on 24, 25 and 26 August 2001 in Geneva
conducted and edited by
Peter Rütters
© Peter Rütters
Dr. Peter Rütters teaches political science at the Free University of Berlin. He is the author of numerous publications on the structure and policies of international trade union organizations, biographies of German trade unionists persecuted under the Nazi regime and on the history of the German trade union movement after 1945. Among other books, the wrote an analysis of the post-war policies and the development of the IUF (Chancen internationaler Gewerkschaftspolitik, Bund Verlag, 1989), a history of IUF activities in South Africa (Gegen Apartheid und für Gewerkschaftsfreiheit, 1996) and a history of the IUF (co-author: Sigvard Nyström), published in English and Spanish by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in 1990. The interview below appeared in: On the History and Policy of the IUF, edited by Peter Rütters and Rüdiger Zimmermann, published by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in 2003 (in German and English).

“… I believe that I did just about the most I was capable of doing in this period with the means available …”
Contents:
1. Family, Schooling, Studies, Political Socialisation
2. Election to the Post of General Secretary 1968
3. Ambitions, Goals, and Activities as General Secretary
4. The Executive Committee
5. European Regional Organisation
6. Other Regional Organisations
7. Multinational Companies
8. Trade Union und Human Rights
9. Training and Organisational Development Programmes
10. ILO and Other International Governmental Organisations
11. The Equality Issue in the IUF
12. Co-operation with Trade Union Organisations
13. Development since 1989
14. Solidarity and Identity
15. A Sort of Summary
1. Family, Schooling, Studies, Political Socialisation
R: I’d like to begin the interview by asking about how you came to the IUF. But before you describe how you become the assistant of Juul Poulsen, the then General Secretary of the Food workers’ international in August 1960, perhaps you could tell us something about your family history and your own development up to when you joined the IUF?
Dan Gallin: I was born on 26th April 1931 in Lwów in Poland. My father was the Romanian consul-general. My family comes from Czernowitz, which then belonged to Austro-Hungary. My maternal grandfather owned a confectionery business and was called Kucharczyk. Czernowitz was then a multicultural city like many in Austro-Hungary. My mother was part Polish, part Armeno-Polish. The Armeno-Poles no longer exist. But from the cultural point of view my mother and her family were German-speaking, and the family of my father was naturally Romanian. I spent the first six years of my life in Poland in Lwów. Then my father was transferred to Hamburg as Romanian consul-general. That’s were I went to school. My parents sent me to a Roman Catholic school because it wasn’t a Nazi school.
R: Was this a conscious decision?
G: Yes. Although basically my father was anti-Catholic because of his Romanian nationalism. For him belonging to the Greek-Orthodox Church was part of his Romanian identity, although he wasn’t particularly religious. Then – it must have been 1938 – I had private tuition from a Romanian teacher whom my father had fetched from Romania. For about two years I followed the Romanian primary school curriculum and then received the primary school-leaving certificate from the Romanian embassy in Berlin. In 1940 my father was transferred to Berlin, again as Romanian consul-general. In Berlin my parents sent me to the French Gymnasium, which I attended until August 1943.
R: Why did your parents opt for the French Gymnasium?
G: Because it had the reputation of being the educational institution in Berlin least contaminated by Nazism. That was why a couple of other people were there. Klaus Wagenbach, Thomas Bonhoeffer … Wagenbach came from a Catholic family, his father was an official of the Centre Party. Bonhoeffer came from the Protestant tradition, was also very religious, and even then anti-Nazi. Within a year we had formed a little anti-Nazi group.
R: How did this manifest itself?
G: It expressed itself in jokes we told each other about Nazis; some of us refused to make the Hitler salute at the beginning of classes, which was relatively easier for me because I was a foreigner and the child of a diplomat as well. But a few Germans for whom it was dangerous also refused; and we discussed what had become of the Jews.
R: Was this already a topic for an eleven or twelve-year-old child?
G: Yes. – Because there were suddenly a lot of Jewish stars in the streets, and then they slowly disappeared. We wondered where they’d gone. In our families we’d been told that we weren’t to talk about it because it was dangerous.
R: Where there any answers? Suspicions?
G: Resettlement. Forced resettlement, but it was all only rumours. We simply didn’t get anywhere with this issue.
R: In 1943 you moved to Switzerland. How did that come about?
G: After the first major bombing raid on Berlin my parents sent me to Switzerland to get me out of danger. They put me in a private school, Le Rosey, at that time only for boys. An upper-middle class cadre school with a lot of prominent students, were I received a very thorough education.
R: In what sense thorough?
G: Thorough in the sense that we had highly qualified teachers who taught us a great deal, knowledge and also skills, for example, I learned to write there. In Le Rosey I prepared the French baccalauréat in literature and philosophy. Apart from that we had sport every afternoon, which later made a lot possible for me. It gave me a healthy constitution that later allowed me to do things that might have been dangerous or rash for others. In many ways I disliked school. To leave the family for the first time to go into a boarding school is always dramatic, especially when it’s in another country. Secondly, I increasingly disliked the elite nature of the school. That hadn’t been my education to date – at any rate, I stayed at Le Rosey until 1948, until I’d completed the first part of the French baccalauréat. I then prepared the second part at the Ecole Lemania in Lausanne. I failed first time round, and finally passed in autumn 1949. I had gradually had enough of school. At that period I began to read a great deal. I discovered Camus, Sartre, and Malraux, and Koestler, as well. Koestler back in my last year at Le Rosey. Darkness at Noon and later The Yogi and the Commissar. I had discovered surrealism for myself. It was a tremendous experience for me, first in painting and later in literature.
R: What impressed you in painting?
G: Dali, Magritte, Max Ernst … That was just my thing. I lived it. It was something that I was really looking for and found. It appealed to me enormously.
R: Do you know what it was that appealed to you?
G: The rebellion, I think, the rebellion, the revolt. And I began to take an interest in left-wing ideas.
R: What aroused this interest? How did it arise?
G: It wasn’t by chance. It came from my parents. As I mentioned, my father was a Romanian nationalist. But in the Romania of the interwar period nationalism had a strong populist trend. My father wasn’t in the slightest elitist, he felt a commitment to the people. For example, I recall a little conversation, I must have been six years old. We were walking along the Alster in Hamburg and I asked him who was worse, the Bolsheviks or the Nazis? He replied, the Nazis. If the Bolsheviks gained the upper hand in Europe they would exterminate us, our family, our friends, and all our acquaintance. But if the Nazis gained the upper hand in Europe they would wipe out the Romanian nation. The Bolsheviks were therefore the lesser evil. My mother was politically much more conservative, but she had absolutely no time for Romanian nationalism. Her world had come to an end with the demise of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, with the death of Franz Josef. And the substitute was the Pan-European Movement, the pan-European idea, which was represented at the time by Coudenhove-Kalergi. In this sense she was an internationalist. My father’s populism and my mother’s internationalism were really the basic conditions for the later development of my socialist thinking.
R: After leaving school you spent a number of years in the United States, you studied and worked there, and engaged in politics. What took you to America in 1949?
G: Chance contacts got me a scholarship for an American university, the University of Kansas in Lawrence. And there I began to study political science. I lived in a student co-operative, communal accommodation. A group in these co-operatives published a literary-political magazine called Upstream, which I found interesting. There was also a right-wing student journal, called The Eagle, edited by ultra-conservative students. In Lausanne I’d begun to paint, and was thinking of becoming a painter. I therefore offered to paint posters for Upstream, which I then did. One day The Eagle printed an article in praise of Franco Spain. That seemed intolerable to me, although at the time I did not have a particular political affiliation. I wrote an article against it, which appeared in Upstream. They liked the article so much that I was asked to join the editorial staff of Upstream. In this period in America there were countless student magazines. Every university published two or three. And they were distributed by the university libraries, which also held magazines from other universities.
R: This was the period when your political commitment began, when you joined a Trotskyist group. How did this come about?
G: I’d started to take a look at America by hitching around the place. And I came across a magazine that was called Anvil & Student Partisan. It was a magazine that seemed very interesting to me. It was put out by the youth organisation of a very small group, the Independent Socialist League [ISL]. The youth organisation was called the Socialist Youth League. The Independent Socialist League had split from the Trotskyist movement on account of the Russian question. The official Trotskyist movement took the view that Russia was a “degenerate workers’ state”, whereas this group held that Russia was in no sense of the word a workers’ state but a new class society that meant even worse oppression for the workers than in capitalist society. This meant that one shouldn’t defend the USSR but had to fight on two fronts. That was how I saw the situation, and so I went to see this group in New York. Some time later, it could have been 1951, between 1950 and 1951, I joined the party, the group, unofficially, because as a foreigner I wasn’t supposed to, and threw myself into political work with all the zeal of a new experience.
R: Your political involvement led to your visa not being renewed and in March 1953 you had to leave the United States. But it also led to your meeting your future wife in this Trotskyist group.
G: Yes, I’d caught the attention of the authorities, who asked me to send them my passport. It was a stateless person’s passport with an American visa that was just about to run out. I sent them the passport, and they kept it until the visa had run out. Then they arrested me because I was in the country without a valid visa. I had to put up bail, $500, to be released. That was in 1952. The authorities told me I should apply for a hearing at the Immigration Service on Columbus Circle in New York to determine whether I was to be deported or not. In the meantime I become close friends with Elizabeth Focht, who was active in the Socialist Youth in Chicago. The two of us hitched to New York. Because of an oversight I waited in vain In New York for a hearing at the Immigration Service where I’d registered. In the meanwhile I’d found a job in a public library, my comrade, too, and there we used the opportunity to organise a union. It was the only union I’ve ever organised in my life. To replace an old communist union, which had collapsed, something new had to be created. And that’s what we did. And we continued with our political work, attended meetings, sold magazines on the street. Everything that’s involved.
R: What induced you to abandon this path?
G: My parents were very nervous and asked, What is happening to you? When are you coming back? And so on. I would really have liked to stay on in New York. I liked it there. But in fact I thought to myself, now you have the choice: either you go underground, into illegality, take on a new identity and become a professional revolutionary, or you stay legal and do everything that’s necessary to do so. I took the latter option. I thought I didn’t want to become a professional revolutionary because I wanted to live a normal life with normal people. So in the spring of 1953 I once again applied for a hearing at the Immigration Service, with the result that I had to leave the country, albeit on my own, within a month. Anyway, this meant that in March 1953 I was back in Europe. Together with my wife, my comrade, I went to my parents in Geneva, where we lived temporarily.
R: Did your parents accept their son’s political involvement?
G: I had problems with my parents. They hadn’t expected their son to become a socialist-Trotskyist activist, nor that he’d turn up with a woman who also belonged to this organisation. Nothing in their lives had prepared them for such a situation, so that relations were very tense, less with my father than with my mother. Finally, I married my wife in December 1953. Tension abated only slowly. My wife found a job, then we moved out and had our own apartment. That made everything easier.
R: In the following years you studied sociology, then you worked for some years for the FAO [Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations], and began at the IUF in August 1960. In the 1950s you had kept up your political engagement in the socialist-Trotskyist environment. How did you come to be appointed to the IUF?
G: I had naturally continued my work in the ISL from Geneva. Basically, I was the ISL’s foreign correspondent. I had planned to try and build up a network of similar groups, which for various reasons were not very well interlinked. I though it would actually be a good idea to use the situation to build up a network. And so I came into contact with many organisations. Also in Germany, where I came across the Funken Group* in Frankfurt, and got to know the IG-Metall historian, Fritz Opel. Through the Funken Group I had contact with Henry Jacoby, who was then head of department at the FAO. He urgently advised me to complete my university studies. In 1958 he gave me a job in his department at the FAO.
R: And how did you come to move to the IUF?
G: I learned from Charles Levinson that the General Secretary of the IUF, Juul Poulsen, was looking for an assistant. I had met Charles Levinson, then Assistant General Secretary of the International Metal Workers’ Federation (IMF), in Rome in 1956 at a productivity congress where I was representing the sociology department of Geneva University. We’d become friends and he drew my attention to this job. I took up the suggestion at once, especially because I was very bored at the FAO. And it seemed to me a stroke of luck that I could become active in the international trade union movement. This was really in keeping with my ideas about what I wanted to do in life.
R: When and why did you develop the idea that work in an international trade union organisation would offer you a meaningful professional and political perspective?
G: There are several important points I have to go into here. First, my relationship with social democracy. My American group had disbanded in 1956 and its members had individually joined the Socialist Party, the American version of social democracy. At an earlier point in time, in 1955, I had become a member of the Swiss Social Democratic Party. In 1949 when I went to America and began to think and feel left-wing, it would never have occurred to me to join a socialist party. Basically, I found them boring – boring, bureaucratic, provincial, and uninteresting. After my return from America, with a bit more knowledge and experience, the social democratic movement seemed to me to be my natural home, regardless of whether I agreed with the politics of the leadership or the party or all members of the party. I realised that you can be in a left-wing mass party without necessarily founding a faction or having to declare your approval of principles or activities you don’t agree with. I had two options. I could try to get involved in politics, that is in the normal social democratic politics of elections, or I could try to be active in the movement in a different way, namely in the trade unions. It wasn’t a clear-cut option at this point.. But I tended to consider the trade union movement as more important because somehow it seemed to me to be more authentic than the party, in the sense that it had closer ties with the membership and that in trade unions politics has a more direct consequences than in parties, insofar as the membership generally has the possibility of judging its leadership more quickly than in a party. Trade unions actually are the first genuine and in many cases last line of resistance against capital and against the various forces we have to combat. So I found the trade union movement increasingly attractive, whereas I could no longer imagine embracing a political career.
R: And with this in mind Charles Levinson drew your attention to the job at the IUF?
