to oppose it on principle. The defence of workers’ interests requires trade unionists to meet different kinds of unsavoury characters from time to time, for example in negotiations, and the only important question when this happens is if the outcome justifies such contacts.
In this instance, a net gain is only imaginable if the contacts take place within a framework of a policy that Chinese workers can recognise as expressing their own interests and aspirations and if they strengthen their capacity to defend their interest.
For this to happen, and for “dialogue” to advance trade union rights rather than just provide a fig-leaf for the lack of an appropriate policy on trade union rights in relation to China, it should meet the following basic criteria:
(1) NO FALSE PREMISES: A dialogue between the ICFTU (or any other democratic trade union organisation, also at national level) and the ACFTU is not a dialogue between two trade union organisations but between a trade union organisation on the one hand and a state organisation on the other. When speaking to the ACFTU, democratic trade unions are speaking to the Chinese state through its labour administration branch. The relationship is not one between equals or partners but one between two counterparts involved in a negotiation.
(2) CLEAR AND SUBSTANTIVE OBJECTIVES: The ICFTU-APRO has stated that the purpose of dialogue is “bringing about the extension of the ICFTU’s position on labour and social issues.” This needs to be clarified and spelled out. It has to mean specific and tangible advances in terms of trade union and human rights. A clear agenda for substantive discussions should be prepared in advance. The focus should be on achieving specific objectives, such as the release of independent trade unionists and democratic activists, including medical parole for prisoners with serious health problems, repealing the state security law, improving prison conditions, abolition of “re-education through labour” and of prison labour, ratification and implementation of key ILO conventions (notably 87 and 98), recognition of independent trade unions, implementation of existing protective labour legislation.
(3) ADEQUATE BRIEFING: The China issue is too important and it too complex to be handled by persons unprepared for the task. Participants in delegations have to take the time to be briefed in depth by persons of proven commitment and thorough knowledge of the labour situation in China and should be familiar with the existing published material on this issue. Chinese democratic trade unionists (HKCTU, Han Dongfang and others), as well as NGOs with specific relevant expertise, should be involved in preparing any dialogue and in the discussions themselves.
(4) TRANSPARENT AND ACCOUNTABLE PROCESS: A full report of the ICFTU-APRO September mission, and of all subsequent missions, should be circulated to all ICFTU affiliates and to the ITSs for comment. Full consultations should be conducted with key affiliates in future missions, including of course those principally affected: the democratic trade unions in Hong Kong.
(5) AVOID FALSE DEBATES: Chinese government representatives have recently been advocating the idea that any engagement on human rights should be conducted on the basis of “equality and mutual respect.” International human rights and labour rights standards provide the most appropriate way of doing just that: they apply to all countries equally, all are responsible for their fair and impartial enforcement and no one is immune from scrutiny. False debates should be avoided. Dialogue should not be used to engage in empty talk about “cultural differences” and “priorities” or to discuss specious claims that China concentrates on “the right to subsistence” and “the right to development” rather than “individual rights”.
(6) DECLARE WHAT IS NOT NEGOTIABLE: No ICFTU or ITS mission should become involved in a discussion on the rights of democratic unions in Hong Kong or of Han Dongfang as representative of independent trade unionism in China. There is no reason for ICFTU or ITS representatives to initiate a discussion on the status, the rights and the activities of democratic trade unionists in Hong Kong, as long as they are allowed to function freely. At the slightest suggestion of pressure on the part of the Chinese government, there should be a clear and unequivocal expression of support, along the lines of DGB president Dieter Schulte’s statement in February 1996: “For German trade unions, solidarity with Han Dongfang is solidarity with the people of China.” All attempts to criminalise independent trade unionism should also be rejected as unacceptable: independent trade unionists detained in China are not “criminals”; the laws they may have infringed probably deserve that description.
(7) INTERNATIONAL CO-ORDINATION: National unions that are engaged in dialogue with the Chinese authorities (including the ACFTU) should co-ordinate among themselves and compare notes within the framework of the ICFTU or their respective ITSs, so as to use the opportunities most effectively and to prevent duplication and waste of resources, as well as preventing such dialogue being used to split union organisations seeking improvements in China’s labour rights practices. It may be appropriate to set up a permanent framework for such co-ordination.