G: At any rate when I heard about this job at the IUF I went to Poulsen and he took me on immediately – at a lower salary than I got at the FAO, but I couldn’t care less. Then I started work in the IUF as chief cook and bottle washer.
2. Election to the Post of General Secretary in 1968
R: In 1970 the Congress elected you General Secretary after the Managing Committee of the IUF (now the Executive Committee) had appointed you Acting General Secretary in 1968. The election was actually supposed to take place at the 1967 Dublin Congress but it was postponed because of dissension. What nevertheless made you perhaps the “natural” successor to Juul Poulsen?
G: I became the “natural successor” because in fact I was already largely running the organisation and also had the necessary expertise and because my professional, political, and other qualifications for the job was recognised by a large part of the affiliates. Normally I would have been elected at a congress.
R: Was this the position you had been hoping for when you entered the IUF or in the course of your work for the IUF?
G: No. When I started at the IUF as Poulsen’s assistant I never imagined that I would ever become General Secretary in this organisation.
R: Because this wasn’t your career plan?
G: I didn’t think I was acceptable. I thought this position should really be taken by a seasoned trade unionist, which I didn’t consider myself to be. I saw myself as a technician, naturally with political views and a certain know-how. But I couldn’t see myself as General Secretary.
R: What changed your mind?
G: What made me to try for this position and stand for election was the Latin American situation, the conflict between the IUF and the AFL-CIO [American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations] in Latin America.* I thought if I don’t fight and if I don’t get to be General Secretary the organisation runs the risk of falling back into the old pattern – it could have ended differently. The Latin American regional organisation would then have remained isolated, perhaps it would have received no more support from the centre, perhaps it would have folded.
R: And what prevented your election at the 1967 Congress – that sort of thing rarely happens in trade unions?
G: At the Congress the leader of the American delegation, who belonged to a union closely aligned with what was then AFL-CIO international policy, declared that the American organisations would withdraw if I were to be elected. The Congress then asked Poulsen to stay on for another year, and the whole issue was sent back to the Managing Committee. In the meanwhile Patrick Gorman, General Secretary of the Meat Cutters [Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America] – an old socialist trade union with a European constitution under which the General Secretary was the leader and not the president as in all other American unions – sent an lengthy telex to the Managing Committee in which he declared that they would leave if I wasn’t elected. At that time the Meat Cutters were the American union in the IUF with the biggest membership. This made it clear to the Europeans what was going on and in September 1968 the Managing Committee appointed me Acting General Secretary.
R: What led to the revolt of the American unions in 1967?
G: When we closed down the Latin American regional offices in 1965 and reconstituted a regional organisation about a year later, it was a great shock of the AFL-CIO. They then investigated to find out where the enemy was and found my file at the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] concerning my quasi-expulsion in 1953 and my political activity in the United States. Then they knew where the enemy was. And on this basis they then claimed that I was mainly responsible for the collapse of their operation in Latin America and for putting the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] out of business in the IUF field. And they were largely right. That was the reason why they said my election as General Secretary was incompatible with membership of an American union.
R: Things appeared to have calmed down by 1968, at least within the IUF?
G: Only one person on the Managing Committee voted against my appointment: Max Greenberg from the RWDSU. In 1970 my appointment was then confirmed by Congress, which at the same time elected an American President, Daniel Conway from the American Bakery & Confectionery Workers’ Union (ABC). The bakers were one of the unions that didn’t understand what had happened in Latin America. All they’d understood was that we had done something terrible by putting an end to cooperation with the AFL-CIO.
R: Under these circumstances, how did cooperation with an American President work out?
G: Shortly before the Congress I had a talk with Conway. He invited me to lunch and told me, It could be that I become President. You’ll probably become General Secretary. We have to work together. What do you actually have against the CIA? I knew that he had originally been organiser for the bakers in the Western United States. And I asked him: when you come to a small town where you have to organise a bakery, what’s the first obstacle you come up against? He replied: the sheriff. And I said: exactly. The CIA is the world-wide sheriff, and I don’t like cops. After that we got along very well.
R: Did your controversial election have any consequences for your position as General Secretary and for your acceptance as a person?
G: No, basically it consolidated my position enormously.
R: Why?
G: Because I came out on top in this endurance test, this acid test. It also has something to do with the culture of the IUF. In the IUF, I think, since it was founded, “being left-wing” has never been perceived as negative. The first General Secretary, Jean Schifferstein, was a left-winger. Hermann Leuenberger was left-wing. Juul Poulsen was a left-wing socialist by conviction. And I believe that was in keeping with the expectations and views of the membership; after all, from the very beginning the IUF was an organisation of small, weak unions, naturally with a few exceptions, which constantly had to fight for survival, even in the industrialised countries. This means that it has a militant culture. And for this reason the concept “left-wing” was never a negative one in the IUF, so that it was never to my disadvantage in the IUF that I was identified as being left-wing. After all, even the majority of our American member unions were left-wing.
R: But surely this was not the case with Daniel Conway’s Bakery & Confectionery Workers?
G: Conway was neither left-wing nor a politically trained trade unionist, but a very upright trade unionist, an extraordinarily decent man. And he understood what motivated me: that I wasn’t there to affiliate the IUF to the Fourth International or to make some sort of attempt to split or subvert the organisation or to merge it with the WFTU [World Federation of Trade Unions], and who knows what else, but that I wanted to build up a clean, combative organisation. And that’s what he wanted, too. We had no problems.
R: So the majority of the American unions accepted you?
G: Yes. – From the 1970 Congress on I was elected unanimously at each congress.
3. Ambitions, Goals and Activities as General Secretary
R: What ideas did you have about the future development of the IUF when you assumed the functions of General Secretary?
G: My point of departure was: the IUF is a trade union organisation, and a trade union organisation is a combat organisation; i.e., it is called upon to engage in combat and where possible to win. It seemed to me an indispensable precondition for this to ensure the independence of the organisation. That is what the struggle against the CIA in Latin America was all about. So, independence from any sort of government influence, let alone employers and whatever. And also from parties. As a socialist I wouldn’t have wanted us to have been somehow subordinated to a socialist party structure or to have been dependent on it. At that time, however, this was only a theoretical question. There was only one practical question then, which was dependence on the American administration, on the CIA and others.
R: Dependence or influence?
G: It could have led to dependence. There were organisations that were really dependent, e.g., the International Federation of Petroleum Workers. That was a CIA operation from the outset and had never been anything else.
R: Coming back to the IUF: apart from independence were there any other important prerequisites for trade union action?
G: The second was to stabilise the organisation internally, and that meant debureaucratising it. Regionalisation was decisive in this regard. It has led to debureaucratisation by gradually changing the Executive Committee; it has become more demanding, much better informed, better educated, I could almost say. It has developed from a rubber-stamp body into a demanding, critical, educated executive. It took years and ran parallel to the development of the IUF from a mailbox into a combat organisation.
R: Was the IUF a mailbox organisation before 1968?
G: When I joined the IUF in 1960, it was a mailbox. Members didn’t expect anything else. But it must be said that, from the present-day vantage point, it was a quiet period when the trade union movement really had no problems. That changed radically in the 1970s.
R: Can we go back to your ambitions as General Secretary?
G: Then there is the third important point, for which the independence of the organisation and its internal stabilisation are preconditions: to achieve effective coordination at the transnational company level. In all, to make my contribution towards making the IUF an exemplary spearhead organisation of the international trade union movement. I found broad support for this in the organisation, since it was a programme that met the expectations of most member unions.,
R: What internal changes in the IUF were associated with the internal stabilisation of the organisation?
G: The most important development was the strengthening of the democratic culture within the organisation, i.e., the ability to deal with one another democratically without anyone feeling threatened or marginalised. The organisations who have to be protected are the weak, and the strong have to learn that this is their obligation too, and that that’s the price of democratic life in the organisation. It had to be accepted that important issues can also be represented by organisations that are perhaps weak organisations and come from the Third World, and that they are to be treated with respect and fully discussed instead of being brushed aside by the majority. To a certain degree this has succeeded.
R: Apart from this, did you manage to implement your ambitious programme?
G: Only partly. I never believed I really had the ability to create an ideal organisation. I’ve always thought that, basically, everyone has a duty to do the most he can in the time he’s there. No one can do more. At any rate, I tried to do all I could to the best of my ability without any illusions that I could actually attain all my goals. But you have to have the goals to get anywhere, to achieve anything at all.
R: And more specifically. To what extent does the position of General Secretary permit the implementation of such a programme?
G: It’s a question of political skill. Naturally, a General Secretary can’t act all on his own. Coalitions are needed. You need support, that means coalitions of important affiliates that understand your goals, agree with them and support them. I managed to achieve this in many cases, certainly on the issue of independence; largely, although never sufficiently, with regard to the internal stabilisation and democratisation of the organisation; partly on the question of action against transnational corporations; in this field the obstacles I never quite managed to overcome came from Europe, from European separatism. That was perhaps the hardest fight in my term of office.
4. Executive Committee
R: Before we talk about “European separatism,” I’d like to take up a remark you’ve just made. You stress the changes in the Executive Committee (until 1973 this decision-making body was called “Managing Committee”), which during your term of office became more demanding and competent. Wasn’t it so in the 1950s and 1960s? Especially at that period, too, there were highly experienced, self-confident, decisive, and assertive trade unionists on the committee – Henri Ceuppens, Hans Nätscher, Marius Madsen, John Swift,* to name only a few. What changed?
G: The Executive Committee of the 1950s was the one that went to America and were taken for a ride with the AFL-CIO proposal to organise the IUF in Latin America, which ultimately put the IUF in Latin America under the control of the CIA for a time. These experienced, self-confident trade unionists didn’t know enough to prevent this, and brought the IUF into mortal danger.
R: Was it a lack of judgment or information?
G: A lack of knowledge, but also because the IUF was taken less seriously than it was later. The Executive Committee as it has developed in the course of time included more and more people who take the IUF seriously and who believe that the IUF is important both for their national unions and in general, as well. In the 1950s and 1960s, in contrast, members regarded the IUF mostly as a side show. Otherwise they might have acquired the expertise they needed to make intelligent decisions. This sort of carelessness with regard to the IUF no longer exists.
R: Can you illustrate this change?
G: Relations between the North American unions and the IUF could be a good example. Since the early 1950s, since they joined the IUF, they had been represented on the Executive Committee. The Meat Cutters, as the biggest union, had a seat on the Committee. Patrick Gorman had been elected, but never came to meetings. . He always sent vice-presidents whom he wanted to reward with a trip to Europe. . And these people turned up for the meeting of the Executive Committee completely unprepared. There were conscientious and serious trade unionists among them who were shocked when they saw that really serious issues were dealt with by the Committee – even at the low level of the time – for which they had not been prepared. That’s inconceivable nowadays. And these preparations don’t begin a month before the meeting of the Committee, they go on the whole year, every year. That’s why I am talking about another Executive Committee.
R: Still considering this example, what has changed in the attitude of the American unionists?
G: There was a fundamental change because of the transnational corporations, when they realised that their own companies were operating throughout the world. If they wanted to keep their bargaining power with these companies they had to get together with other unions in other countries. The IUF’s coordinating activities in transnational corporations were absolutely decisive in this respect, and have changed the attitude of the American unions on the importance and the nature of international trade union policy.
5. European Regional Organisation
R: I’d like to come back to your remark about “European separatism” and the controversy about the European regional organisation. Since 1967 the IUF had been setting up regional organisations whose status and ties with the IUF were, however, settled only by an amendment of the statutes at the 1973 Congress (Article 12). The first regional organisation of the IUF was in Latin America, followed later by other regions. The regional organisations have their own structures, enjoy a high measure of independence in the regions, coordinate and represent the interests of affiliates vis-à-vis and in the central decision-making bodies of the IUF. Some are now even able to finance themselves. The 1967 decision to set up a regional organisation for and in Latin America was in reaction to the loss of control by the Geneva Secretariat over regional activities in Latin America since the beginning of the 1960s.
G: First of all it must be stressed that the founding of the regional organisation for Latin America, and later for Asia, Africa, and, finally, for North America had to do not only with the question of a loss of control but also with preserving the independence of the organisation. The reason was, after all, to fend off intervention by the CIA, and precisely that implied preserving the independence of the international organisation. After we had stopped all activities in Latin America in 1965 and had done nothing for a year, we re-launched regional policy a year later on a new basis and created the first regional organisation of the IUL. The idea was to prevent anything like that ever happening again. And the answer was democracy. First of all we set up a regional organisation for Latin America without North America, with an elected governing body and an elected Regional Secretary, thus no more proconsuls from Geneva or Washington or wherever, but officials elected from among the membership. The creation of the Latin American regional organisation was incredibly important for Latin America but also for the IUF in general because this regional organisation became the model for all regional organisations. Gradually the IUF came to be composed of affiliates that had their own self-determined intermediary structures in the form of regional organisations. Many trade secretariats didn’t understand this. How could you hand over so much power to the regions? they asked, while we repeatedly emphasised that our strength lay precisely in the fact that power was in the regions and member unions had the feeling they could influence the policy of the organisation. In this sense the regional organisations actually have a double function, they implement general IUF policy in the region but also convey the demands of regional affiliates to the IUF governing bodies.
R: To come back to Europe. The revision of the statutes in 1973, especially the commitment of the regional organisations to the policy and structures of the IUF, was the formal cause for relations between the existing European regional organisation and the IUF becoming the subject of fierce debate in the following years.
G: In a certain sense the issue in Europe was the same as in Latin America: it was all about preserving the independence of the IUF.
R: Why?
G: The starting point for the European organisation was a committee of the trade unions in the European Economic Community [EEC]; a small committee to which trade unions of the six EEC countries originally belonged. The IUF Executive Committee accepted this without any problem, because it was recognised that within the EEC trade unions were concerned with specific fields of activity, and because the committee was regarded as an interest group within the IUF.
R: What changed the situation?
G: The founding of the ETUC [European Trade Union Confederation] independently of the ICFTU [International Confederation of Free Trade Unions] as a general European organisation including the Christian trade unions and including the communist trade unions that had left the WFTU [World Federation of Trade Unions]. This changed the scope of the European organisations and gave them different objectives. At this point in time the European members in the European Community also decided to set up an independent organisation that was to have no organisational links with the IUF.
R: What led to this development?
G: I would say European nationalism, fostered by the Commission of the European Community and the ETUC. I see the ETUC as a product of the Commission, which had tried in the 1970s to establish exclusively European institutions at all levels, where necessary in competition to existing international organisations. The Commission assumed that it needed a European civil society, and where this didn’t exist in the form envisaged by the Commission, it tried to create it.
R: Wouldn’t this mean that the ETUC was more or less a political State creation?
G: Yes. So it was. Because the objective and political perspective of the ETUC from the outset was to strengthen a European identity at the cost of an international identity. It was plain European nationalism, which was intended to replace the various national nationalisms and which would necessarily lead to demarcation against international organisations and against the idea of world-wide international solidarity.
R: How did IUF member unions come to decide to found the ETUCF [European Trade Union Committee of Food and Allied Workers in the Community] as an organisation independent of the IUF?
G: It was generally recognised that the IUF should have a European regional organisation. The founding of the ETUCF, which saw itself as a trade union committee of the ETUC and not as an IUF institution, ran counter to this view and split IUF affiliates in Europe. This position was supported by the [German food worker’s union] NGG [Gewerkschaft Nahrung-Genuss-Gaststätten], and by the Belgian, Dutch, and Italian organisations and, naturally, Luxemburg.
R: Why did they want to be independent of the IUF, which would presumably have weakened the latter? After all, to some extent they were unions, or the successors of organisations, that had helped set up the IUF in 1920.
G: I believe there were political reasons: the influence of the Commission. The same reasons came to bear as with the founding of the ETUC, i.e., the view that in trade union matters Europe should keep to itself, isolated from international solidarity. The fact that Asia and Japan were not perceived as important from a union and general point of view perhaps also played a role.
R: What do you mean?
G: A lack of knowledge and reluctance to become involved with something far away, foreign, that didn’t belong to the “club.” There was pronounced club thinking in all this. It had to do with the personalities who originally founded the Committee (1958): Ceuppens, van Hattem, Stadelmaier.* These three, in particular, where the proponents of European separatism in the IUF. I regarded this development as highly dangerous for the IUF.
R: What was the danger for the IUF?
G: European separatism in trade union terms means stressing a particular European interest, partly in contradiction to the general international interest; shifting the focus of interest and commitment, possibly financially, as well, to the European level. At this time these positions were advocated very openly by this group when they said that, basically, what counted was Europe and the IUF could look after the rest of the world to the exclusion of Europe.
R: Were the differences in the 1970s formulated so clearly? I would have expected that a plea for an independent regional organisation would argue rather that a supranational political institution had arisen in Europe and that the trade unions had to create structures to establish their capacity to act and exert influence vis-à-vis this institution, and that these structures were not fundamentally directed against an international but, like national structures, related to a political institution.
G: That was the official position. Unofficially we were told that the IUF was responsible for Third World countries and for relations with the Americans, Japanese, and others, which were not, however, seen as important, whereas the European unions needed their own organisation together with the Christian and communist organisations. Activity was to focus on Europe in the sense of the European Community. I saw this as a direct threat to the IUF. Firstly – and here I see a parallel to developments in Latin America – because I did not consider that the independence of this European trade union organisation was safeguarded. I couldn’t imagine – and I still can’t – that a trade union organisation that is basically kept by the Commission has the necessary political independence to defend trade union interests effectively in the context of the European Union. And I believe that later developments have shown that this was a real problem. An organisation of this sort had to become a transmission belt of Commission policy in the trade union movement instead of an institution representing trade union interests at the EU level. 70% of the ETUC budget is still provided by the Commission.
R: Was the ETUCF also financially dependent on the Commission of the EC [European Communty/Communities] or EU [European Union]?
G: It was and is completely dependent, completely unable to operate without subsidies from the Commission. First the use of conference rooms in Brussels, second translation, interpreters, everything is paid by the Commission, whereas the IUF has to pay the interpreters itself at its meetings. When you consider that the greater part of conference costs are in fact interpreting and translation costs, you can see what this means.
R: To what extent does this establish heavy dependence on the Commission and endanger political independence?
G: I think it would be naïve to underestimate the psychological effects of this dependence. It creates dependency and thus threatens the political independence of the organisation.
R: After the founding of the ETUC and the 1973 amendment of the IUF statutes, a European organisation running parallel to the existing ETUCF, the EURO-IUF, was set up by the IUF. Why was this very unusual step taken?
G: Because of the differences in perspective and because of the actual political split in the IUF in Europe on the issue of the European regional organisation there was – to put it ironically – a “seven-years’ European civil war” in the IUF. The IUF founded a European regional organisation, the EURO-IUF, which was soon joined by the members of the ETUCF, as well, and applied to the ETUC for recognition of the EURO-IUF as “European trade union committee,” with the result that the ETUC granted neither of the two applications. The end of the story was the about-face on the part of the NGG when Günter Döding became chairman.
R: Before the story came to an end: Was the founding of an independent European organisation necessary if only because the IUF assembled social democratic trade unions, while the ETUC was non-aligned and demanded the same of “its” trade union committees?
G: We have always regarded it as the task of the IUF to establish the unity of all food etc. trade unions within the IUF. Thus we also took in the Christian organisations: the Belgian Catholic federation was the first to join, then the Dutch came, later Luxemburg. That defused the argument that the IUF – because it was under social democratic leadership and had a social democratic majority – was not open to Christian unions.
R: But apparently it was a problem for the IUF prior to 1974 to accept Christian trade unions?
G: It wasn’t a problem for the IUF, it was a problem for the Christian unions, because they had to make a choice between an international perspective and a European perspective. And at that time they opted for an international perspective.
R: And the links with the Christian trade union international, the WCL [World Confederation of Labour], were no obstacle for the IUF?
G: No. The Belgian organisation, which was the first to come to the IUF, belonged to a small Christian international of food workers in the WCL. We told them they could stay in the WCL and we would tolerate double membership. That eliminated their remaining doubts and they joined the IUF, mainly because the IUF was obviously a far more effective organisation.
R: Was the existence of the ETUCF a danger for the IUF chiefly because of competition for members and resources?
G: No. There was another problem. It seemed possible that the IUF could also be excluded from transnational work at the European level, as had happened, for example, to the International Metal Workers’ Federation [IMF] through the foundation of the independent European Metalworkers’ Federation [EMF]. We wanted to prevent this in the IUF. In all, the ETUCF represented three threats: the threat to independence through dependence on government influence through the EC Commission; second, the exclusion of the IUF from effective work in transnational companies; third, the longer-term threat to the material resources of the IUF, for its capacity to provide effective support for weaker members in other parts of the world.
R: Were these more in the way of potential threats? Or were there cases during the “seven-years’ civil war” where support was denied or transnational company activities weakened for Eurocentric reasons?
G: No, it was a potential threat, but which was expressed quite openly in statements made by responsible officials in Europe, that is by the ETUCF. It was associated with a view of solidarity, for example with unions in Third World countries, merely as providing aid – instead of understanding it as developing capacities, which could make reciprocal solidarity possible. They couldn’t imagine that one day they might need help from, say, South African trade unions. And this attitude is still widespread in European unions, a disastrous attitude in my view.
R: I’d like to come back to the changes you mentioned in the relationship between the IUF and the ETUFC triggered by the departure of Herbert Stadelmaier and the election of Günter Döding to leadership of the NGG. What brought the about-turn, the change of position?
G: Döding had clearly recognised the dangers that had arisen for the IUF and felt that the IUF should not be weakened, and that a European regional organisation had to be embedded in the IUF with the same statutes and with the same obligations as all other regional organisations. The outcome was the merger between the ETUCF and the EURO-IUF. The organisation that came into being through this merger, the European Committee of Food, Catering and Allied Workers’ Unions within the IUF [ECF-IUF] was both a European regional organisation under the IUF statutes and a trade union committee of the European Trade Union Confederation.
R: What induced the other trade union representatives to fall into line with the “Döding course”?
G: The first result was that the shift in position by the NGG created a majority for a European regional organisation integrated in the IUF. Since the NGG was determinant in Europe, other organisations fell into line.
R: Were other unions that had previously advocated or supported an autonomous European organisation so easily persuaded to the contrary?
G: It should be remembered that – as I said – there were just three champions of European separatism in the IUF. Furthermore, the Belgian and Dutch organisations had never thoroughly discussed the issue of a European perspective, activities, and goals. There had never been a congress that could have discussed these questions. Ceuppens didn’t think much of congresses, he took the view that, since he wrote the resolutions before the congress, anyway, a congress was really a waste of time. In his organisation, Lambert van Hattem had been left in charge of the “international playground,” and in his organisation the European question was never discussed in depth. Positions in the NGG, however, were broader based. But the fact is that personalities had a disproportionately large say in many organisations. And if they changed their minds or gave up, so did the organisations, just as they had previously supported the contrary course.
R: What changed after the merger of the two IUF European organisations to form the ECF-IUF [European Committee of Food, Catering and Allied Workers’ Unions within the IUF]?
G: In matters of TNC policy, the IUF has come to be actively involved in European company work, and European TNC activities have been embedded in international activities. But relations have continued to be problematic, because European separatism was and still is very deep-rooted, and surfaces time and again. And the whole style of work and the political culture at the European level are different, much more bureaucratic. It’s a culture that seeks co-operation with companies, plays down conflicts of interest, negotiates behind closed doors, relies on personal contacts instead of discussing the issues with the members , and then arriving at the negotiating table with a membership position fully worked out. This still distinguishes the European regional organisation from the IUF as a whole and from other regional organisations.
R: Could it perhaps be said that the differences in political culture between the European regional organisation and the other regional organisations together with the IUF as a whole can be attributed to the politico-administrative institutions of the EU with their opportunities for exerting influence, to the informational and consultative forums offered by the European works councils, and to the social dialogue with employer organisations institutionalised by the EU?
G: Of course the EU is important and has influence on how trade union organisations are structured and what functions they have. But this doesn’t explain how an organisation sees itself. This can vary a great deal. An organisation can regard itself as being part of an international and maintain close cooperation with the international, or, at the other end of the scale, it can consider itself an independent organisation that has as little as possible to do with the international. There have been strong fluctuations between these two poles in the European regional organisation of the IUF. As far as the employers are concerned, the existence of these organisations has not led to substantial negotiations. There have been contacts in the hotel sector, in the sugar industry, which for the most part have remained non-committal and bogged down in procedure.
R: And the social dialogue, has it taken place?
G: Only in rare cases, only formally and basically without results.
R: Why without results?
G: Fundamentally, the employers are not interested. It’s a mistake to think that the mere existence of an institutional framework can induce them to show commitment to something they are basically convinced is not in their interest. I believe it’s completely mistaken to think that – in whatever context – a negotiation situation with management can be created in which concessions can be won from them without having to put them under pressure or at least showing the capacity of doing so.. But this is the attitude taken at the European trade union level, apart from a few demonstrations like those recently in Nice and a few other cities previously. They are one-off events. There is no long-term, strategic, organised activity to put pressure on the employers to bring them to the negotiating table. The way I see it, the social dialogue fails because it is prescribed by the Commission without the necessary preconditions being established, so that, as before, it will not take place, or will remain fruitless or merely formal.
R: But this also means that member organisations don’t demand it.
G: Yes, that’s where part of the responsibility lies. And the other part is that the secretariats of the European trade union committees develop no initiative in this regard, don’t make any proposals or point out possibilities. A democratic mode of operation includes the constant involvement of affiliates in discussions, constant feedback to affiliates, the development of a discussion culture by encouraging members to take an active part in decisions and in the discussion of policy issues.
6. Other Regional Organisations
R: Let’s leave Europe to one side for the present and consider the differences between the European and other regional organisations. Relations between the IUF and the regional organisations in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and North America so far appear to be less conflictual if not free of conflict.
G: The strong regional organisations outside Europe are Latin America and Asia/Pacific.
R: What makes them strong?
G: First of all they were strong union organisations with a long tradition, e.g., the Australian trade unions can be compared with any European trade union. The Japanese unions, too, to a certain extent.
R: Good, that would be the model of “developed industrial countries.” And in Latin America?
G: In Latin America there is a very old trade union movement, for example in Argentina, in Chile, Brazil, with interruptions due to military dictatorships, etc., whose traditions go back to the 19th century, and which have therefore developed a strong sense of identity. This is very much less the case in Africa. The African regional organisation is problematic because of the weakness of the organisations, with the exception of South Africa. It hasn’t managed to stabilise since the death of the first Regional Secretary, Ishmael Nedziwe, in January 1993.
R: So the regional secretaries have a key role to play in the development and stability of the regional organisations and for their political style.
G: Absolutely. And this is true for all regions.
R: You haven’t yet mentioned the North American regional organisation.
G: For the time being it is practically inactive. It covers only two countries, which to some extent have overlapping unions and therefore do not perceive the same need to coordinate as in other regions. They coordinate partly in other ways. The biggest unions have developed their own international activities and see no need to maintain a regional institution. In addition, there were personnel problems in appointing regional secretaries, e.g., the loss of one of the most able regional secretaries that we had, who moved to the ILO [International Labour Office], then a number of misguided personnel decisions which have destabilised the region.
R: Do the other regional organisations face similar problems?