(8) INTEGRATED STRATEGY: Dialogue cannot be a substitute for pressure. A number of factors, including the record of human rights diplomacy relating to China, the principles of non-selectivity and universality in the application of human rights and labour rights standards and the severity of rights violations which continue to occur in China, indicate that international pressure remains a critical component of any effective strategy for achieving improvements in China’s human rights practices. Dialogue must be part of an integrated strategy: it should be one of a package of measures, and must be backed up with significant pressure, such as raising rights violations in the ILO and the UN Commission on Human Rights and speaking out publicly on specific instances of rights abuse. Dialogue without pressure is nothing but appeasement and will merely serve to degrade the authority of international standards and of the international trade union movement.
(9) REFUSE TO BE A PRISONER OF DIALOGUE: Threats to break off dialogue on the part of the ACFTU should under no circumstances be accepted by democratic trade unionists as a reason for making concessions. They should simply be noted as an indication that the possibilities for dialogue have run their course – whether permanently or temporarily would be a matter for the ACFTU to decide.
Recommendations
On Hong Kong
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The HKCTU, as a major local affiliate, should be as a matter of course among the decision makers of ICFTU and ITS policy and programs in China and Hong Kong, and should not be considered only an occasional consultation partner.
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The organising capacity of the HKCTU should be strengthened by financial support from all sections of the international trade union movement. It is not necessary to match the financial resources of the FTU and the support it receives from the Chinese government: the HKCTU can do much more with less. Its applications are modest and there is no reason why they should not be met in full.
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As a preventive measure against the usual tactics of isolation before attack, continuous and concerted efforts should be made by the ICFTU, the ITSs and national trade union organisations to enhance the international links and representation of the HKCTU. The international contacts of the HKCTU should be broadened and diversified through bi-lateral delegations, missions, co-operation programs and all other possible forms of international exchange between the HKCTU and various national trade union centers and national unions. The HKCTU should also be assisted in obtaining representation in every useful international platform, such as the ILO, the UN Commission on Human Rights, etc., as well as, of course, the ICFTU and the ITSs.
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There is generally a lack of awareness, discussion and articulation on political developments and strategies in Hong Kong. This is demonstrated by the unclear and narrow ideological platform of the political parties in the HKSAR (see above). The HKCTU wishes to carry out a sustained educational program among its members and the public on political development, in particular in the direction of social-democracy. Such a program should be fully supported by the international trade union movement.
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Should applications for affiliation be received from the FTU or FTU unions to the ICFTU or ITSs, such applications should be rejected on the grounds that the political commitments of the organisation are incompatible with the constitutions and the responsibilities of democratic international trade unions in general.
On China
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Full support, politically and financially, should be extended to Han Dongfang and other Chinese democratic trade unionists, by the ICFTU, ITSs and national trade union organisations in a position to do so.
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A permanent campaign should be organised by the international trade union movement for the release of all trade union and democratic activists detained in China, until they are all out of jail and until their actions no longer constitute criminal offences in China.
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Full support should be extended to workers struggling to assert their rights in China, by publicly exposing and denouncing the repression against them.
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An ICFTU High Level Mission to China in 1998 is premature. It represents a major diplomatic victory for the Chinese government for which there is no counterpart of equal value on the table. The mission should be postponed until significant progress is visible on human and trade union rights issues in China and any invitations of the ACFTU to seminars, joint conferences and other multilateral meetings should be postponed.
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Any bilateral contacts by IUF affiliates should respect the policy agreed at the April 1995 IUF Executive Committee regarding such bilateral contacts (circular attached).
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So far as contacts between the ICFTU and the ACFTU are concerned, the main contact point should be the ICFTU secretariat in Brussels. What happens in China is of concern and of critical importance to the whole world and the entire international trade union movement; there is no reason contacts and political responsibility should be sub-contracted only to a regional organization (no more than contacts with Russia, for example, should be sub-contracted to either ICFTU-APRO or the ETUC).
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A deepening of the internal discussion on China policy should be organised within the ICFTU with the participation of the HKCTU and HKTUC, Han Dongfang and the NGOs with special expertise in this field. A Working Party should be organised to that effect.
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Trade unionists who have visited China on behalf of their union or of their ITS within the context of a particular transnational company should have the opportunity to compare notes on their experiences and explore ways in which international trade union activities within TNCs can be used to advance the cause of trade union rights in China. This could involve a series of meetings organized by ITSs or, as a minimum, through a network created for exchanging such information and experience.