G: The problem of the regional organisation in Latin America is obviously the economic crisis. Previously the period of Latin American dictatorships determined the activity of the regional organisation. For a long time the main activity of the regional organisation was to fight for fundamental democratic rights and to support hard-pressed and sometimes illegal unions by partly illegal means. Which also meant that revenue from the region was and still is statistically insignificant. But now our problem is the economic crisis, which is why, with the exception of Brazil, all Latin American unions are in a state of financial crisis.
R: From a financial point of view the regions – apart from Europe and North America – are either just able to contribute enough to cover the costs of the regional structure (Asia/Pacific) or the regional organisations are dependent on “subsidies” from the IUF (Latin America, Africa). Does this financial dependence mean the subordination of regional interests to the overall interests of the IUF? Does financial dependence hamper the development and defence of regional positions and regional “identities”?
G: No. There has never been a conflict between the overall interests of the IUF and regional interests as perceived by the regional organisations – except in Europe. The main reason is that the IUF has never hindered them from developing their regional identity: it has tended rather to encourage this. It has been part and parcel of IUF policy to promote regional autonomy.
R: This raises the question why the development of a regional identity in Europe led to conflict with the IUF while in Asia and Latin America relations with the IUF have not been fundamentally affected.
G: There has never been a move by Latin America or Asia to isolate themselves from the rest of the world. The idea has never been raised that it could be in the interest of the unions to isolate the region from the rest of the world. This happened only in one case, with the Argentinean Peronist unions in the 1950s and 1960s, who tried to develop an independent Peronist-led regional organisation. Otherwise this now occurs only on the communist side. In Asia there have never been moves in this direction because the assumption was always that the international connections can only be to the advantage of the unions.
R: Is a regional orientation and regional “identity building” fostered and reinforced by the development of regional economic spaces? In Europe, after all, the establishment of the EEC and its development into the EC and EU have led to a “European separatism,” as you put it. There have been similar approaches in other regions, albeit without the supranational character of the EU, and three economic areas and zones of influence have become established, each under a certain economic hegemony: America under the United States, Asia under Japan, and the EU for the overall European area and beyond. Do such developments reinforce regional “identities” and do they possibly increase tensions with the central, international level of the IUF?
G: No, because the orientation that you describe is directly opposed to a trade union perspective. If, to put it in Marxist terms, you assume that a trade union interest is a class interest – and a class interest is international – then it is absolutely contrary to these developments. Such ideas were, however, widespread in the ETUC along the lines that there are basically only three important trade union organisations in the world, the ETUC, the AFL-CIO, and the Japanese. And in essence you can forget the rest of the world as long as these agree among themselves. This is naturally diametrically opposed to the IUF’s political perspective and to that of other trade secretariats.
R: But it doesn’t have to conflict with the self-conception of member unions?
G: No. But in fact no chance of becoming influential in the IUF. However, conflicts have arisen, for example in Asia, not between the region and other regions or between the region and the international but within the region with unions that really pursue a national interest. Primarily the Japanese unions. It has also found expression in the human rights issue, on which the IUF pursues a pretty consistent and hard line internationally and regionally in Asia in defending fundamental human and trade union rights. For example, the IUF takes a hostile stance towards the Chinese state trade unions or, in the case of a dictatorship like Burma, has adopted a policy of exclusion. This policy was challenged by certain Japanese trade unions, not by all, but by some that pursue a different policy, taking much closer account of Japanese economic interests which invest in countries like Burma or China. These conflicts were settled within the region, and the problem has never reached a critical point. The Japanese trade unions who have advocated this type of policy have always expressed their reservations and objections, in the international context, too, and at international congresses, without, however, risking a breach with the international. They have tried to negotiate exceptions, but they have never called in question the fundamental policy and orientation of the IUF.
R: Doesn’t this example also show a change in the function of the IUF, which is becoming an institution for coordinating the regional organisations, so that its job is more and more to bundle the common interests of the regional organisations, where necessary to moderate and reconcile policy differences?
G: This is partly the case. But there are also overarching activities, like transnational company activities which affect all regions to varying degrees and for which trade unions from different regions meet and cooperate in another context under the aegis of the IUF. There are various levels of IUF activity at which different functions of the IUF come into play.
7. Transnational Companies
R: You have mentioned effective coordination at the level of transnational companies as an important goal that you wanted to attain as General Secretary. Why did TNCs become a key focus of attention for the IUF?
G: The reason is very simple. In this area the role of an international organisation is quite natural and obvious. By their very nature transnational companies create an international sphere of activity because the level at which decisions are made is no longer accessible to single unions to the same degree as at the national level, where trade unionists negotiate with national companies. Mutual support and solidarity between trade union organisations must therefore operate across borders – and this is really the most fundamental function of an international organisation, only an international organisation can do this.
R: How has IUF policy towards transnational or multinational companies (TNCs) developed?
G: Action at the level of transnational companies began specifically in 1963/64. An affiliate in Pakistan, a tobacco workers’ union, which had a major problem with the local management in a British-American Tobacco [BAT] subsidiary, asked us, the IUF, for support. We then asked the Secretary of the British Tobacco Workers’ Union, Percy Belcher, to go to Pakistan to take part in negotiations with BAT as a member of the delegation of the Pakistani union. The British union was chosen because of its militancy and expertise and because it was very strong in BAT; naturally language and cultural aspects also played a role in the choice. Percy Belcher’s intervention was quite successful, I think partly because of the surprise effect, because at that time no transnational company had expected to be facing an international trade secretariat in a local conflict. This was new.
R: And the consequences for IUF policy?
G: The 1964 Congress adopted a resolution that established the principle that it was a task of the IUF to coordinate the activity of unions in transnational companies. And we later followed this through resolutely. But nothing happened until 1975.
R: Why this long delay?
G: Because embedding this principle in the practice of the organisation needed a certain time and also because we weren’t called upon to do so. At that time there were few transnational corporations, far fewer than today. In most cases unions manage to cope with them within their own, national scope. Unlike today, when almost everything is transnationalised, capital has become much more mobile, and the unions are constantly in difficulty, in various ways and for various reasons.
R: And why was there an increase in concern with multinational companies in 1973?
G: In 1973 came Nestlé. We had been concerned about the Nestlé group for some years. However, the first international Nestlé conference took place only in 1972. Looking back, it’s quite amusing to note that the Nestlé group was insulted because we didn’t invite them to this meeting. But in 1973 the conflict broke out with Nestlé on a question of principle, on the validity of fundamental trade union rights. At the Nestlé plant in Chiclayo, Peru, which produced condensed milk from milk powder, there was a radical plant union under the leadership a Maoist movement. The management didn’t know how to cope with it and wanted to break it. The management reacted to the subsequent strike and occupation of the factory by the workers by calling in the army and besieging the factory. It was clear to us that without IUF intervention, the management would succeed in smashing the union. We therefore initiated an international campaign, which resulted in a variety of actions at other Nestlé plants, stop work meetings, letters, protest demonstrations, etc. This was an unpleasant surprise for Nestlé – nowadays transnational companies have thicker skins. But the decisive factor then was the New Zealand dairy workers’ union. At that time, Nestlé had a gigantic factory in New Zealand to produce milk powder, which supplied the entire Pacific coast of Latin America. The New Zealand union had complete control over the industry, with a membership rate of 95%, and it told Nestlé that if the conflict in Peru was not settled by recognition of the union and the conclusion of a collective agreement – which were the demands of the IUF and the union – it would shut down the factory in New Zealand. That would have lost Nestlé millions, so Nestlé gave way, recognised the union and concluded a collective agreement. By the way, later on the conflict also led to me and Enildo Inglesias, the Secretary of the Latin American regional organisation, being arrested by a police detachment when we were visiting Chiclayo; the chief officer was holding a letter with a Nestlé letterhead. We were escorted to Lima and expelled the following day.
R: This conflict with Nestlé in Peru was on a question of principle, since fundamental trade union rights – the freedom of association and the right to the regulation of working conditions by collective agreement – had been challenged and, moreover, the dispute was conducted by the Nestlé company in Chiclayo with the aid of the military. In such a conflict situation there is certainly a high mobilisation potential among IUF affiliates, and a strong will to exert considerable pressure. Do member unions also show sufficient willingness to intervene in the case of “normal” disputes with multinational companies?
G: Since the 1980s, I would say, no week goes by without a conflict arising, not, however, of this fundamental type, and not in such a hard form as in the dispute with Nestlé in Peru or with Coca-Cola in Guatemala in 1980/84. In this conflict trade unionists were murdered, which resulted in a very broad mobilisation of affiliates.* It’s different when a union says: we’ve been on strike for a week now, if you don’t intervene we might lose the strike. In such a situation an average of about ten per cent of member organisation are likely to participate in an international campaign, not always the same ten per cent. It depends on the company, on the industry, on other factors.
R: How do the unions participate?
G: By doing something, in a variety of ways. Depending on the case it can be writing letters to the management, but it can go as far as industrial action. Every company is a special case. And the geographical distribution differs, the vulnerability, the weak spots are different in nature, the distribution of union strength in companies differs from case to case, so that in each instance you have to rethink how you can influence the company. In the case of Coca-Cola, for example, the crucial factor was that a single, internationally well-known, very visible product was involved, and the company was therefore vulnerable to an international boycott. You can’t boycott Unilever. Unilever originally had about 400 brands – now they’ve been reduced to much fewer – and Unilever doesn’t appear on any of them. And as far as the possibilities for unions to participate are concerned, in some countries, for example in Scandinavia, international solidarity strikes are legal.
G: Are the Scandinavian unions also willing to use this instrument?
G: It depends on the case at issue. If they regard a conflict as a serious one, then they are. Even though there have been only a few to date: they’ve taken action in disputes with Nestlé, Coca-Cola, and Unilever. But, as everywhere, strike is the ultimate measure. If we can achieve our aims without striking, it’s just as well.
R: What other measures do transnational companies still react to?
G: Bad publicity, i.e., public relations, consumer reactions, bad image.
R: Have the various, sometimes massive conflicts with TNCs changed their attitude towards the trade unions and the IUF?
G: A different situation has arisen because the IUF has started concluding agreements with transnationals with the aim of safeguarding fundamental trade union rights.
R: With which companies?
G: With two French companies, Danone and Accor – Accor is a hotel chain – and with Chiquita Brands International. I still signed Danone (1988) and Accor (1995). Chiquita came this year. Danone goes much farther than all others: agreement was reached not only on safeguarding fundamental trade union rights but also on equality for men and women, the same level of information on economic and social issues for employees in all plants, training measures with regard to the introduction of new technologies and company restructuring. Agreements on health and workplace safety were added later. This agreement is managed jointly by the IUF and the group management, but also by management and unions in each enterprise.
R: How did this agreement come about?
G: What was crucial in the case of Danone was that the group had a remarkably social-minded management. The former head of the group, Antoine Riboud, was a social Catholic and very open-minded as regards the trade unions. With this agreement he wanted to give Danone a socially progressive image. It was also partly preventive, to protect the company against industrial action through the timely identification and defusing of problems. With the help of this agreement, a parallel information network was established across the group to, let us say, complement the information of individual managements. I believe that the agreement with Danone was to some extent a result of the Coca-Cola dispute, i.e., how the IUF conducted this conflict with the necessary toughness and success. That gave the various TNCs food for thought, and then they were prepared to talk to us. At the European level there are now many agreements, about 40, but the companies’ willingness to negotiate, and the basis on which agreement is reached comes from the International and not from Europe.
R: Still considering the example of Danone – how was the Danone agreement supported and influenced by the member unions?
G: Once the company had indicated that it was interested in an agreement, we had many meetings with the member unions in Danone to discuss problems and identify the goals. With these demands we then went to the company and negotiated. The purpose of the agreement is to safeguard the possibilities of trade union organisation, to open up spaces for the national organisations.
R: But according to reports to the IUF Executive Committee, some unions have been slow to accept and have only minimally implemented parts of the agreements, notably on equality.
G: You’re right. This is a special case. It’s true that in this particular case all member organisations voted for the agreement without objection and then didn’t implement it, with certain exceptions. We therefore had to discuss this situation with our members , who then, not all of them, but in a number of cases, appointed women at the local level to oversee implementation of the agreement. And then it worked. But initially we faced the situation that company managements were sometimes more progressive than our own members. This was embarrassing. Here we are dealing with the women’s problem, that is, the problem that the trade union movement has with the practice of equality. This was not the case when it was a matter of enforcing the best practice level of information at the plant level, everyone was in on that.
R: How did this demand come to be made?
G: We had noticed that in the Danone group basically only the Germans and the French had an adequate level of information in their own companies, whereas, for example the Spanish were told nothing at all and the Italians very little. That’s how it came to the demand for implementing the information status in terms of best practice.
R: What was the reason for these differences?
G: Local managements had developed their own independent policies on this issue and the group management hadn’t seen this as a problem, although Danone is very centralised.
R: Did the agreement with Accor develop in the same was as that with Danone?
G: At Accor one of our French member unions had a relatively good relationship with the group management, and used this to approach them about their willingness to conclude an agreement with the IUF. For reasons similar to those of Danone, Accor agreed, and after two meetings we signed an agreement. The subject matter of this agreement was primarily trade union rights. In the meantime, I believe, it has been extended to cover equality.
R: Was there a particular objective in view in expanding the agreement?
G: The objective was to extend the agreement to cover issues other than trade union rights. Once the principle is established that one can talk about other things, as well, and not only about fundamental trade union rights, other issues will naturally arise. Slowly an agreement like that with Danone develops, which touches on a range of issues and which becomes very close to an international collective agreement.
R: Is this the direction in which agreements with companies are developing?
G: Yes.
R: What should international collective agreements deal with in future?
G: Questions of principle, but ones that go beyond trade union rights, dealing with industrial safety, equality, of course, optimum information in all companies, training, qualifications, job security.
R: Isn’t there a danger of the IUF intervening with these international agreements in material arrangements of national collective agreements or even of concluding pay agreements instead of national unions?
G: No. The IUF doesn’t see itself as replacing national affiliates. I don’t believe it was ever the goal of the IUF to engage in collective bargaining instead of member organisations. But I wouldn’t completely exclude this perspective. However, trade union structures would first have to change and the IUF would have to become a genuine international trade union with the capacity to negotiate.
R: For the trade unions, wouldn’t this development risk provoking a split between trade union members in transnational companies and those in other firms with a local or national scope, thus threatening national collective agreement systems, e.g. the industry-wide wage agreement in Germany?
G: Agreements with transnationals are certainly not intended to replace or encroach on industry-wide wage agreements in any way. What is conceivable is that, in addition to national wage agreements, there can be an agreement with a transnational company under which, however, no conditions can be negotiated that undercut those of the industry-wide agreement. This is nothing new. It has existed for a long time at the national level, and is conceivable at international level. But it would mean the national unions being prepared to delegate an important portion of their authority to an international trade union organisation.
R: Are they prepared to do so?
G: Not at the moment. They might be, the idea has never died out and will continue to be discussed in various forms. But I believe it to be inevitable.
R: Why?
G: Because of increasing transnationalisation and because of regional organisations. For example, if we look at the European Union, the harmonisation of legislation, the harmonisation of working conditions, and the increasing influence exerted by the Commission on legislation that is applicable in all countries create the preconditions for the international merging of trade unions. This has already taken place at the national level, unions have begun to merge at the local level, and the regional level, and finally at the national level. The problems weren’t fundamentally different.
R: To come back to the aspect just mentioned, don’t negotiations and agreements with multinational companies provoke a split among employees, lead to the development of a two-class society of workers: those in multinational companies, represented by a strong, influential, international trade union organisation, and those in local, national factories and companies, poorly organised and neglected from the trade union point of view?
G: This problem already exists. It hasn’t arisen because international trade union organisations like the IUF have entered into international agreements. In certain groups, working conditions are better and wages higher than in small enterprises. This happens not only in Third World countries but is particularly serious there, where TNCs generally pay higher wages than local companies. This is a real problem, which is why must care must be taken at national level that all of the union, in each of its areas can move forward. But this is neither unusual or new for unions, it it’s already part of trade union work at the national level, and at the international level it won’t be any different. Of course, it means that we mustn’t conclude any international agreements that could undercut those at the national level.
R: And how far do international agreements go that the IUF has so far concluded and is in a position to conclude in the foreseeable future?
G: For the foreseeable future, I think, only framework agreements will be concluded.
R: Is what has now become possible at the European level with the so-called Euro works councils complementary to IUF transnational policy or a threat?
G: The question can’t be answered in general terms. It depends on what companies are involved, and on how the European regional organisation sees its own role and how it handles the representation of interests in the context of the Euro works councils.
R: Does this mean that European developments in transnational policy diverge from the international level, the IUF?
G: In some cases, yes, in others, no. It depends on the previous history. Take Danone: the initial international works council at Danone is now a European works council, in which, however, the representation of non-European unions is safeguarded by the participation of IUF regional secretariats in meetings of the Euro works council; they are recognised by Danone as representing the IUF affiliates in their region, which enormously strengthens the legitimacy of the IUF. I think Danone decided to restrict the representation of non-European unions to the IUF regional secretaries mainly for cost reasons. And as far as its name is concerned, the Danone works council is not a European works council, it’s called an international works council.
R: There seem to have been strong tensions or competition between the European transnational policy of the ECF-IUF and that of the IUF.
G: The IUF has always sought to turn the European works councils into international works councils. It has succeeded in some cases, where the employee side on the Euro works councils has invited representatives from other regions to its internal meetings. For example, at United Biscuits: the American Bakers’ Union attended internal meetings of the employee side of the Euro works council. However, no-one but European representatives has so far been admitted to joint meetings with the employers – except at Danone and Accor.
R: Is the IUF systematically involved in meetings of the Euro works councils?
G: In principle, yes. But in practice it has not managed to do so everywhere and in sufficient measure.
R: Doesn’t this give rise to the problem that at the European level interest representation vis-à-vis multinational firms will become divorced from that at the international level, at the global level owing to better information and regionally limited agreements?
G: This is a real danger. But in the context of the European works council arrangements we have tried to attain two goals: first, to expand them geographically as far as possible, in the first place to the whole of Europe instead of limiting it to the EU, then beyond Europe; and, second, going beyond their information and consultation functions, to convert them into negotiating bodies. In some case we have been successful, in others not. For example, Nestlé accepted that incidents or problems taking place outside Europe be discussed. And later, after my time, regional Nestlé meetings took place with the participation of the regional company managements. It is the aim of the IUF within a certain space of time to bring eventually everything together in institutionalised form at an international meeting, again with the participation of regional managements.
R: I’d like to bring the subject back to a more general level. What function does activity in multinational companies have for the continued existence and self-conception of the IUF?
G: I don’t think this has been a decisive factor for the IUF as such. After all, the IUF is older than the transnationalisation of the world economy. Naturally there has been internationalisation of the world economy since the 19th century but not in the dimensions that have developed with the transnationals. Moreover, in the case of the IUF the majority of members are probably not employed in transnational firms. The existence of the IUF as such does not depend on TNC activities. But this work has changed the IUF. The development of the IUF from a mailbox organisation to a combat organisation has to do with this. Characterisation as a mailbox organisation need not necessarily be derogatory: mailboxes are useful. In this framework the function of the organisation tended to be the exchange of information, e.g., about agreements concluded in various countries, comparisons of pay levels and working conditions, etc., and, before that, the fight against strike-breakers. The IUF had functions before the advent of transnational companies and for those members who don’t work for transnational firms, it still has these functions. But the IUF would have condemned itself to decline if it hadn’t taken action on the issue of transnationals. It has become a direct challenge to IUF member unions to organise mutual solidarity and joint action at TNC level. And that is why it has become a central task for the IUF.
R: Could your draw a balance, or rather an interim balance, of transnational activity by the IUF in which you played a decisive role from the 1960s/1970s?
G: In the meantime something happens every week without it necessarily involving spectacular conflicts. Work goes on continuously in a large number of transnationals. It ranges from the exchange of information to putting pressure on the management. One result, at any rate, has been that in most cases the majority of member organisations have felt they have been given support and that they have come through these disputes successfully. The weight and contribution of the international organisation in resolving local disputes do make an impact. I would see this as a success, not necessarily always immediately visible or tangible. Although tangible when you look at the cases in question, visible less so, because in most cases it doesn’t become public at all.
8. Trade Union and Human Rights
R: Among these conflicts with multinational companies, you have mentioned disputes important for the IUF which were concerned not only with negotiating working conditions. These confrontations addressed matters of principle, being also about the safeguarding, recognition, and application of elementary trade union and human rights. In the meantime the IUF frequently faces the task of providing active support for the defence of trade union and human rights and of mobilising its affiliates to this end. During your term of office, how did the trade union and human rights issue and IUF policy in this area develop?
G: This task developed mainly because the IUF extended the geographical reach of its action to regions in which the human rights issue was very acute, where trade union rights were disregarded or violated, and where human rights in general were at risk. In Latin America, to some extent in Asia, in Africa. And naturally it began with the defence of trade union rights.
R: First came union rights and then extended action to include the human rights context?
G: Not exactly. The issue of democracy is to begin with independent of trade union rights. Only well-established democracy provides scope for trade union action, whereas under an undemocratic, authoritarian, let alone totalitarian regime, there can be no room for trade unions. We had to face this experience in Latin America, where, shortly after the foundation of the regional organisation, we found ourselves having to combat various military dictatorships.
R: How has the IUF reacted to the violation of union rights?
G: With public relations campaigns and statements. Larger-scale action or campaigns really started only in the 1970s. The Guatemala Coca-Cola campaign is a good example for linking these issues. It was a campaign that linked the human rights issue with a campaign against a TNC. And it was not unimportant that our attention was first drawn to the problem in Guatemala by Amnesty International. Amnesty International had invited me as General Secretary of the IUF to take part in a mission to Guatemala because of the situation in the Coca-Cola bottling plant. Through this mission I had made contact with this trade union and then reported back to the Executive Committee of the IUF, which decided that we had to intervene and approach Coca-Cola. That was how it started. The origin of this action was the link between trade union rights and human rights and the operations of a company in a country where all these rights were systematically violated and which itself violated them.
R: As regards human rights violations, what possibilities does the IUF have to exert pressure?
G: Public relations and attempts – partly public, partly not – to cooperate with human rights organisations and to persuade other trade union organisations, trade secretariats, and the ICFTU to give priority to a certain issue.
R: Are relations with human rights organisations like Amnesty International, the League for Human Rights, or Human Rights Watch continuous or ad hoc?
G: Relations are ad hoc, also with Amnesty International. Again it’s the lack of material resources that stops us from maintaining continuous relations when they’re not required in emergencies.
R: What constitutes a problem and a case for conflict in the violation of trade union rights? What causes the IUF to take action?
G: Roughly speaking, when the survival of a trade union is at risk.
R: Does the fact that a whole range of such union rights violations takes place in the multinational field give the IUF greater scope for exerting influence?
G: Certainly. There are greater possibilities of applying pressure on transnational companies than on companies that operate only at the national level.
R: This could also mean that multinational company structures inadvertently help the development of favourable conditions for trade unions and the establishment of trade union rights.
G: Yes, because by their nature they are international.
R: Do all member organisations accept the fundamental trade union principles in similar measure in all regions?
G: I would say, yes. But this doesn’t necessarily mean that the political will to go to war for them is present everywhere to the same degree. That’s a different matter. There is no difference of opinion about the fundamental importance of these principles but there can be differences about the means considered reasonable for reacting to the violation of union rights.
R: In general, does the violation of trade union rights lead to member organisations being willing to act, to mobilise?
G: Only if the violations are very serious. After all, trade union rights are constantly being violated, everywhere, and not only in Third-World countries, also in the industrial countries of Europe and in the United States. If it appears that the organisations affected are actually able to cope on their own, you can’t mobilise. When it’s evident that outside help is needed and can play an important role, then you can mobilise. Since the 1970s awareness of this problem has grown and sensitivity towards the violation of trade union rights has increased.
9. Training and Organisational Development Programmes
R: Helping and supporting member unions threatened by the violation of fundamental trade union and democratic freedoms or hopelessly at a disadvantage in disputes with multinational firms has doubtless become an important task for the IUF. But for some time now it has been supplemented by systematic training and organisational development programmes to promote the development of trade unions, especially in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, and thus to improve the IUF’s capacity for taking action and engaging in disputes. In close cooperation with the Swedish trade union organisations, the IUF has developed a training programme for Third World trade unions since the end of the 1970s, which has grown impressively and taken on considerable financial and organisational dimensions. How did this programme come about?
G: The IUF accepted a proposal by the Swedish President, Sigvard Nyström, who had indicated that resources for an IUF training programme could be made available. The IUF was able to accept the offer because we had made sure that there were no strings attached except that the funds had to be used for the purpose for which they had been intended.
R: Why did the IUF get involved in an externally financed programme?
G: The IUF wanted to give member organisations that needed it organisational assistance. It couldn’t do so by its own means because the affiliates wouldn’t have been prepared to provide own resources on this scale.
R: What subject matter did the programme cover?
G: Trade union educational courses. The programme provided the possibility of carrying out training courses at the national level; but there were also seminars and meetings at the regional level and in some cases at the interregional level in which common interests like TNC work and organisational work could be addressed.
R: What effect have the programmes had?
G: Capacity enhancement and the development of skills relevant for trade union work. The programme quite certainly intensified a sense of cohesion because many of these training and educational courses brought together trade unionists from different countries, who were thus able to strengthen their contacts. It’s difficult to establish a direct and measurable link between the training programme and effectiveness.
R: Did the training programme, as was intended, enable member organisations to continue the work on their own after the financed programmes were at an end?
G: Some programmes were continued, others brought to an end, some were carried on in another form. The final outcome was, however, that we abandoned the concept of training and educational programmes altogether and renamed the whole programme trade union development programme.
R: Isn’t this another label for the same activity or is there a different concept behind it?
G: There’s also a different concept behind it, namely a more precise definition of the goals in terms of capacity development, thus trade union development programme. This development activity can be measured in terms of the increase in the number of members, the ability to take part in international action, the development of the specific organisation, etc.
R: I’d like to come back to the financing of the training, now trade union development programme; have the donor organisations maintained their “unconditional” assistance in the long term?
G: Sometimes there were difficulties because it proved that the allocation of funds was, after all, tied to certain conditions over time, certain geographical priorities, preferences, and procedures. This led to difficulties, which were, however, resolved by restoring the original conditions.
R: Why were these demands made?
G: In some cases this sort of programme was determined more by internal policy considerations of the so-called donor organisations than by the needs of the recipients. If this proves to be the case, such programmes are stopped.
R: The financial dimensions of these programmes are considerable. Doesn’t this mean that the IUF is in principle dependent on resources it doesn’t control and which, ultimately, are not available to members without reservations?
G: Dependence can only arise if there’s no longer any will to reject programmes if they aren’t in keeping with our own purposes.
R: Could the IUF have afforded to stop the Swedish programme from 1977/1978 on?
G: Yes, absolutely.
R: And wouldn’t that have seriously disturbed relations with member organisations in Third World countries?
G: It would have meant that relations with the Swedish organisation would have been disturbed. The ball would have been in court of the Swedish organisations. They would have had to explain what it meant for them and for the IUF.
10. The ILO and Other International Governmental Organisations
R: Apart from activities immediately relating to affiliates, the defence of the interests of member organisations in international governmental organisations is one of the tasks of international trade union organisations. How important for the IUF are international governmental organisations like the ILO [International Labour Organization]?
G: For the IUF the ILO is without doubt the most important institution among the international governmental organisations. Particularly important for the IUF are the technical meetings that take place in the IUF sectors: food, agriculture, and hotels, restaurants, tourism. They give periodic opportunity, unfortunately at long intervals, for member organisations to meet, to discuss joint action, and to adopt joint resolutions or other texts with the employers, which set certain standards in this area.
R: How important are these norms?
G: They have a political relevance in that reference to such standards can in certain cases weaken the position of employer organisations or governments if they get into conflict with trade unions.
R: Can your give any examples?
G: There are examples, but I can’t recall any off-hand. It hasn’t been an important part of the work. Overall it’s work that we had to do because we had to take charge at ILO meetings within our jurisdiction. The IUF always provides the secretariat of the workers’ group at such meetings, where the main task was to negotiate about language with the employers’ side.
R: Was the IUF able to influence the agendas of such conferences to any significant extent?
G: In principle the ILO sets the agenda in consultation with unions and employers. But the fact is that every meeting can, on the basis of agreements on both sides, at least partly set the agenda for the next one. In the past, until well into the 1980s, there were no major difficulties in reaching agreement on common points. This changed in the 1980s when the policy of the employers towards the ILO changed in general. They are now much less willing to cooperate and are on much more of a confrontation course. They have no problem about letting a meeting fall through or fail to reach a result.
R: What role do ILO conventions play in IUF policy?
G: They have an important function in addition to the technical conferences. In our field of activity there were, in particular, conventions for the hotel industry and for home workers, but there are also the general conventions that aim to safeguard important trade union rights. It has become very difficult to conclude sector-specific conventions because for some years now the employers have been systematically opposed. This is evident in the policy of the International Organization of Employers [IOE]. The employers’ delegations have negotiated with us on a number of occasions, and they would have signed an agreement if it hadn’t been for the intervention of the IOE, who called them to heel.
R: In the ILO, as a tripartite organisation, it would suffice for trade unions and governments to join forces for a convention to be adopted.
G: Yes, and this has happened. Our hotel workers’ convention is a convention adopted by a very narrow majority, like the home workers’ convention in which we played a decisive role. In both cases, however, ratification is very slow in coming.
R: Does the IUF keep a continuous eye on the ratification process by, for example, developing an action programme after the adoption of a convention to accompany the ratification phase by campaigns in the individual countries ?
G: Regular reports are submitted to industry conferences by member organisations, and affiliates are called upon to develop activities in this direction. But it can’t be said that systematic campaigns were mounted involving member organisations.
R: Why not?
G: For lack of resources.
R: The ILO is certainly the most important international organisation for the IUF. But there are others of importance for the Food workers’ international.
G: There’s one that’s important and where we have never taken action –except in a very limited way – and that’s the FAO and the Codex Alimentarius it has initiated. Once again for lack of resources we have never involved ourselves seriously with it. There could have been other UN organisations, too, UNDP [United Nations Development Programme], UNIDO [United Nations Industrial Development Organization]. Basically, there are a number of organisations in the United Nations system that touch on the interests of the food, agricultural, and hotel unions. The IUF has never had the resources to involve itself seriously in these organisations. That was not our priority. If we’d done that the whole secretariat would have been occupied full-time with it. We couldn’t afford that, we had to set other priorities.
R: Has the defence of interests in the FAO been given higher priority since the merger with the plantation workers?
G: No.
R: With regard to international governmental organisations is there any division of labour with the ICFTU, which deploys considerable resources for the representation of trade union positions in the UN system and other international institutions?
G: The ICFTU expends a very great part of its energy and means lobbying the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] and a few others, drafting position papers, sending people to conferences, but it does very little else. It seems to me that the ICFTU is a negative example for what can happen if one devotes oneself full-time to this activity. It means that a trade union organisation gets bogged down in international organisations, expending an enormous amount of energy and resources with very little to show for it.
R: Is it so unimportant to defend trade union positions vis-à-vis the WTO [World Trade Organization], International Monetary Fund, UN organisations, etc.?
G: That’s the wrong question. Can’t greater impact be achieved by using other means of applying pressure, which then find expression in such organisations? If the draft of a convention runs through the ILO machinery and is then submitted to an international conference for adoption, the result depends less on the work done by the secretariat within the ILO as on the assessment of the employer organisations as to whether rejecting the convention will cost more at home than rejection is worth to them. This means that the adoption of conventions, like every type of legislation, is ultimately the outcome of a balance of power, and for us it was always more important that the balance of power in international organisations, too, should be established bottom up, so that it can then take effect in such bodies, instead of acting in these bodies without pressure from below.
R: Has the IUF been able to exert such pressure from below systematically on decision-making processes in international organisations?
G: Not sufficiently. But because we have set our priorities on TNC work and organisational development work, I believe we have been more effective than others who have limited themselves to lobbying the international bureaucracies.
11. The Equality Issue in the IUF
R: The issue of equality may not have had high priority within the IUF; nevertheless, after hesitant beginnings in the 1950s, it has been more intensively discussed since the 1970s. The demand for equality in the work process and in society has had two dimensions for trade unions: it is directed “inwards” towards changes in their own organisation and affiliates and “outwards” in that it it should become a factor in determining working conditions, e.g., in agreements with transnational companies. Since the 1980s various measures have been adopted by the IUF to raise the proportion of women trade unionists on IUF decision-making bodies. Who was instrumental in this development?
G: A far-reaching congress resolution came from the Finnish hotel workers’ union, whose implementation led to intense controversy, since it demanded the introduction of quotas and a stronger representation of women in the managing institutions of the IUF. Unexpectedly for me, most of the opposition came from the other Nordic unions, from the Swedes, Norwegians, and Danes.
R: What was the reason for this opposition?
G: The IUF is a confederation of trade unions, and the members of the governing bodies come from the leadership of the member organisations – almost all of them men, the vast majority men. Representative participation by women would have had to take as its starting point the fact that women constitute approximately (we never knew exactly) 40% of affiliate membership. If you now insist that a corresponding or even approximately corresponding proportion of women be delegated to the managing bodies of the IUF, you have the alternative of either waiting until the natural development of affiliate structures raises more women into leading positions, and that could take a hundred years, or quotas must be introduced. Quotas coerce member unions, who perhaps had no intention of delegating women into the governing bodies and who deny the international organisation the right to force them to do so. None of the Latin trade unions saw that as a problem, neither the Spanish, nor the Italians, or the Latin Americans. But the Swedes, Norwegians, and Danes saw it as an enormous problem, and attacked the quota arrangement on democratic grounds because they regarded this procedure as profoundly undemocratic.
R: A quota arrangement for the decision-making institutions of the IUF is indeed an infringement of autonomous member organisations’ right of self-determination .
G: Yes. And for that reason it had to be made clear to member organisations that the quota system was in the interest of a higher goal that legitimated this infringement and rendered it necessary, and that they should therefore accept it. Finally a quota system was adopted. And the result was that more women were elected for the next Executive Committee than ever before, in excess of the quota, but against the strong opposition of a few, which naturally had its political price.
R: What was this political price?
G: That my relationship with some Scandinavian organisations was lastingly damaged.
R: Was this because of democratic theoretical objections or because leading trade unionists feared the quota arrangement would endanger their own power position within their organisation?
G: I presume the latter, but that’s only an assumption. At any rate, none of these organisations had a woman in a leading position, except perhaps in a white-collar organisation but not in the blue-collar organisations.
R: What effect did the increase in the number of women in IUF managing bodies and the concomitant intensive discussion of the equality issue have on practical policy in the IUF?
G: Efforts by the secretariat to introduce women’s issues in TNC activities intensified. Initially as regards the representation of women but also by trying to open the debate on specifically women’s issues. It was also attempted to introduce the equality issue at all levels in general IUF policy.
R: Was this done systematically?
G: By the secretariat, yes. But the policy was not supported by all member organisations. No organisation expressed itself against it did but some affiliates remained passive or simply ignored the policy.
R: Were there any reasons?
G: For some organisations equality issues had never been high on the agenda in the first place and were not given priority. And then the controversy about this question and the constant demands addressed to member organisations by the secretariat to take action on the issue may have aroused resentment and opposition in some affiliates.
R: Could you sum up the changes in attitude among affiliates?
G: Yes, I think it’s now generally accepted that women should be represented on the governing bodies; secondly, that there are specific women’s issues that ought to be taken into account in general activity, e.g., that the presence of women is necessary in TNC activities, and that there are women-specific problems. This is shown, for example, by the fact that the demand for measures to eliminate inequality in vocational further training and opportunities for promotion are always raised in negotiations with transnationals.
R: So far, is the impact and success of women’s policy more evident internally or in external relations, i.e., in structural and policy changes in the IUF and its affiliates or in the implementation of women-specific and equality-related demands in the various areas of action?
G: I would say both. Nevertheless it’s still a long way to equality in all areas. My successor is a man, in most affiliates men still hold the leading positions, although the proportion of women is gradually increasing.
R: What induced you to push Ron Oswald as your successor and not a Rosalinde Oswald?
G: Because at the relevant point in time I considered him the most able successor. Earlier I had also had two women in mind as possible candidates but neither of them wanted to succeed me.
12. Cooperation with Trade Union Organisations
R: In the course of our conversation there has often been mention, mostly in passing, of other international trade union organisations. I’d like to take up this aspect and look at it systematically. Particularly in view of the limited resources of the IUF, cooperation would seem appropriate, at least with “like-minded” international organisations, i.e., with other trade secretariats close to the free, social democratic trade union movement and with the ICFTU. Has there been cooperation between the IUF and the ICFTU on general or specific issues and tasks in international trade union policy? In the course of today’s conversation, I’ve gained the impression that you see relations with the ICFTU as distant or even negative?
G: Yes, that’s the case. It has to do with the attitude of the IUF towards the international labour and trade union movement, which was (and to some extent still is) quite distinct from that of the ICFTU. For instance, we have been critical of the overemphasis the ICFTU placed on work in international institutions; of its underestimation of the fight for human rights and trade union rights in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, so that, for example for quite some time Amnesty International defended trade unionists from all over the world much more consistently than the ICFTU did. This has now changed, and the human rights section at the ICFTU is now one of its most effective. We were also critical of its politically conservative stance, which was fairly close to that of the international department of the AFL-CIO at that time, which has now changed since the AFL-CIO changed. A second aspect was that we were always advocates of much closer cooperation between trade secretariats. The ITSs [international trade secretariats] originally met only once a year in January for the conference of ITS general secretaries. We wanted to have quarterly meetings and managed to get two conferences a year accepted. We were the driving force in initiating joint action on transnationals. This led to the setting up of the ICFTU/ITS working group on transnationals, which was, however, also underestimated by the ICFTU and therefore didn’t get funds for more than one meeting a year. In the early sixties there was an ITS liaison office in Geneva under secretary Borek Zofka, a Czech trade union exile with an Austrian passport. This office was eyed with great suspicion by the ICFTU because it was regarded as the potential nucleus of a rival international of the ITSs. At that time Edo Fimmen had been dead only twenty years, so that his ideas were still alive. In the course of the 1960s, the office lost the support of the majority of trade secretariats and was closed down in the late 1960s against the will of the IUF and IMF. In my period of office we went on trying to establish cooperation between trade secretariats, especially as regards transnationals. There were a number of conferences, one of the important ones was held in Washington in 1989; we managed to win the support of four other ITSs for the conference whereas the ICFTU attended only symbolically. However, follow-up activities were frustrated for lack of funds.
R: Was there cooperation of any sort, sporadic or continuous, with the ICFTU in your period of office?
G: In the field of equality between women and men there had always been cooperation with the equality department of the ICFTU; we were represented there and took part in their activities. In addition, we were represented at executive committee meetings of the ICFTU and were always involved. Later, after 1989, we also played an active role in the conferences on the Eastern European question organized by the ICFTU. The ICFTU was always invited to IUF Congresses. That was about the extent of cooperation.
R: Didn’t relations between the IUF and the ICFTU change in the course of time?
G: Yes, in the 1980s and 1990s. But changes occurred because our demands and those of other ITSs put the ICFTU under pressure to act. They had at least to give the impression of doing something. The ICFTU usually met all initiatives that it had not itself developed with suspicion and hostility.
R: Why?
G: I think it was a bureaucratic reflex, because all independent initiatives were considered as a potential threat and because it apparently feared that the trade secretariats together could play a more important role than the ICFTU could. And that’s why every independent initiative to persuade the trade secretariats to take joint action and adopt a common goal was systematically blocked and frustrated. The ICFTU took the view that if the ITSs wanted to coordinate their activities this should be done by the ICFTU and should not be done independently on their own initiative and by their own means.
R: Apparently there wasn’t sufficient support on the part of other trade secretariats for these initiatives to achieve independent coordination of the ITSs and which came from you. Why these reservations?
G: The ICFTU persuaded them that they shouldn’t support them.
R: Doesn’t this assessment make the other trade secretariats mere stooges of the ICTFU?
G: Yes, that’s what they were.
R: That surprises me. I find it difficult to believe that the trade secretariats, which are so jealous of their independence and their usually experienced general secretaries and presidents became more or less stooges of the ICFTU. I can hardly imagine this when I think, for example, of the MIF [Miners’ International Federation] under Dennis Edwards or the ITF [International Transport Workers’ Federation], to give just two examples.
G: Not stooges in that sense. The Miners’ International Federation [MIF] or later the ITF under Harold Lewis were opposed to any cooperation, whether close cooperation with the ICFTU or cooperation among trade secretariats. And as far as your other remark is concerned, just because some ITS general secretaries are great egocentrics and prima donnas doesn’t necessarily mean they are capable of independent political thinking. R: This is certainly one of the reasons why cooperation between the IUF and individual trade secretariats like the IMF, ITF, ICEF [International Federation of Chemical, Energy and General Workers’ Unions], FIET [Fédération International des Employés et des Techniciens], etc., rarely became a lasting arrangement – the tourism committee maintained for over a decade by the IUF, ITF, and FIET is likely to have been a positive exception – even though the failure of such efforts was in each case also due to specific circumstances and events. Since the development of cooperation between the IUF and the ICFTU and other trade secretariats tended to be difficult, how were relations between the Christian World Confederation of Labour [WCL] and the communist World Federation of Trade Unions [WFTU]? Specifically: has the WCL played a role for the IUF as reference or rival in the international arena?
G: In itself, the WCL is an unimportant organisation. The only federation to represent a majority of organised workers in its own country is in Belgium. There are significant organisations that represent a minority of workers, in the Netherlands and in Luxemburg. The Christian trade unions as such are important partners for the IUF only in the Benelux countries. As a problem this disappeared when these members of the WCL joined the IUF.
R: And in other regions, in Latin America for example?
G: The WCL has no important affiliates in Latin America but it does have a lot of money. Mainly from the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, from Dutch and German church charities. The WCL is a disruptive factor, not so much for the IUF as for the trade secretariats in general because of its verbal radicalism and its highly conservative line of action. This is evident, for instance, in Central America in the cooperation of CLAT [Central Latino Americana de Trabajadores], the Latin American regional organisation of the WCL with Solidarismo, a movement organised by employers to stop trade unions. CLAT combines a markedly pro-employer practice with radical class struggle rhetoric.
R: Have there nonetheless been any beginnings of cooperation?
G: In the late 1970s, early 1980s we offered the WCL a sort of cooperation by proposing the same arrangement for its Latin American affiliates as in Europe, i.e., membership in the IUF while retaining membership in WCL structures. But they weren’t interested. It should be noted that we have never regarded the food workers’ international of the WCL, the World Federation of Agriculture and Food Workers [WFAFW] as a serious rival, nor as a serious co-operation partner.
R: Were, in contrast, the WFTU and its food workers’ federation serious competition?
G: The WFTU was also never a really serious rival. There was never any question of co-operation because of the fundamental opposition between the attitudes of the state trade unions in communist countries and the positions represented by the IUF, so that we never sought co-operation. In the food sector the WFTU organisation was never a serious rival because of its inability to carry out practical trade union work and because of the small number of free trade unions in its ranks, i.e., unions that had given themselves a communist leadership by free and democratic decision. In the Western industrial countries there were only the CGT [Confédération Générale du Travail], the CGIL [Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro], and some Japanese unions.
R: Was there any initiative on the part of IUF affiliates to cooperate or seek closer links with the WFTU food workers federation?
G: In the late 1970s, early 1980s or thereabouts there were some moves by the Finnish food workers’ union, which was under communist leadership and a member of the IUF, and by the Italian unions to promote co-operation between the two organisations by inviting them to their congresses. And there were talks, friendly in form but which in substance could only reach the conclusion that there was no common ground.
R: Did anything change in relations with the WFTU after 1989?
G: No. We had contact with the French CGT food workers’ union to invite them to join the IUF. They decided to stay in the WFTU structures instead.
R: Were there any proposals or initiatives after 1989 for the two organisations to merge, the IUF and the WFTU food workers federation?
G: I can’t remember any such proposals ever being made. It would naturally have been an unrealistic prospect. We’ve never had the feeling that links with WFTU structures would bring us any sort of benefit, only problems. Because they have very few genuine trade unions in our sense but very many political burdens. This is clearly evident in the fact the biggest organisation in the existing WFTU structures in the food and agricultural sector is still the Russian agro-industry union which is actually an organisation of the kolkhoz bureaucracy. Their congresses are always dominated by a very large majority of kolkhoz directors, and it’s therefore basically a sort of employers’ association. And it’s inconceivable that we accept anything like that in the IUF.
13. Developments since 1989
R: 1989 brought a major turning-point in international political relations and in the political and social situations in many countries owing to the final collapse of the Eastern bloc, the subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union, the end of the East-West conflict, and, finally, the marginalisation of communist movements and organisations. This turning-point has naturally affected the structures and policy of the international trade union movement and international trade union organisations, and it suddenly made substantial demands on international trade union organisations. What consequences has 1989 had for the IUF?
G: The new task we faced after the collapse of the Soviet bloc was to develop relations with the new trade unions as rapidly and lastingly as possible. And by new I don’t necessarily mean only the trade unions that had developed from the political opposition in some countries like Solidarność in Poland but also the unions that had renewed themselves on the foundation of old structures and become independent unions, for example in Czechoslovakia. But we were clearly overtaken by events.
R: In what way?
G: Because the collapse of the Eastern bloc and these new tasks came as a surprise. It wasn’t that we weren’t expecting the collapse sooner or later. I considered that the political system in the Soviet Union couldn’t last and had to collapse sooner or later, along with the bloc. But we had been reckoning with other time scales and hadn’t imagined it could happen so fast and so suddenly. In this regard we were unprepared and that also meant that there weren’t sufficient financial and human resources for tackling such a task. But because the job had to be done it was undertaken at the cost of existing regions, which for a time received less intensive attention. But it couldn’t be avoided for the simple reason that the General Secretary and his staff couldn’t be everywhere at once. It certainly contributed to the IUF’s financial crisis in 1993, because the IUF’s reserves were used up.
R: In view of this exceptional situation, weren’t member organisations prepared to make additional resources available?
G: No, they didn’t do that. Instead they developed bilateral activities in central and eastern Europe themselves.
R: Did this happen in consultation with and coordinated by the IUF?
G: In some cases yes, in others no.
R: Why was this involvement in central and eastern Europe apparently so uncoordinated?
G: Because it was assumed that action needed to be taken, that it was imperative, and that it had to be taken fast. These activities were not carried out to the exclusion of the IUF. But in the early 1990s it wasn’t possible to plan anything jointly; we were limited to informing each other mutually about what we were doing. In the course of time we then tried to coordinate activities through the Executive Committee. The IUF had appointed a regional coordinator in the Secretariat, Wolfgang Weinz, who largely succeeded in bringing the various activities together. But to begin with there was a great deal of disorder and confusion, not for reasons of political demarcation or the like but simply through the efforts of various organisations at various levels to meet the need for action.
R: Was central and eastern Europe divided up among IUF member unions?
G: Yes. Germany to Poland, the Netherlands to Hungary and Austria, naturally Hungary and to some extent Slovenia and Croatia. But this was done relatively spontaneously and in fact in keeping with the natural focal interests of neighbouring countries, although a lack of expertise in many member organisations had a negative impact. For example, a local Swedish organisation started to support the meat workers in Hungary without knowing that their efforts helped split the national organisation. In bilateral relations there was naturally always the danger that the western European unions had their pet projects and neglected others, especially because in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Central Asia, and Transcaucasia the situation very rapidly become highly complex. The development of bilateral relations was a transitional phase that lasted some four to five years.
R: Has the IUF developed criteria for establishing relations with unions in central and eastern Europe? After all, developments differed strongly from country to country, and in some countries a more or less broad spectrum of competing unions came into being.
G: There were no political criteria. Trade unions were only expected to be democratically constituted free unions. And naturally they all were, with few exceptions. The most important exception was the agro-industry union in Russia, the only Russian union that remained in the WFTU. The chairman is still chairman of the WFTU food workers’ international.
R: What activities was the IUF able to develop?
G: First of all we tried to extend TNC work to eastern Europe. In some cases we succeeded. We tried to convey a social democratic political conception. In this we were far less successful.
R: What do you mean by “social democratic political conception”? And what hindered success?
G: In our view, the new unions in eastern Europe needed to develop their own political perspectives as trade unions and that they should build relations with parties that defended their interests. If such parties didn’t exist, they should if possible create them or contribute to the founding of parties close to their views. The way we saw it, such parties could in general only be social democratic parties. Our efforts were unsuccessful.
R: And why were you unsuccessful?
G: Because to begin with the unions rejected politics. They took the view that they should keep out of politics, and in many cases they proclaimed the incompatibility of political and trade union functions. This changed in the case of Czechoslovakia, later the Czech Republic, in that the trade union movement gave its support to the newly founded Social Democratic Party of the Czech Republic. In Poland Solidarność developed in a conservative direction. In Romania the unions divided themselves among various parties, none of which could be described as representing labour interests. In Bulgaria there were parties close to the unions, but which couldn’t compete with the reformed communists and the conservatives.
R: In addition to transnational work and the communication of political orientations, has the IUF developed other activities?
G: An attempt was made to spur the educational activities of the unions in the sense of trade union development. This led to an unfortunate experiment, together with ICEM, to set up “democracy centres” in three countries Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania. We had hoped that at least our own affiliates would develop coordinated educational and organisational work. This succeeded in none of the three countries. The unions perceived these centres as a gift and cooperated as long as money kept coming; afterwards the centres collapsed. Given our experience with educational projects in Third World countries we should really have known this would happen. But it was a hasty project undertaken under the pressure of events.
R: Were there other IUF activities to support the shift to democratic organisations?
G: We staged various eastern European regional conferences so that people could get to know one another and get talking, so that they could develop common ideas and demands. I remember a conference in Prague where we at least succeeded in bringing together trade unionists from all the Yugoslav successor countries for discussions. We considered that a political achievement.
R: Did the unions address special demands to the IUF?
G: There was a sort of expectation we neither could nor would meet: to distribute money.
R: What was the attitude of trade unionists to the assistance and, above all, to the programmatic ideas and practical support they received from “Western” organisations like the IUF? Didn’t they feel it to be patronizing?
G: That’s a complicated question. Basically, it was depressing to see how much patronizing the unions actually expected and were prepared to accept. These unions found themselves in politically and economically completely destabilised societies after 40 years of totalitarianism in the East, 70 years in the USSR, which was marked by the systematic repression of every form of civil society and independent thinking, so that to begin with they often expected another message of salvation from us. They were absolutely prepared to subordinate themselves, even though under the surface and over time resentment developed. We therefore saw our task as being rather to strengthen their self-confidence and self-reliance, their trust in their own ability to develop programmes and activities. The political element I mentioned earlier was part of this. In some cases the message got across, was understood and put into practice. In other cases not at all.
R: Did the IUF create structures in the 1990s to promote change in unions and their integration in the work of the IUF?
G: No structures, only conferences. We started out with the idea that geographically Europe was a whole and that it was the task of the European regional organisation to assist and integrate the European part of the former Eastern bloc, whereas the IUF intervened only occasionally if the situation was urgent or the European regional organisation unprepared.
R: Where did the differences in the scope of action between the IUF and the ECF-IUF show?
G: In the integrative capacity of the regional organisation, which had developed more slowly; in the willingness to act, to make contact, and provide assistance, which were initially beyond the European regional organisation and still are. What it is capable of is involving eastern European unions into their normal meetings.
R: To what extent have relations with unions in central and eastern Europe normalised over the past decade?
G: Relations have normalised with those who came in at an early stage but new unions keep joining e.g., unions in Transcaucasia and Central Asia have quite recently joined.
R: Have the demands that confronted the IUF and other international trade union organisations after the events of 1989 changed relations between the IUF and other trade secretariats, the ICFTU, and the WCL?
G: No, that can’t be said. We’ve carried out a few projects with the ICEM, not only the three democracy centres mentioned. There was cooperation with the ICFTU in the sense that we attended meetings at which the situation in eastern Europe was discussed and experience and opinions exchanged. In fact, however, the ICFTU has a minimal infrastructure for eastern Europe, a person in charge and two assistants, disproportionately weak considering the importance of the task.
R: Did relations with the WCL change after 1989?
G: No. The last President of the IUF in my term of office, Willy Vijverman, was also Chairman of the Belgian Christian organisation. I think this was the first time that a trade secretariat had a Christian President coming from the WCL. At the beginning of my term of office we made an active effort to promote a merger between the ICFTU and the WCL. It failed, not spectacularly, it just died. For some years now the WCL has had a General Secretary, Willy Thys, who is in principle against union unity, both at the international level and the national level, and who seeks to maintain divisions where they exist and to provoke them where they don’t exist, so that the prospects of a merger have receded.
R: Did the events of 1989 have any other repercussions?
G: The disappearance of the World Federation of Trade Unions [WFTU] as a credible alternative, certainly induced the communist-controlled South African unions to participate more actively in the IUF. It led to some other communist-dominated unions coming to the IUF, e.g., an organisation in Costa Rica active in the banana industry. But all in all the effects were insignificant. We had hoped that the industry trade unions of the French CGT and the Portuguese CGTP [Confederaçâo Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses] would join the IUF because of reorientation or resignation. This hasn’t happened. The CGT food workers’ organisation has so far remained with the WFTU, and the Portuguese CGTP wants to join the European trade union structures but not the international organisations.
R: With the end of confrontation between the blocs, the marginalisation of the Communist movement, and the practical “demise” of the WFTU, did the IUF not lose important integrative factors that had helped tie affiliates to the IUF?
G: Not at all. The struggle against the WFTU had never been an important factor in keeping the IUF together. Anti-communism in this sense was never an important integrative factor in the IUF.
R: In Latin America, also?
G: No. In Latin America the struggle against the CIA was an important factor for integration, not against the WFTU. Anti-communism from a left-wing democratic perspective was always taken for granted, but we never had to concern ourselves much with it. What did concern us was the transnationals and the efforts of affiliates to hold their own against them. That was and remains the decisive integrative link.
14. Solidarity and Identity
R: What binds individual unions to an international trade union organisation like the IUF? Why does a relatively large proportion of unions maintain their membership in the IUF, meet their financial obligations towards it, collaborate more or less actively, and, where necessary, show a willingness to provide active support for other unions?
G: I believe the notion of solidarity shouldn’t be underestimated, it is widely accepted among IUF affiliates and regarded as a mission and duty. Over and above this, there are naturally very many organisations that expect a range of services, in the form of international protection against persecution, services in the form of information, or solidarity support. But there are also some unions, including founder organisations, that have never really expected or received any service worth mentioning from the IUF.
R: What ties these organisations to the IUF?
G: The idea of solidarity
R: An altruistic notion of solidarity?
G: Perhaps not completely altruistic, since it is believed that there is a general interest and if it is at risk anywhere in the world, even indirectly, it can have repercussions for one’s own situation. That means that the violation of trade union rights must not be tolerated anywhere in the world to prevent it from happening one day in one’s own country.
R: Do, for instance, Swedish unions really believe they could indirectly be affected by violations of trade union rights in the Philippines or Guatemala?
G: I have the impression they believe that if they tolerate violations of trade union rights without reacting this could weaken their own position. For the Swedish unions the fact plays a role that they received considerable international help in the 1905 general strike, which they lost, and they feel a duty to do something in return.
R: Almost a century later?
G: Yes.
R: That’s remarkable. Is this a position that could find any degree of consensus among unions in Europe?
G: Quite certainly among the western European unions; the eastern European unions are still focussing on the hope of receiving material help to develop or reconstruct their organisations. This is gradually being replaced by the realisation that cooperation between organisations must be based on reciprocity.
R: Do American and Japanese organisations have motives similar to those of the western European unions?
G: In North American organisations the solidarity idea is also strong. I don’t know if they depend on it, but at any rate they feel it to be useful and that it strengthens their position when they receive international support in their own industrial disputes.
R: And how do the Japanese unions see themselves?
G: The Japanese unions aren’t basically different from others. They also feel a duty to exercise solidarity, which they usually do in forms that least affect their relations with their own employers, i.e., through financial contributions or statements. In the IUF area there has never been a case of them declaring a conflict to help in a dispute in another country. But it does happen that they talk with the management of a company, for example, to help obtain recognition of trade union rights in another country.
R: And the other side, the unions that expect protection. Who are they?
G: Unions in Third World countries, whose existence may be at risk.
R: Is the IUF in a position to offer protection?
G: Yes, by mobilising its affiliates. But it also depends on how sensitive governments or transnationals are to public pressure. In some cases they are, sometimes not.
R: Does the receipt of solidarity induce member organisations to show solidarity themselves?
G: Yes. For example, the South Africans. In spite of the political difficulties that the IUF had in South Africa through the dispute with the Communist Party, etc., the South African unions are well aware that they received a high measure of solidarity from the IUF. They therefore also feel a strong duty to return solidarity. When South Africa’s biggest brewery group, South African Breweries, made massive purchases of breweries in eastern Europe, the IUF called a conference where the eastern Europeans came together with the South Africans. I believe it was with a certain satisfaction that the South Africans announced they were prepared to support the eastern Europeans in securing their trade union rights in these breweries. This was also an experience for the eastern Europeans. The Spanish unions, to mention another example, are very active in solidarity activities and always refer to the solidarity they received from the IUF in the Franco period.
R: Isn’t this solidarity, which also seems to be communicated via a sectoral identity, endangered by the many mergers?
G: The IUF is the outcome of four mergers – the first was in 1920 between bakery, meat, and brewery workers, the next with the tobacco workers (1958), then with the hotel and restaurant workers (1961), the last with the plantation and agricultural workers (1994). Each time the identity question has been raised. The present composition of the IUF covers highly divergent organisations as regards occupation, organisational culture, and many other aspects. What we have tried to do is to preserve sectoral identity within the IUF and to give expression to it through industry-specific activities. That’s why there’s a hotel and restaurant workers’ group, a tobacco workers’ group, an agricultural workers’ group, and now, only after my term of office, a food workers’ group. Cohesion between all these groups within an international organisation is not ensured by sector-specific identity.
R: By what then?
G: Really by a common organisational culture that has developed over many years around certain priorities, values, ways of doing things, how people relate to each other, etc. Basically, through a democratic discussion culture, agreement on general social and political goals, and through the concept of solidarity.
R: Is this a sort of IUF corporate identity?
G: Exactly. That’s what holds us together, much more than a sector-specific identity. But this naturally includes the possibility of commitment to sector-specific activities and goals and, where needed, of organising support.
R: Don’t mergers endanger this self-conception, this identity and tradition of the IUF?
G: Not the mergers that have taken place so far, because up to now the IUF has always taken in a smaller organisation and has been able to transfer its culture to it. If there were to be a merger between the IUF and bigger organisations, it’s questionable whether the IUF would be in a position to transfer its culture to the bigger organisation or at least to hold its own in its own domain. But for the foreseeable future the IUF doesn’t need to merge with anyone, there is no material necessity or any other sound reason why it should merge with any other organisation.
R: Isn’t there danger for the identity of the IUF from another direction, as well, because in the national context member organisations are increasingly amalgamating sector or industry based unions into multi-sector or general unions?
G: There are a few important unions of this sort in the IUF, at least three in England, two in Denmark, one in the United States. It has never been our experience that cooperation and cohesion in the IUF has been at risk because they are structured along the lines of general unions and are not sector-specific organisations. This is because the sectoral divisions in the general labour associations are also largely autonomous and develop and maintain their own relations with the trade secretariats.
15. A Sort of Summary
R: … Let’s try to sum things up. What essential changes in IUF trade union policy took place during the 40 years of your work for the organisation?
G: I would say the degree of effectiveness of the IUF as the international representative of member unions increased significantly, the socio-political orientation of the IUF gained considerably in clarity, and the internal cohesion of the IUF was strengthened.
R: Very positive and noteworthy developments.
G: Yes, without wanting to give myself sole credit.
R: Have these developments made the IUF into a sort of global player?
G: What’s a global player?
R: Someone who is in a position to put forward ideas and goals on a global scale and who has a good chance of being able to realise them.
G: Yes, then the IUF would now have to be regarded as a global player.
R: Comparable with global players like many multinational companies?
G: Yes, with relatively unequal means and limited possibilities, but within these limits, yes.
R: At the beginning of this interview we talked about what goals, expectations, and ambitions you had had at the beginning of your term of office as General Secretary. What goals were attained, what expectations fulfilled, and what ambitions were you able to realise?
G: I’d rather answer this question in the negative, in the sense of what goals were not attained: in particular, the attempt at a sustainable reorganisation and re-orientation of the international trade union movement didn’t succeed as a whole.
R: A sort of Fimmen model?
G: More or less. Even if the attempt didn’t actually fail, it didn’t really make progress. Although one should never underestimate what long-term effects something can have, what one does, and which doesn’t perhaps produce immediate or short-term results. And it must be said that, leaving aside ambitions and goals, I’ve always had the idea that you can’t achieve more than what you can do while you are there, with the means at your disposal. I have the feeling that I did just about the most I was capable of doing in this period with the means available. That naturally doesn’t mean that I was able to implement all my ideas and ambitions, but at least that I don’t need to have a bad conscience.
R: But could these ambitions have been realised at all in the framework of the IUF?
G: I believe that at that time, under the prevailing circumstances, they could not have been realised either in the IUF or elsewhere. And not even if I had been General Secretary of the ICFTU, if you look at the history of the ICFTU, or in other trade secretariats.
R: Were your ambitions too far-reaching and too unrealistic?
G: Yes, I would say so.
R: What was your most important experience as General Secretary?
G: That you can achieve more than you imagine. That you should have high ambitions and keep to them even if you can’t realise them, so that the general level of expectations in the movement is raised. That it’s right to make high demands of yourself and others. That you have to have a thick skin and that you have to expect defeats and have to understand how to cope with them.
R: For you as General Secretary of the IUF, was there an important experience that comes to mind before all others?
G: I think the Coca-Cola campaigns in Guatemala were rather important, in various ways and for various reasons. First, as I said, because much can be done that you don’t necessarily imagine possible, especially that you must have high ambitions, that you must have confidence in people, that is to say, you must have faith in people’s ability to do great deeds over and beyond their routine activities … Yes.
R: What was your most significant success?
G: To bring the organisation to where it is now.
R: What was your most bitter defeat?
G: At the end of my term of office failure to achieve consensus … on the wars in Yugoslavia.
R: What was your greatest failure?
G: I think the failure to attain general trade union policy goals, concerning ITSs, ICFTU, international trade union structures; and failure to achieve a new form of cooperation between trade secretariats.
R: What ground-breaking decision were you instrumental in making or influencing?
G: Establishing action in transnational corporations as a central priority.
R: Can you cite outstanding errors of judgement or false assessments you made as General Secretary?
G: Exaggerated optimism in relation to people both in the IUF and outside. And perhaps overestimating the ability of organisations to rise above their situation.
R: Those are misjudgements.
G: Yes.
R: And errors?
G: I shouldn’t have hired certain people, which led to a great waste of time and energy. That was a mistake. I should have given more of my time to management matters in the organisation.
R: Instead of?
G: Instead of concentrating exclusively on the making and driving policy , leaving the administration to others with insufficient supervision.
R: In retrospective, what should have been different, what could you have done differently?
G: That has to do with the previous question. It’s really the inverse of the preceding question. What I did wrong I should have done better.
R: Let’s shift the perspective. What goals would you have today if you were to be appointed General Secretary at the next IUF Congress and had the prospect of 30 years in office before you?
G: The same. Based on the progress that has been achieved, to implement them further. Otherwise, from this point of departure, the same goals.
R: Then that’s probably the answer you would give to the next question. What are the prospects for international trade union organisations and international trade union policy?
G: All international trade union organisations face three tasks: organisation, policy, and democratisation. This means international trade union policy must be democratised, it must reach deep down among the membership, including them, involving them. All organisations have to become combat organisations if they aren’t already, because we’re constantly faced by the power issue and we can expect no quarter. And the people who still don’t understand this are simply in denial of the realities and seriousness of the situation. This presupposes that you have to set general political goals or that those you already have must be made more conscious and be articulated more clearly. And you have to aim for fundamental changes in society. And to achieve this, you have to link up with other actors in civil society to create a progressive, very broad popular movement. There are already signs of this happening; Seattle, etc. …, where the unions have to take part, and if possible and if they deserve it, play a leading role.
R: Perhaps to reiterate: combat organisation means…
G: … It means the ability to sustain conflicts successfully; not to avoid them – naturally not to provoke them recklessly – but since they are unavoidable, t to enable yourself, to give yourself the means, to win.
R: A final question. What have you been doing since 1997? What are your goals, what tasks have you set yourself? What is your perspective?
G: Exactly the same, free lance.
R: That’s a short answer to several questions. Thank you for the interview.
Abbreviations in the Interview
AFL-CIO American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations
BAT British-American Tobacco [BAT]
CGIL Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro
CGT Confédération Générale du Travail
CGTP Confederaçâo Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses – Intersindical Nacional
CIA
Central Intelligence Agency
CLAT Central Latinoamericana de Trabajadores
EC European Community/-ies
ECF-IUF European Committee of Food, Catering and Allied Workers’ Unions within the IUF
EEC European Economic Community
EMF European Metalworkers’ Federation
ETUC European Trade Union Confederation
ETUCF European Trade Union Committee of Food and Allied Workers in the Community
EU European Union
FAO Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FIET Fédération International des Employés et des Techniciens
ICEF International Federation of Chemical, Energy and General Workers’ Unions
ICFTU International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
ILO International Labour Organization/International Labour Office
IMF International Metalworkers’ Federation
IOE International Organization of Employers
ITF International Transport Workers’ Federation
ITS International trade secretariat
IUF International trade secretariat
MIF Miners’ International Federation
MNC Multinational corporation/company
NGG Gewerkschaft Nahrung-Genuss-Gaststätten
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
TNC Transnational corporation/company
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organization
WFAFW World Federation of Agriculture and Food Workers
WFTU World Federation of Trade Unions
WTO World Trade Organization
Footnotes
* The Funken Group was an independent left-wing socialist group in Frankfurt am Main, primarily composed of former SAP members and members of the post-war SPD. The point of reference of the group was the publication of the eponymous journal “Funken”, which appeared in a total of 118 issues between 1949 and 1959.
* Since the end of the 1950s, the IUF had begun with intensive regional activities in Latin America, but was able to carry them out only with the personnel and material help of the international department of the AFL-CIO. Since the beginning of the 1960s at the latest, the IUF lost control over this regional work, with regard to staffing, union policy objectives, and activities, which were evidently determined more and more by the anti-Communist Central-American policy objectives of the United States. In late 1965 all activities and institutions in Latin America carried out or existing in the name of the IUF were brought to an end and closed down. About a year later, regional policy was resumed on a completely new basis. On this important chapter in IUF history, see: IUF: Memorandum on IUF Activities in Latin America, October 9, 1965; also P. Rütters: Chancen internationaler Gewerkschaftspolitik. Struktur und Einfluß der Internationalen Union der Lebens- und Genußmittelarbeiter-Gewerkschaften (1945-1985), Cologne 1989, 59-72.
* Henri Ceuppens: Centrale des Travailleurs de l’Alimentation et de l’Hôtellerie (Belgium); Hans Nätscher: Gewerkschaft Nahrung-Genuss-Gaststätten (Germany); Marius Madsen: Dansk Slagteriarbejderforbund (Denmark); John Swift: Bakery and Food Workers’ Amalgamated Union (Ireland).
* Lambert van Hattem: Industriebond NVV (Netherlands).
* Cf. IUF: The Coca Cola – Guatemala Campaign 1979-1981, Geneva, 1981